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This thesis investigates how peace negotiation processes influence peace settlement 
referendum outcomes. It addresses a re-occurring problem in peace processes of settlements 
being rejected by popular vote after strenuous political negotiations. For this purpose, it 
investigates and compares how the Annan Plan negotiations in Cyprus and the Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA) negotiations in Northern Ireland culminated with the acceptance of the latter 
and the rejection of the former. In doing so, it effectively bridges an existing gap in academic 
research and literature. Research and theory on peace negotiations and mediation has 
traditionally focused on uncovering how the process helped the political leaders sitting at the 
negotiations table reduce military tensions, improve relationships, and come to different types 
of agreements. It had not yet considered referendum results as a crucial outcome of 
contemporary peace negotiation processes. Existing research on referendums, on the other 
hand, traditionally studies voting behaviours through public opinion polls and surveys, or the 
analysis of referendum campaigns, seldom considering how they are shaped by negotiation 
processes.  
The comparative case study analysis of the Annan Plan and GFA negotiations and 
referendums presented in this thesis provides for unique comparative features and a novel 
research design. It aims, not only at understanding how the Annan Plan and GFA negotiations led 
to opposing overall referendum outcomes, but also how they shaped differences in support 
between and across the four communities. While the Annan Plan was rejected due to the low 23 
ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ'ƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞ ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨdƵƌŬŝƐŚǇƉƌŝŽƚƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇvoted for its ratification. 
The GFA was ratified with a similar difference in support between the local communities, the 
very high 96-97 per cent vote from the Nationalist community and the 51-53 per cent from the 
Unionist community. Bridging existing knowledge in peace negotiations and referendums 
literatures, this thesis compares how specific features of the negotiation process, namely, 
mediation strategies, political inclusion, civil society inclusion, and the agreement ?Ɛ design, 
ƐŚĂƉĞĚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ?ƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
strength of the campaigns, and voter information and uncertainty. Its findings are based on an 
empirically rich analysis of interviews conducted in Cyprus and Northern Ireland during the first 
half of 2014, which included key political stakeholders and civil society actors. The thesis 
demonstrates that the secretive and exclusionist nature of the Annan Plan negotiations, and the 
comparatively less secretive and more inclusive GFA negotiation process, shaped the 
referendum campaign periods leading to the opposing outcomes of the two cases. It further 
shows that support for the peace settlement was higher in the communities where the mediated 
negotiations included more political parties and where civil society was, directly or informally, 
included in the negotiations.  
The findings support existing claims that inclusive and participatory negotiation processes can 
foster support for the peace process, adding that they can deeply shape peace settlement 
referendum experiences and outcomes. It argues that referendums are unsuitable for traditional 
secretive and exclusive peace negotiation practices that fail to educate and engage the public. 
The contribution is novel in arguing that, as a tool of democratic politics, peace settlement 
referendums need to be preceded by inclusive negotiations that involve a broad spectrum of 
political stakeholders and civil society and that, therefore, when referendums are used to seal a 
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Peace treaties do not make peace; people make peace. 





















Referendums have taken place in the context of peace negotiations throughout the world 
and for a variety of purposes. Since the year 2000 alone, referendums have taken place in 
peace processes in Somaliland, the Philippines, Cyprus, Iraq, South Sudan, and more recently 
in Colombia. Peace process referendums, or peacemaking referendums, have been held to 
determine the status of a territory, such as the independence, secessionist, or self-
determination, referendums in East-Timor in 1999 or South Sudan in 2011. Others have been 
held to consult the people on specific aspects of the negotiation process, such as the 
apartheid referendum in South Africa in 1992, and are referred to as either procedural, or 
mandate referendums (Loizides 2014). Others, yet, have been used to ratify negotiated 
peace settlements, such as was the case in Northern Ireland in 1998, in Guatemala in 1999, 
in Mindanao (Philippines) in 2001, in Cyprus in 2004, in Iraq in 2005, and more recently in 
Colombia in 2016. 
Peace settlement referendums, in particular, take place at a crucial juncture in a peace 
process. The Good Friday Agreement (GFA)1 referendum put to vote a peace settlement 
painstakingly negotiated between a majority of the political parties in Northern Ireland. The 
victory of ƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞŝŶDĂǇ ? ? ? ?ďĞĐĂŵĞĂƐǇŵďŽůŝĐƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
of the conflict that had lingered for decades between the Nationalist and Unionist 
communities. The 2004 Annan Plan referendum in Cyprus, on the other hand, represented a 
major setback in the decades-long peace negotiations between the leaders of the Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. The settlement aimed at allowing for the island to 
become a European Union (EU) member as a united country, but failed to receive the 
support of the Greek Cypriot community. Ten years onward, the island remains divided and 
negotiations on a new peace settlement are still ongoing. These two cases, compared in this 
study, show that referendum experiences can have opposing results that both have 
significant consequences for a peace process. Despite this, we still know little about how 
peace agreements, typically negotiated by political leaders, can be supported by the people 
in referendums.  
                                                          
1
 The Northern Ireland peace settlement is also referred to as Belfast Agreement. For simplicity, it is referred ƚŽĂƐ ‘'ŽŽĚ
&ƌŝĚĂǇŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?Žƌ ‘'& ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? 
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This thesis sets out to uncover how peace settlement referendums are shaped by the 
negotiation processes where, precisely, these settlements are produced and the decision to 
use a referendum to ratify them is taken. Its underlying aim is to uncover how peace 
negotiations can favour broad support for peace settlements and potentially avoid a failed 
referendum that hinders the peace process. Peace referendums can, in fact, serve peace 
negotiations in several ways. For example, by consulting popular opinion on the issues under 
negotiation, a referendum can provide greater legitimacy to the process. Peace settlement 
referendums in particular, can help ripen negotiations by functioning as a deadline and draw 
public2 support for the implementation of an agreement (Loizides 2014; 2015; Haskell 2001). 
Furthermore, the referendum experience has the potential to reduce democratic deficits 
and encourage civic engagement in political life (Haskell 2001). However, referendums can 
also have a negative impact on peace processes. Divisive referendum campaign periods can 
further polarize already divided societies, exacerbate conflicts and even lead to an escalation 
of violence in conflict settings (Reilly 2003; Lee and Mac Ginty 2012). The South African 
experience in 1992 and the East Timorese in 1999 are two examples of referendums that 
were followed by violence upsurges.  
Although referendums are increasingly used in peace processes, peace negotiation 
literature has only begun to study how peace referendums aid or hinder peace processes. 
With a few exceptions (Lordos 2009; Kaymak 2012; Lee and Mac Ginty 2012; Loizides 2014; 
Qvortrup 2014), little has yet been done within peace negotiation research and literature to 
understand how referendums can best serve these processes. Peace settlement 
referendums, in particular, can become a significant failure if the agreement reached by the 
representatives of the communities in conflict fails to gain acceptance by the communities 
they represent. However, traditionally, the success and failure of peace negotiations has 
been measured in terms of the outcomes produced by the bargaining process, which 
typically takes place between political elites and excludes the people.  
This thesis begins by identifying this gap in academic research and literature between 
existing knowledge on peace negotiations and that on referendums. While existing academic 
literature on peace negotiations has not yet studied referendums as negotiation/mediation 
outcome, existing studies on referendums have not yet analysed how they are shaped by 
                                                          
2
 dŚĞ ‘puďůŝĐ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐǁŚŽdo not participate directly in the negotiation process, 
although its process and outcomes concern them. 
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negotiations. Research and literature on peace negotiation and mediation originally only 
considered whether any other form of agreement (from a mere cease-fire to a full 
settlement)  was reached as an indicator of success or failure in these processes (Bercovitch 
and Langley 1993; Bercovitch and Derouen 2004). This notion, however, has been challenged 
in two ways. First, especially in intractable conflicts, the ability of a negotiation process to 
manage a conflict by keeping conflict disputants at the negotiations table and away from 
battlefield, came to be recognized as a successful outcome (Andersen et al. 2001; Greig 
2001). Secondly, in several peace processes around the world, settlements reached through 
mediated negotiations were never successfully implemented.  
As peace agreements began to fall apart in Angola, Sri Lanka, and other peace processes, 
a concern for understanding what makes an agreement durable grew among researchers. By 
asking what makes for the successful peace settlement implementation, significant 
developments took place in research and theory around peace negotiations. Mediation 
literature, in particular, began to study how mediators could draft agreements that were 
both supported by political leaders and would provide for successful implementation and 
post-conflict stability (Haass 1991; Stedman 1991). Significant studies were conducted on 
the impact that certain provisions of peace agreements had on the success and failure of 
their implementation (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; 
Pearson et al. 2006). This literature eventually became linked to the literature on 
consociationalism, which researches the long-term impact of the implementation of power-
sharing forms of government in divided societies (for example, Lijphart 1977; Gates and 
^ƚƌƆŵ ? ? ? ? ?^ŝƐŬ ? ? ? ? ?:ĂƌƐƚĂĚĂŶĚEŝůƐƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?DĐ'ĂƌƌǇĂŶĚK ?>ĞĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ).  
The enquiry into what makes a durable agreement gave depth to the field, which became 
more concerned with the impact of peace negotiations on the larger societal context in 
which it takes place. The most recent advances in the literature have been born out of the 
debate on peacemaking and peacebuilding practices. Long-term peace, peacebuilding 
scholars argued, is achieved by empowering and mobilizing local people to build new and 
constructive relationships. Thus, they criticised traditional peace negotiation practices for 
being elitist and producing agreements that failed to effectively address the needs of the 
local communities (Burton 1987; Lederach 1997; Kaldor 2000). In fact, recent research in the 
field has found that different forms of civil society and public participation in peace 
negotiations can aid and ripen negotiations as well as the development of durable 
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agreements (Irwin 2001; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008; Paffenholz and Spurk 2006; Kaymak, 
Lordos, and Tocci 2008; Aljets, Chacko, and Jessop 2008; Nilsson 2012).  
What research and literature on peace negotiations has not yet considered is that, in 
cases where referendums were required for ratification, peace agreements have been 
rejected by the people. The Annan Plan and, most recently, the referendum on the peace 
agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) are only two examples. Increasingly, peace negotiations can only be fully 
successful if the agreement negotiated between political elites is to be supported by the 
communities they represent. Therefore, whether or not an agreement is accepted in a 
referendum is a crucial negotiation outcome that has mostly been neglected by the field.  
While studies on what shapes results in peacemaking referendums are still scarce, the 
literature on referendums is considerably wide. A significant volume of research has been 
done on European integration referendums. These studies tell us that referendum results 
ĂƌĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚǀŽƚĞƌƐĨŽůůŽǁĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌ ?ƐŽƌƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ
on the issues at stake in the referendum, or by the way they frame those issues in their 
referendum campaigns (Pierce, Valen, Henry, and Listhaug 1983; Hobolt 2006; Baun et al. 
2006; Lubbers 2008). They also tell us that the organization and strength of the referendum 
campaigns, hence how able and/or effective they are at reaching and influencing the 
electorate, can also have a significant effect on referendum results  (Strauss 1993; Schneider 
and Weitsman 1996; Gilland 2002). Additionally, they alert us to the fact that the degree of 
public information and education regarding the issues at stake in the referendum play an 
important role in shaping voting behaviours. Researchers have found that voter education 
ĐĂŶ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞǇ ĨŽůůŽǁ Ă ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ Žƌ ƚŚĞ ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ Ă
campaign can have on their decision-making (Leduc 2002; Hobolt 2007).  
Some of these aspects have, indeed, been studied through public opinion polls on the 
Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement Referendums (Webster and Lordos 2006; Lordos 
2008; Hayes and McAllister 2001; Somerville and Kirby 2012). However, these are typically 
quantitative studies that tell us little about how negotiation processes might shape 
referendum results. Research and literature on the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement 
negotiations, on the other hand, is typically concerned about how and why political leaders 
reached a negotiated peace agreement or not, and seldom considers the impact of the 
referendum experience itself - the works of Michael (2007) and Kaymac (2012) are a few 
5 
 
exceptions to this. A link between one type of explanation and the other is missing. An 
answer to the question of how peace negotiations can usher positive referendum results and 
how peace process referendums can aid conflict resolution or transformation lies in the gap 
between the two. 
This thesis provides for a novel research design that focuses precisely on analysing the 
negotiation processes to explain referendum outcomes. It aims, specifically, to build a more 
substantial understanding of how the way peace negotiations are conducted shapes 
referendum experiences and outcomes. It proposes the following research question: Do 
peace negotiations influence support for peace settlements in referendums and, if so, how? 
The Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations are selected for comparison 
primarily because the Annan Plan was rejected by the majority of Cypriot voters in its 
referendum in 2004, while the GFA was accepted by the majority of Northern Irish voters in 
1998. This allows for two separate in-depth analyses of a negotiation process that 
culminated with the peace settlement being accepted in a referendum and one that did not. 
Comparing these cases, this thesis provides for a richness and reliability in its findings that 
could not be achieved simply by studying the two cases individually.  
The two cases are also interesting to compare when the percentages of support given by 
the main local communities are considered. To be implemented, the Annan Plan required 
ƚŚĂƚĂŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨďŽƚŚƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚĂŶĚdƵƌŬŝƐŚǇƉƌŝŽƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐǀŽƚĞĚ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ? tŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ŽŶůǇ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ Ă  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞ Ĩrom 24 per cent of Greek 
Cypriots and, therefore, was rejected, it did receive a 65 per cent support in the Turkish 
Cypriot community (United Nations 2004, para. 72). Although the GFA received the support 
of a majority of both the Nationalist and Unionist communities in Northern Ireland, it is 
estimated that 96-97 per cent was given by the Nationalist community and 51-53 per cent 
from the Unionist community (Melaugh and McKenna 1998). Because it is important that 
peace settlements are supported by each of the communities involved, this thesis 
investigates not only how the Annan Plan and the Good Friday Agreement negotiations led 
to overall opposing referendum outcomes, but also how they shaped the differences in 
support between the communities. This, in turn, refers not only to how it shaped the 
differences in support given by the two communities in each of the cases, which are 




The Conflicts in Cyprus and Northern Ireland 
 
 In order for the analyses of the Annan Plan and GFA negotiations and referendums done 
in later chapters of this thesis to be better understood, some historical background of the 
two cases will be provided here. An historical overview of the conflicts and the evolution of 
the two peace processes, up to the point when the Annan Plan and GFA referendums take 
place, is given for several reasons. Overall, it is necessary to understand why the 
negotiations in each of the cases took place in the format that they did, as well as the 
motivations, interests and positions of the political leaders, or political parties, that came to 
participate in them. It is also important to understand the origins of the fears and the 
grievances between the Cypriot and Northern Irish communities and how they played out 
during the referendum campaign periods. The conflicts in Cyprus and Northern Ireland have 
distinct conflict histories, but they also share striking similarities. To highlight these 
similarities, the two histories will be intercalated throughout. 
One of the similarities between the historical circumstances behind the two conflicts is 
that they have a history of British colonialism in common and in both cases the conflict 
erupted during the decolonization process. In the eighty-three years of British 
administration, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities remained culturally 
distinct, each speaking its own language, each with its own educational system, each 
practicing different religions, and each having inherited the historic mistrust and hostility of 
Greco-Turkish relations (Tocci 2004, 43). As the British were signalling their departure in 
1950, a national movement led by Orthodox Archbishop Makarios gained the support of a 
growing communist movement in their struggle for enosis, meaning unification with 
 ‘ŵŽƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚ ? Greece (Anderson 2008, 2). Fearing Greek Cypriot domination, Turkish Cypriots 
reacted to the growing enosis campaign with anti-union demonstrations that evolved to 
pursuing taksim, the Turkish word for division, or partition. Taksim was an expression of 
their desire for the island to be divided between Greece and Turkey (Yilmaz and Ercan 2005, 
30).  
With the impending threat of the communal struggles evolving into a regional war, by 
1959 the United Kingdom (UK) invited Greece and Turkey to negotiations in Zurich and 
London on the foundation of an independent Cyprus. In the Zurich-London agreements, a 
power-sharing political regime was designed to safeguard the rights and autonomy of the 
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two ethnic groups, providing for the protection of minority rights to Turkish Cypriots and 
avoid supremacy of the larger Greek Cypriot community. The United Kingdom, Greece, and 
Turkey were to become guarantors of the independence, territorial integrity, and security of 
the new state.  
The Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960. Yet, its power-sharing, constitutional 
arrangement collapsed merely three years later. Friction between the Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot leaderships over the interpretation of the constitutional provisions gave rise 
to a period of constant constitutional crisis, government paralysis, and increasing communal 
tensions (Anderson 2008, 8). Communal clashes and the impending threat of Turkish military 
involvement pushed the United Nations (UN) to intervene. The UN Peacekeeping Force in 
Cyprus (UNFICYP) was deployed to the island in 1964, with the Secretary General responsible 
for the peacemaking mission, aiming to bring about a negotiated solution to the conflict.  
An uneasy peace prevailed under the presence of the UNFICYP until the civil government 
of Papandreou was overthrown by a military junta in Greece. A split between Athens and the 
Greek Cypriot leadership began to emerge as the, by then, Greek Cypriot President Makarios 
became wary of unifying Cyprus with the dictatorship (Solsten 1993). In July 1974, the Greek 
ũƵŶƚĂƵŶĚĞƌƚŽŽŬĂĐŽƵƉĚ ?ĠƚĂƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚDĂŬĂƌŝŽƐĂŶĚƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚŚŝŵǁŝƚŚEŝŬŽƐ^ĂŵƉƐŽŶ ?ĂŶ
enosis advocate. Perceived as a growing threat to Turkish Cypriot aspirations, the Greek 
coup eventually prompted Turkey to military action. An all-out war began in Cyprus involving 
Greek, Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot and Turkish forces. To separate the opposing forces, 
UNFICYP established ceasefire lines and a buffer zone across the island. Significant migration 
took place as Greek Cypriots fled their homes in the north to escape Turkish troops and 
Turkish Cypriot combatants, while Turkish Cypriots in the south ran to the north for 
protection (Anderson 2008, 13). The Green Line, as it came to be known, has shaped the 
everyday life on the island since. The territory north of the buffer zone came under total 
control and occupation of the Turkish army and under Turkish Cypriot administration. In 
1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was unilaterally proclaimed, although 
it is not internationally recognized by any state, except for Turkey. South of the Green Line, 
the Republic of Cyprus continued to be administrated by Greek Cypriots. 
The origins of the conflict in Northern Ireland are similarly associated with British 
colonization. When Ireland became a Free State in 1922, the northern Ulster provinces 
remained part of the United Kingdom, from then, of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
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While many Irish rejected the partition, the Irish government ?Ɛ focus at the time was on 
building up the new Irish State. It, therefore, distanced itself from the potentially 
destabilizing effect that being politically involved with Catholic Irish nationalism in the North 
could have on the Republic (Ruane and Todd 1996, 251). The borders of the new state of 
Northern Ireland were drawn to encompass the Protestant majority, who wished to remain 
part of the United Kingdom. This majority, however, remained fearful of Irish nationalist 
aspirations, which they saw as a threat to their religious and British cultural traditions, as 
well as to their union with Great Britain (Hennessey 1997, 3). The Catholic minority in 
Northern Ireland, on the other hand, felt cut off from their Irish identity and trapped in a 
Unionist-dominated political establishment which excluded them from power (McKittrick 
and McVea 2002, 5-6).  
Over the years, discriminated access to employment, housing, as well as to other 
resources and opportunities, led to an increasing unrest within the Catholic community in 
the North. Lack of access to the political establishment gave way to the exploration of new 
forms of political participation through protest. Street parades were  W and are to this day - 
traditionally used by both communities to display and mark their distinct ideologies and 
cultural identities. However, these would often spiral into rising cycles of violence (Jarman 
1997, 56). In 1968, a civil rights march in Derry broke down in violence and rioting after 
confrontations between Catholic protesters and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)  W the 
mainly Protestant Northern Ireland police force (Lee 1990, 420-421). What followed was a 
succession of marches and counter-marches, sectarian rioting, and the bombing of public 
buildings by both Unionist and Nationalist paramilitary groups (Gidron et al. 2002, 51).  
/Ŷ ƵŐƵƐƚ ŽĨ  ? ? ? ? ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚƌŽƵďůĞƐ ? spreading from Derry to Belfast and across 
Northern Ireland, British troops were deployed to contain the escalating violence. The 
government in the Republic of Ireland, on the other hand, was reluctant to get involved 
since within Sinn Féin, its largest political party, members disagreed on whether Irish unity 
should be pursued. The divisions within Sinn Féin, however, translated into a split in the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), which was founded during the fight for Irish independence from 
Britain. Dissident members formed the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and declared war against 
British occupation in the north (Bew 2007, 450). In parallel, in the Unionist camp, the loyalist 
paramilitaries (because of their professed loyalty to the British Crown) had returned to 
activity during the sixties in order to defend the Protestant community (Fitzduff 2002, 8-9). 
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Groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association/Ulster 
Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF) were the most significant among these.  
The activity of the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries characterizes the conflict that 
unfolded, with both being responsible for 90 per cent of the deaths, bombings, shootings, 
kidnappings, intimidation, and terror in Northern Ireland (Fitzduff 2002, 8-9). The barricades 
put up by the paramilitaries eveŶƚƵĂůůǇ ďĞĐĂŵĞ ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ ďƌŝĐŬ  ‘ƉĞĂĐĞůŝŶĞƐ ? that drew a 
territorial and physical separation between the two communities (McKittrick and McVea 
2002, 55-56). By March 1972, the parliament collapsed and direct rule from Westminster 
was established after the largest Nationalist political party at the time, the Social Democratic 
and Labour Party (SDLP), abandoned the parliament. Unable to militarily defeat the PIRA, 
combined with the loss of democratic legitimacy of the political institutions, Britain came to 
the realization that a solution to the conflict would have to allow for a deeper 
transformation of the political establishment in Northern Ireland (McGrattan 2010, 59-60). 
The origins of the two conflicts, therefore, were shaped by the British decolonization 
process and also in both armed conflict ignited between two communities divided along 
ethnic lines. These communities have antithetical, zero-sum nationalistic aspirations, and all 
share the desire to unite, or stay uŶŝƚĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ŵŽƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐ ?Žƌ ‘kin states ? ? 
 
The Peace Processes 
 
The Cypriot and Northern Irish peace processes also evidence similarities. For example, 
the enlargement of the European Community (EC), later the European Union (EU), served in 
both cases to ripen the moment for the peace negotiations that eventually produced the 
two peace settlements. On the other hand, while the United Nations (UN) has played a 
significant role in the peace process in Cyprus, this was not the case in Northern Ireland, 
where the British and Irish governments, along with the United States (US), played the more 
significant roles. More importantly, the way the two peace processes unfolded shaped the 
way the Annan Plan and GFA negotiation processes were conducted, such as who its 
participants were, the main conflicting issues between them, who mediated them, and other 
characteristics that will be analysed in this thesis. 
The hŶŝƚĞĚ EĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ 'ŽŽĚ KĨĨŝĐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ
General have been able to repeatedly bring the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political 
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leaderships to the negotiations table for the past 50 years. After the demise of the Plaza 
mediation in 19643, intercommunal talks intermittently took place between 1968 and 1983, 
mainly in secret. The self-proclamation of the TRNC and the inability of the Cypriot leaders to 
negotiate concrete commitments lead the Good Offices mission to begin proposing concrete 
solutions for negotiation from 1983 onwards. During this period, the Framework Documents 
and, thereafter, Boutros-'ŚĂůŝ ?Ɛ^ĞƚŽĨ/ĚĞĂƐǁĞƌĞƵŶƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚ ?
The period that preceded - what would later become known as - the Annan Plan 
negotiations was one of rising tensions and military build-up on the island. The Greek Cypriot 
leadership grew impatient towards the Turkish Cypriot leader ZĂƵĨĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?Ɛ resistance to 
compromise, at the same time as the opportunity to pursue integration with the European 
Union emerged (Richmond 1998, 206 W7). In 1992, Greek Cypriot President George Vassiliou 
ƐƵďŵŝƚƚĞĚ ǇƉƌƵƐ ? ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ h ? dŚĞ ŵŽǀĞ ǁĂƐƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇ ƉƌŽƚĞƐƚĞĚďǇ ƚŚĞ dƵƌŬŝƐŚ
Cypriot leader and Turkey, who claimed that the Greek Cypriot government had no right to 
act on behalf of the entire island. Thereafter, the Turkish Cypriot leadership pledged to only 
participate in accession negotiations when Cyprus became a federal State, and to only 
accept EU membership if it was also granted to Turkey (Kyle 1997, 31). From this point, 
dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ďĞĐĂŵĞ ĞŶƚĂŶŐůĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ the Cyprus problem. EU membership, 
indeed, became a pivotal issue in the Annan Plan negotiations when US Special Envoy 
Richard Holbrooke - who had mediated the Dayton Agreements that brought an end to the 
war in the European Balkans in 1995 - advocated for a negotiated solution to be made a 
precondition to Cypriot EU accession4 (Michael 2011, 148 W49). ,ŽůďƌŽŽŬĞ ?Ɛ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ
strategy would set the groundwork for the Annan Plan process that unfolded thereafter.  
When Kofi Annan took over as UN Secretary General in 1997, he nominated Álvaro de 
Soto as his Special Representative to Cyprus. At the start of the negotiations, they were able 
to bring the Greek Cypriot leader Glafkos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash 
to commit to reaching an agreement and placing it to a referendum in both communities 
before the Treaty of Accession to the EU was to be signed in April 2003 (United Nations 
2003, para. 43). However, Rauf Denktash refused to commit when the deadline was reached. 
                                                          
3
 For more on the Galo Plaza mediation and an analysis of its consequences for the Cyprus peace process, see Amaral 
(2013). 
4
 After the end of the Cold War, Cyprus remained of strategic interest to the US. The Cyprus conflict weakened not only 
NATO, but also limited EU expansion. Turkey was also perceived as a crucial agent of American interests in the unstable 
Middle East and a vital ally geographically proximate to Iran, Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, the British military bases in 
Cyprus were of strategic importance for the US on the verge of the Gulf crisis (Savvides 1998, 49 W50). 
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Consequently, when the European Commission accepted that Cyprus, along 10 other 
countries, would become EU states, a solution to the Cyprus conflict was no longer a pre-
condition for accession. As this was occurring, major political changes were underway on 
both sides. Clerides lost his re-election to the Presidency of the Republic to Tassos 
Papadopoulos, the leader of the right-wing and traditionally nationalistic Democratic Party 
(DIKO). In the parliamentary elections in Northern Cyprus, pro-solution Mehmet Ali Talat 
was elected Prime Minister. With support from Erdogan, who had pledged to strive for 
dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉƚŽƚŚĞhduring his election campaign, Denktash was eventually side-
lined, allowing Talat to effectively lead the last phase of the Annan Plan negotiations.  
In February of 2004 in New York, the new negotiation teams would agree to finalizing the 
Plan and hold simultaneous referendums in April, ũƵƐƚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĚĂƚĞŽĨǇƉƌƵƐ ?ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ
to the EU. To guaranty that an agreement would be reached, the two delegations agreed 
thĂƚƚŚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ'ĞŶĞƌĂůǁŽƵůĚ  ‘Ĩŝůů ŝŶƚŚĞŐĂƉƐ ? in the final agreement concerning issues 
the parties could not agree on. However, at the last round of negotiations in Bürgenstock, 
Switzerland, in March 2004, Papadopoulos refused to hold face-to-ĨĂĐĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐǁŝƚŚdĂůĂƚ ?Ɛ
delegation (United Nations 2004).  
After Bürgenstock, the political leaderships on both sides began to form and publicly 
display their positions regarding the Plan, which would be placed for referendum a month 
later. On the Turkish side, while Denktash was against the Plan, Prime Minister Mehmet Ali 
Talat and Turkey strongly ĚŝƐƉůĂǇĞĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ Ă  ‘yeƐ ? vote. Papadopoulos, on the 
other hand, called upon the Greek Cypriot ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƌĞƐŽƵŶĚŝŶŐůǇ ǀŽƚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? to the 
ŶŶĂŶ WůĂŶ ? ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŐŶŽƌĞd Greek Cypriots ?. He 
further stated that he believed the Annan Plan would undermine the Republic of Cyprus 
precisely at the time its political weight would be internationally strengthened with EU 
accession (PIO 2004a). 
/ŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞh<ĂŶĚ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞh ?ƚŚĞŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ )ŝŶ
1972, impelled the two countries to work together on a solution to the Northern Ireland 
conflict (Byrne, 2000, 3, 17). In March 1973, the British proposed  W just as in Cyprus - the 
establishment of a power-sharing arrangement to substitute the majority rule of the 
Northern Irish parliament in Stormont. The resulting Sunningdale Agreement created a new 
power-sharing government, which took office in January 1974 and institutionalized 
cooperation with the Republic of Ireland through the Council of Ireland (McEvoy 2008, 74-
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76). Protestant fears that the Council symbolized a first step towards Irish unity, and the 
resulting lack of support from an increasingly divided Unionist community, led the 
Sunningdale government to collapse just a few months later (Barton 2009, 16-17). The 
British government continued its attempts to find a power sharing solution between the 
communities throughout the seventies. British military presence in Northern Ireland was 
reduced, while local security forces and security measures were reinforced (Ruane and Todd 
1996, 134).  
In the early eighties, the use of torture and interrogation techniques led to a hunger strike 
among republican prisoners. British Prime Minister Margaret dŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐŝŶĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ
the prisoners ? request for treatment as war-prisoners, rather than ordinary criminals, as well 
as the death of ten hunger strikers favoured a growing international sympathy for the 
republican cause and support for Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland (Ruane and Todd 1996, 134; 
McKittrick and McVea 2002, 137). Demands within Great Britain for security after the IRA 
London bombings of 1981-82 pushed Thatcher to search for a solution through cooperation 
with the Irish (McGrattan 2010, 117-118). In the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, the British 
government granted Ireland a consultative role in Northern Ireland affairs. The agreement 
was welcomed by the Nationalist SDLP, but Sinn Féin regarded it as a British attempt to 
undermine Irish unity. It was also met with contempt by Unionists, especially the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP), led by Reverend Ian Paisley, who declared the agreement was a victory 
for terrorism and a betrayal by London  ?K ?>ĞĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?-67). 
dŚĞ W/Z ?Ɛ ďŽŵďŝŶŐ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ĨĂĐĞĚ ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ƵŶƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƚǇ ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ
Nationalist community. With the goal of encouraging Sinn Fein to pursue its goals politically 
and bring the PIRA to a cease-fire, SDLP leader John Hume initiated talks with Sinn Féin 
leader Gerry Adams (Barton 2009, 29 W31). The Hume-Adams dialogue and the Downing 
Street Declaration of 1993 were instrumental in getting the paramilitaries from both 
communities to agree to a cease-fire. In December 1993, British Prime Minister John Major 
and Taoiseach Albert Reynolds declared their respect for Irish unity, if that was to be the 
wish of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. To offer the Unionists reassurance, 
the government of Ireland committed itself to changing its constitutional pledge over 
Northern Ireland in the event of an agreement. The PIRA announced its cease-fire in August 
of 1994, which was quickly followed by the loyalist paramilitaries  ?K ?>ĞĂƌǇ  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? W29; 
K ?ŽǁĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). In an attempt to take advantage of the momentum this set for the start 
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of peace negotiations, the British and the Irish government put forward the Joint Framework 
Documents, which defined the lines upon which a political settlement could be agreed 
during the All-Party negotiations (Tonge 2002, 115). The proposal, however, received mixed 
reactions. While the Unionist parties perceived it to undermine British sovereignty, the 
Nationalist parties especially welcomed its North-South bodies (Barton 2009, 32-33). 
Nonetheless, after the cease-fires of 1994 the expectation was that All-Party peace talks 
would unfoůĚ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƐƚĂůůĞĚďǇƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞŵĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞW/Z
decommission arms ďĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ W/Z ?Ɛ ƌĞĨƵƐĂů ƚŽ ĚŽ ƐŽ 
(Tonge 2002, 168-169).  
The involvement of the United States had a major impact in breaking the stalemate. The 
Irish community in the United States grew increasingly unsatisfied with the Republic of 
/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐŵŽĚĞƌĂƚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ /ƌĞůĂŶĚĂŶĚ ůŽďďŝĞĚƚŽŐĞƚƚŚĞh^ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
peace-process  ?K ?ŽǁĚ ? ? ? ? ?ŽĐŚƌĂŶĞ ?ĂƐĞƌ ?ĂŶĚ^ǁĂŝŶ ? ? ? ? ). In 1992, the newly elected 
President Bill Clinton took an entirely different approach to dealing with Sinn Féin than that 
taken by the British, with their policy of isolating the party and not talking to  ‘ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?. A 
visa was provided to Gerry Adams for a visit to the US as part of a strategy that intended to 
persuade the republicans to adhere to the political route as an alternative to pursuing their 
aims through violence, fully backed by a responsive and powerful external actor (McKittrick 
and McVea 2002, 197).  
In an attempt to resolve the decommissioning issue, an International Body on Arms 
Decommissioning was set up with US Senator George Mitchell, who had been nominated by 
Clinton as Special Envoy to Northern Ireland, as chairman (Fitzduff 2002, 128). The report of 
the Mitchell Commission, as it became known, set the ground rules for what would come to 
be the Good Friday Agreement negotiations. It recommended that a simultaneous and 
parallel decommissioning of the republican and loyalist paramilitaries take place alongside 
the peace negotiations (art. 34). Importantly, the report also recommended for the 
negotiations to take place in an elected body (art. 56). However, when Unionists and the 
British government insisted that elections be held to determine which political parties would 
participate in the negotiations, republicans regarded it as a show of intransigence and a 
stalling tactic. The disagreement eventually led the PIRA to break the cease-fire in February 
1996 with the bombing of Canary Wharf, London (McGrattan 2010, 147, 148).  
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Despite this setback, elections to the Peace Forum were held in May of 1996. 10 political 
parties earned seats at the Peace Forum and the mandate to negotiate a peace agreement 
in the All-Party talks. Representatives of the British and Irish governments were also present 
for consultation in the talks, chaired by George Mitchell. Since the loyalist paramilitaries had 
maintained their cease-fire, the political parties associated with them, the Progressive 
Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), were allowed in the 
negotiations, while Sinn Féin was excluded for having broken the cease-fire (Fitzduff 2002 
128-129). The party was allowed to join the talks when the cease-fire was re-instated in 
 ? ? ? ? ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? /ĂŶ WĂŝƐůĞǇ ?Ɛ ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ hŶŝŽŶŝƐƚ WĂƌƚǇ  ?hW ) ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ <ŝŶŐĚŽŵ
Unionist Party (UKUP) refused to continue the negotiaƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ^ŝŶŶ &ĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ
abandoned the talks. 
No substantial commitments were made, however, until George Mitchell persuaded 
participants to agree on a deadline in March 1998. Yet, the British and Irish governments 
struggled to reach an agreement on the North-South cooperation institutions. When an 
agreement was reached between them and a draft document was presented to the parties 
in Northern Ireland, Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) leader David Trimble rejected it (Mitchell 
1999). This crisis precipitated British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Irish Prime Minister 
Bertie Ahern to join the negotiating parties at Stormont, for what would be the intense final 
two days of negotiations. The Belfast Agreement was finally struck on the 10th of April, the 
day of the Christian commemoration of Good Friday and the reason for which it came to be 
known as the Good Friday Agreement. 
 
 
The Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement Referendums 
 
In comparing how the characteristics of the negotiations shaped the referendums in the 
two cases, this thesis provides an in-depth analysis of the two referendums. The separate 
and simultaneous referendums on the ratification of the Annan Plan  W in the north and south 
of the divided island - were held roughly a month after Bürgenstock, on the 24th of April 
 ? ? ? ? ?  ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? vote was required from both communities for the 
agreement to come into force in what was the first referendum experience in Cyprus. As was 
already described, although the Annan Plan was rejected overall by 66 per cent of the 
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people across Cyprus, the majority of the voters in the Turkish Cypriot community supported 
it (United Nations 2004, para. 72). Despite the fact that the EU conferred membership to the 
whole island, and therefore did not a priori exclude the Turkish Cypriot side from being part 
of the Union, it continues to recognize only the Republic of Cyprus as legitimate, leaving only 
the Greek Cypriot south to enjoy full EU membership. Kofi Annan described the referendums 
ĂƐ ‘...a watershed in the history of United NatioŶƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ŝŶǇƉƌƵƐ ? ? (United Nations 2004, 
para. 2), which proved to be a major setback for prospects of conflict resolution in Cyprus in 
the decade that followed (Michael 2007).  
As with the Annan Plan, two referendums were to be held simultaneously for the GFA to 
be ratified. In this case, a related referendum was required to amend the Republic of 
/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?Ɛconstitutional claim to Northern Ireland, which was part of the terms of the Good 
Friday Agreement. As a result, the GFA referendum in Northern Ireland and the 
constitutional referendum in the Republic of Ireland took place simultaneously. Unlike in 
Cyprus, the majority of the people in Northern Ireland voted in favour of implementing the 
Good Friday Agreement on the 22nd of May 1998, with the already mentioned differences in 
support between the Unionist and Nationalist communities. The constitutional change in 
Ireland was also, overwhelmingly, accepted. After the referendum, the decommissioning 
issue remained problematic. While Trimble insisted that all arms be decommissioned before 
the new government institutions came to power, the PIRA refused to do so. Despite this, the 
power-sharing government was established but worked frailly for less than three years until 
it was suspended in October 2002. The Assembly would resume their functions only after 
the St. Andrews Agreement was signed in 2006.  
In reviewing existing explanations for the referendum outcomes in both cases, this thesis 
shows that authors seldom refer to the same aspects of the negotiation process to explain 
ƚŚĞ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ  ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? Žƌ ƚŚĞ EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ /ƌŝƐŚ  ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?. In Northern Ireland, the fact that the 
negotiations were inclusive, taking place between the several political parties, is considered 
to have facilitated agreement by strengthening the more moderate positions and political 
parties. Plus, it allowed for the final agreement to accommodate the differing interests of 
both moderate parties and the more extreme republican or loyalist views (McGarry and 
K ?>ĞĂƌǇ  ? ? ? ?Ă; Horowitz 2002). The resulting power-sharing institutions designed in the 
agreement have been argued as crucial for the arrival at a political commitment (Horowitz 
2001 ?DĐ'ĂƌƌǇĂŶĚK ?>ĞĂƌǇ  ? ? ? ?ď) ?'ĞŽƌŐĞDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐŵĞĚŝĂƚŝon style based on facilitating 
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communication and developing procedural artifices has been seen as crucial in helping the 
parties move slowly towards agreement (Curran and Sebenius 2003; Curran, Sebenius, and 
Watkins 2004). Furthermore, civil society is seen to have played a significant role in the 
process, leading reconciliation activities between the communities as well as exerting 
pressure on political leaderships to bring the negotiations to a successful end (Cochrane 
2000; 2001; 2006 ?ĞůůĂŶĚK ?ZŽƵƌŬĞ ? ? ? ? ). 
In the case of Cyprus, some of these same aspects have been argued to have led to the 
failure of the Annan Plan. For example, the UN ?ƐŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ have been found to 
have played a crucial role in the Annan Plan ?Ɛ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ? The fact that the UN Secretary 
General was allowed to use his discretion to decide on the issues left unresolved at 
Bürgenstock, is considered to have allowed the political leaders to appear unaccountable for 
the final plan and to campaign against it (Kaymak 2012, 106). It has further been argued that 
the UN over-pressured the respective leaderships by using the EU accession date as a 
deadline (Drath 2004, 349). Importantly, authors indicate that because the Annan Plan was 
negotiated secretively between political elites, the mediators failed to consider, involve, and 
gain support from other quadrants of society (Drath 2004; Michael 2007; Lordos 2009). 
However, although these constraints and strategies applied to both communities, authors 
tend to use them only to explain Greek Cypriot rejection and not the opposing Turkish 
Cypriot acceptance.  
When existing explanations of each of the cases are compared, aspects considered in one 
of the cases are not analysed in the other, or used to explain its outcome. For example, 
negotiation secrecy has not been seriously considered by those who have analysed the GFA 
negotiations, and neither has the fact that peace negotiations in Cyprus was not politically 
inclusive been considered as an explanation to the outcome in the Annan Plan case. On the 
other hand, as this thesis will show, analyses on the success and failure of both processes 
tend to only attempt to explain why the agreement was reached by the political 
representatives, and not necessarily why it was accepted or rejected in the referendum. In 
effect, the two different outcomes are often not differentiated, and rather treated as one 
and the same.  
Nonetheless, all of the characteristics of the negotiations mentioned in the literature on 
both cases can potentially have shaped the referendum outcomes in different ways. For 
example, representatives of a group or political party that were not included in the 
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negotiations can expectedly be less inclined to support an agreement in a referendum. 
Therefore, who mediators included in the negotiation process or the extent agreements 
accommodate the interests of certain stakeholders can influence whether the agreement 
will receive their support in the campaigns and referendum. This, however, asks whether 
potential ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ‘ƐƉŽŝůĞƌƐ ? should be excluded or accommodated during a negotiation 
process. Equally, the manner in which a negotiation process is conducted can have an 
important impact on the degree of information available to the public, both about what is 
being negotiated and the agreement itself. Therefore, the degree of secrecy could 
potentially shape the degree of voter education in a referendum and, consequently shape 
ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ĂƌĞ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ ďǇ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ĐƵĞƐ Žƌ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ
campaigns.  
These are all potential links between the negotiations and referendum outcomes that are 
explored in this thesis. Taking from existing literature on peace negotiations and the two 
cases studies, it compares how mediation strategies, political inclusion, civil society 
inclusion, and agreement design in both the Annan Plan and GFA negotiations influenced 
their referendum results and experiences. It bridges peace negotiations and referendum 
literature, by investigating how these aspects of the negotiations shaped those aspects of 
the referendum experience that were found to determine referendum outcomes, namely, 
political support for the agreement in the referendum, the organization and strength of 
referendum campaigns, and public information or uncertainty regarding the issues at stake 
in the referendum. 
 
Thesis Objectives and Structure 
 
The research presented in this thesis was completed using a structured focused 
comparison (George and Bennett 2005) of the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement 
negotiations and referendums. Research on referendums in peace processes has developed 
mainly through individual case studies. Although comparisons have been drawn between 
different cases, this has been done merely to illustrate certain points the authors aim to 
make, but not in a structured comparative process. While the qualitative study of 
referendum outcomes does not allow a claim to be made that the detected causal 
mechanisms are sufficient to explain the referendum outcomes, it allows this study to 
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uncover causal mechanisms upon which theory can be built. It also allows for a deeper, 
contextual understanding of the impact of peace negotiation practices in the external, wider, 
societal environment in which they take place. In this sense, it departs from traditional 
peace negotiation and mediation literature by looking at outcomes that surpass the political 
elites sitting at the negotiations table.  
The research findings are drawn from the analysis of an extensive number of interviews 
carried out in Cyprus and Northern Ireland during the first half of 2014. The interviews were 
conducted with politicians who were members of the Annan Plan and Good Friday 
Agreement negotiation delegations, including some of their leaders, as well as with political 
representatives from parties not included in the negotiations. Individuals and 
representatives of civil society groups were interviewed especially, but not only, for their 
involvemĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶŽ ? referendum campaigns. This included the director of the 
civil society-ůĞĚ ‘Ǉes ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ in Northern Ireland. Interviews were, furthermore, conducted 
with journalists who reported on the negotiations and referendums, as well as with 
academic experts.  
Interviews were selected as the primary research method in this study mainly for allowing 
information to be gathered from first-hand participants. Most importantly, the kind of 
information/data needed is not often reflected in the official documents produced by the 
interveners. This includes information on the thinking or debate behind the political 
decision-making that negotiations entail. Similarly, media accounts and other secondary 
documents were not reliable or depicted biased accounts of the negotiations and 
referendum. The interviews used here are especially important, as they provide information 
not easily attained through political outcomes analysis (such as an analysis of the items in 
the settlements) or other primary sources (such as official or media reports on the 
negotiations or referendum). Nonetheless, official documents and memoirs were conjointly 





The five chapters of this thesis go through the different stages of the research process. 
The literature review presented in the first chapter will demonstrate that, although the 
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outcome of a peace settlement referendum can have a profound impact on a peace process, 
the literature on peace negotiations has not yet consider this as a significant outcome of a 
negotiation process. It aims to demonstrate why and how the influence of negotiation 
process characteristics on referendum outcomes should be studied. By bridging the 
literatures on peace negotiations and on referendums, it will suggest a research path that 
takes advantage of the knowledge developed by both fields. Several questions are made 
throughout the chapter that guide the search for which aspects of the negotiation process 
could potentially influence peace settlement referendum results. The search for answers to 
these questions in the literature will show that the most extensive studies on referendums 
have been in the context of European integration and how the present study  W and 
peacemaking referendums in general  W can benefit from what has been done there. The 
review of referendums literature will display what has been found to influence voter 
behaviours and, hence, referendum results. Those aspects are used throughout the thesis to 
demonstrate how certain aspects of the negotiation influenced the outcome of the 
referendums in the two cases.  
Chapter two thoroughly describes the design of the research and methodology used, 
while presenting the reasoning behind the methodological choices that were made in the 
study. In this chapter, the choice for a comparative and qualitative case study analysis will be 
justified and its limitations in understanding how peace negotiations shape peace settlement 
referendums discussed. It will begin by arguing for the comparability of the two case studies 
and proceed to describe the structured and focused manner through which the two are 
compared. The variables that will be analysed and compared, pertaining to both the 
negotiation process and the referendums, will be presented and defined. Given that this 
study is based on interview research, this chapter will conclude with a description of 
interviewee selection, the resulting implications for the data and research, as well as all 
issues related to the data collection and analysis.  
Chapters three and four present the two in-depth analyses of each of the cases. The 
presentation of the cases does not follow a chronological order and the Cypriot case is 
analysed first. This presentation respects the chronological order in which the case study 
research was undertaken. The two chapters conform to the same structural presentation. 
This reflects a concern in this research to compare, as far as possible, exactly the same 
aspects of the negotiations across the two cases. The undertaking is a requirement for the 
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structured and focused comparison method used. The analysis of the impact of each of the 
negotiation process conditions on the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement referendums 
is preceded in both chapters by a small historical description of the negotiation processes. 
This description aims at providing context and details of the negotiations that are important 
to understanding the arguments that are made in the chapter. Both chapters explain, not 
only how the negotiations shaped the overall result of the referendums, but also the 
differences in support given by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in 
Cyprus, and the Nationalist and Unionist communities in Northern Ireland.  
The findings from previous chapters are then compared in chapter five. Here, it is shown 
how mediation strategies had an influence on whether political leaders and political parties 
in Cyprus or Northern Ireland supported the agreement in the referendum or not, as well as 
the strength of their campaigns. Interestingly, the two negotiation processes are found to 
differ in terms of their degree of secrecy/transparency, an element found to help explain 
differences in voter information across the two cases. It ĂůƐŽ ĨŝŶĚƐ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ
participation in the negotiations shaped those ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞagreement in the two 
referendums ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ ?dŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶĐŽĨĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŐƌŽƵƉƐŝŶ
Northern Ireland and in the Turkish Cypriot community, alongside their consistent 
engagement with the negotiation process is, in both cases, associated with strong and 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ ? ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ ĨĞǁĞƌ Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĞŬ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇǁĞƌĞĂƚƚĂĐŬĞĚďǇƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?>ĂƐƚůǇ ?ƌĞƐƵůƚƐŽŶƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƚŚĞƚĞǆƚŽĨ
the agreement on the referendum outcome are ambivalent. Although the communities that 
were more informed about the agreement were the ones that supported them the most, the 
text of the agreement was not necessarily known or understood by all voters. The Greek 
Cypriot case, in particular, suggests that the low level of public engagement and voter 
information predisposed the community to be more influenced by the strong, politically 
ďĂĐŬĞĚ ?  ‘ŶŽ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƵŶĨŽůĚĞĚ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ
question in both referendums was on whether or not voters supported the agreements 
reached during the negotiations, that is not necessarily the question voters answered nor 
ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ƚŚĞǇ ǀŽƚĞĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? Žƌ  ‘ŶŽ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵƐ ? dŚĞ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ĞŶĚƐ ǁŝƚŚ Ă
discussion on the implications of the findings to existing research and literature. Revisiting 
the arguments found in the literature for and against the use of referendums in peace 
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processes, it is argued that employing referendums in peace processes requires a tailoring of 
the negotiation process itself.  
The conclusion summarizes and further articulates how the findings of this research can 
inform existing literature and research on peace negotiations as well as peace settlement 
referendums, and indeed, the literature on both case studies. The study of the two cases 
shows that the GFA negotiations were a less secretive, more inclusive and participatory 
process than the Annan Plan negotiations. This is shown to have ƐŚĂƉĞĚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?
engagement and civil society mobilization in support for a peace settlement during the 
referendum ?ǁŚŝĐŚĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞ. It proves novel in demonstrating that 
the negotiation process in north Cyprus was more inclusive than in south Cyprus, leading to 
a greater mobilization of political parties and civil society in support for the agreement in the 
referendum. This finding is similar to what occurred in the Good Friday Agreement 
negotiations and resulting referendum. It then reflects on this research and suggests 




This thesis makes an original contribution to academic research and literature on peace 
negotiations and referendums. It is among the first to provide an in-depth comparative study 
of peace referendums and puts forward a novel research design through which referendums 
can be studied as an integral part of negotiation processes. The in-depth analyses of the 
Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations and referendums provided is based on 
a wide range of new interview data that brings together the personal accounts of the 
majority of political actors and voices in both cases. Although the two peace processes have 
been extensively researched, in analysing the two negotiation processes with a view to 
understanding how they shaped the referendum campaign period, it casts a new light on 
some of their features. In doing so, it makes a contribution to the practice of peace 
negotiations and mediations by demonstrating that certain features of those processes can 
increase or decrease public support for its outcomes. This aims at generating knowledge that 
can be used to avoid peace referendum results that present an obstacle to a peace 
processes, such as has been the case with the rejection of  peace settlements. Furthermore, 
by paying attention to the differences in support given by the different local communities in 
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the referendum, it allows for an understanding on how referendums can potentially be less 
polarizing experiences and peace settlements be supported more equally among these 
communities. 
The research bridges academic research and literature on peace negotiations and 
referendums by demonstrating why and how referendum results should be studied as 
negotiation outcomes. It further shows that referendum experience can be deeply shaped 
by the negotiation process. The contribution is novel in arguing that, when referendums are 
used to seal a peace settlement, the entirety of its negotiation process needs to be adapted 
from the start. As a tool of democratic politics, peace settlement referendums need to be 
preceded by inclusive negotiations that involve a broad spectrum of political stakeholders 





1. Peace Negotiations and Settlement Referendums 
  
Peace settlement referendums have the potential to symbolise an important transitional 
point from conflict to peace (Lee and Mac Ginty 2012). Conversely, the rejection of a peace 
agreement in a referendum can have devastating consequences for a peace process. For 
example, the rejection of the Indigenous Rights Accords in Guatemala in 1999, or the 
rejection of the Annan Plan in Cyprus in 2004, brought both peace processes to a standstill. 
Yet, negotiation and mediation literature tends to not integrate the study of peace 
settlement referendums as a significant negotiation/mediation outcome. Given that the use 
of referendums in peace process is a relatively new practice, and one that has become more 
frequent in the past two decades, existing academic literature on this specific type of 
referendums is still small. However, numerous studies are available on other kinds of 
referendums, especially on European integration referendums. This research and literature 
on referendums consists of studies that investigate what shapes voting behaviours. It largely 
focuses on referendum campaign periods and seldom considers how they are shaped by 
negotiation process conditions. Therefore, this chapter reviews such literatures with the aim 
of uncovering how the existing knowledge in these groups of academic research can be used 
to investigate how negotiation processes influence referendum outcomes in peace 
processes. Aiming to bridge the gap between the two academic literatures, this research 
takes advantage of the knowledge developed in both fields. 
The chapter begins by reviewing the evolving notion of what outcomes are produced by 
negotiation processes in conflict contexts. It will show that the cessation of violence or a 
cease-fire and the arrival at some kind of settlement (whether partial or final) have 
traditionally been considered as the main outcomes and success indicators of negotiations in 
conflict settings (Touval and Zartman 1985; Bercovitch 1986; Bercovitch and Langley 1993; 
2000). However, when the arrival at a peace agreement proved to not necessarily prevent 
the re-emergence of conflict, researchers began to look at other outcomes. The successful 
implementation of an agreement, or its durability, for example, was seen as a better 
indicator than an agreement being reached (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; 2003; 
Pearson et al. 2006; Beardsley 2006; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Svensson 2007). This shift 
opened up the field to consider how negotiation processes are impacted by factors that are 
external to the negotiation process. After all, although peace agreements are often designed 
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at a negotiation table behind closed doors, it is precisely in that external world that those 
agreements are meant to be implemented. In effect, a third wave of research is unveiling 
how peace negotiations can be part of a deeper and sustained conflict transformation 
process able to reconcile conflict-torn societies (Lederach 1997; Väyrynen 1991; Kaldor 
2000; Byrne 2001; Papagianni 2010). 
The chapter subsequently reviews referendums literature. As already mentioned, the 
review will include literature on other types of referendums, particularly on European Union 
integration referendums. It aims at finding what factors have been found to influence voting 
behaviours in referendums and, therefore, referendum results. These factors are 
synthesised into three main determinants: political ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?the referendum 
campaigns; and public information and uncertainty. It is by understanding first what shapes 
a referendum outcome that we can pose the question of how negotiation process conditions 
might shape them. Towards this end, the following section will bridge peace negotiation and 
literature with referendum literature to formulate a framework under which the impact of 
negotiation process conditions on referendum outcomes can be studied.  
The chapter then closes with a reflexion on what determinants have been considered by 
researchers so far when searching for explanations for the failed Annan Plan and the 
successful Good Friday agreement referendums. This will demonstrate that existing 
explanations for the success or failure of each of the cases are often given without 
considering those factors that referendums literature finds determinant. Furthermore, by 
comparing the explanations given on the two cases, it demonstrates how some of the 
reasons given for the failure of the Annan Plan are not considered when authors explain the 
success of the GFA and vice-versa. A series of questions are presented to suggest how a 
systematic comparison of the Annan Plan and GFA negotiations and referendums can inform 
the literature regarding how peace negotiations can lead to successful referendum 
outcomes that aid, rather than hinder, the peace process. 
 
 
The Evolving Notion of Negotiation Outcomes in Peace Processes 
 
The understanding of what outcomes are brought about by negotiations in peace 
processes has evolved overtime. It has, in fact, remained an object of debate particularly in 
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international mediation literature to this day (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991; 
Bercovitch and Derouen 2004; Bercovitch 2006). The outcome of a mediation process was 
initially considered to be any type of agreement reached between the negotiating parties. 
This was, arguably, inadvertently defined by researchers in the eighties and nineties, 
especially the work of Jacob Bercovitch. Bercovitch (1986; Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 
1991) used quantitative methods to investigate which characteristics of a mediation process 
ǁĞƌĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ? mediation outcomes, which were defined and coded as the 
observance of a cease-fire, a partial settlement, or a full settlement. The definition of 
 ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?Žƌ  ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? mediation in peace negotiations was, therefore, tied to the need 
for the measurability of data for quantitative treatment. Yet, as Bercovitch (2006, 301) 
himself wrote at that time, civil wars and ethnic conflicts challenged diplomatic missions 
throughout the world and mediation scholars were beginning to understand that mediation 
needed to affect the antagonist and mistrustful relationships between the parties in conflict.   
Negotiations between the highly antagonized parties in violent ethnic conflicts meant, not 
only that it was more unlikely that negotiating parties would arrive at any sort of agreement, 
but also, even if the parties arrived at an agreement, this was not sine qua non to it being 
implementĞĚ ? ŶŐŽůĂ ?Ɛ Đŝǀŝů ǁĂƌ ƌĞ-escalation after the Bicesse and Lusaka agreements of 
19945, alongside other agreement implementation failures in Sri-Lanka in 1989, Somalia 
1993, Rwanda 1994, or Sierra Leone in 1998 (Stedman 2001, 12), pushed scholars to have a 
longer-term perspective. Scholars who delved into the study of what makes an agreement 
 ‘ƐƚŝĐŬ ? ? Žƌ ŝƚƐ  ‘ĚƵƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?, opened up the field to the study of political leaders ? negotiating 
behaviour, particularly how domestic conditions influence their ability to commit to peace. 
In quantitative studies, durability was conceptualized as the non-reoccurrence of violence 
during a given period after an agreement is reached. Some of these studies found that the 
offer of security guarantees by third parties was associated with more stable agreements in 
civil wars (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Pearson et al. 2006, 121). Others found that 
mediated processes were likely to produce settlements that break-down within eight weeks 
of being agreed upon, unless they are supported by a peacekeeping operation and/or 
                                                          
5
 The Bicesse (1991) and Lusaka (1994) Agreements aimed at ending a two decade civil war in Angola between the Marxist 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), but 
broke down after the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, refused to accept defeat in the post-agreement elections and re-
escalated the conflict. The mediation process led by Portugal, the United States and Russia  W the Troika  W and the United 
EĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝƐ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝǌĞĚ ĨŽƌ ĨĂŝůŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƉƵƚ ŝŶ ƉůĂĐĞ ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŽƌǇ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƌƵůĞƐ ƚŽ ŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ƚƌĂŶƐition into 




followed by a period of economic development (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007, 189). 
Others yet found that agreements that contain provisions for the territorial autonomy of 
threatened groups (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001, 202) and power-sharing provisions 
(Hartzell and Hoddie 2003), particularly on military and territorial issues (Jarstad and Nilsson 
2008), were more likely to lead to a durable peace. Therefore, although peace agreements 
continue to be the focal outcome, this area of research looks beyond the bivariate outcome 
of an agreement having been reached or not, and into the  ‘ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? of the peace agreements 
reached.  
Additionally, awareness that the arrival and implementation of an agreement required a 
certain degree of trust to develop between disputants drew attention to relational, and 
more subjective negotiation outcomes (Kriesberg 2001; Bercovitch 2006). Studies emerged 
on conĨůŝĐƚƐ ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƌŝǀĂůƌŝĞƐ ?, where the prolonged experience of conflict highly 
antagonized the involved parties and severely reduced the likelihood of an agreement being 
reached. In such cases, it was argued, it was necessary to consider that the ability to reduce 
violent interactions between disputants was an important mediation outcome (Andersen et 
al. 2001; Greig 2001). These arguments take a step back from a conflict resolution focus in 
the literature and highlight that it is equally important to consider successful conflict 
management as a significant outcome.  
As peace studies scholars, on the other hand, began the search for a definition and the 
components of peace, peace negotiations were understood as part of a broader peace 
process that takes place between societies. Concurring with the development of Critical 
Theory, the opening up of the field to this broader political and sociological context invited 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞůŝƚŝƐƚ ? approach present in the practice and theory of peace negotiations 
and mediation (Ron 2009). Peacebuilding scholars in particular criticised peacemaking 
processes for being secretive and exclusionist and for consequently tending to produce 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚŽŶůǇĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞůŝƚĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?dŚĞƐĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚ
by elites are then imposed on the wider society, they argue, and for that reason fail to 
address the wider societal conflict between the groups involved (Burton 1987; Lederach 
1997; Väyrynen 1991; Kaldor 2000; Byrne 2001; Papagianni 2010). Long-term peace is, 
instead, achieved by empowering and mobilizing local people to reframe their zero-sum and 
adversarial relationships into new and constructive ones (Lederach 1997). Recent research 
has found that the use of participatory mechanisms that engage the grassroots and/or 
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include civil society in the negotiation process, have a positive impact on the sustainability of 
peace. To have a civil society actively engaged in a peace process has been found to be 
associated, not only with the arrival at peace agreements that are more balanced and widely 
perceived as legitimate, but also to durable agreements that are more successfully 
implemented (Nilsson 2012).  
Peace negotiations, therefore, far from being an isolated affair between political elites, 
are recently beginning to be understood as playing a crucial role in reconciling societies by 
ƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?ĂŶĚŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƉĞĂĐĞ
(Cochrane 2000; Byrne 2001; Papagianni 2010). In effect, peace negotiations have become 
more porous in recent years through the involvement of civil society, as well as through 
public diplomacy mechanisms (Handelman 2012). Some examples of this are the public 
consultations process that has taken place in the peace process in Colombia (Herbolzheimer 
2016, 8) and the use of ƉƵďůŝĐ ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ƉŽůůŝŶŐ ? Žƌ  ‘ƉĞĂĐĞ ƉŽůůƐ ? ? in Northern Ireland (Irwin 
2003) and, more recently, in Cyprus (Interpeace 2014). The use of referendums, as well, has 
been found to have the potential to serve conflict resolution by: signifying popular approval 
for peace processes, reducing democratic deficits in conflict settings, and encouraging civic 
engagement in political life (Haskell 2001; Lee and Mac Ginty 2012).  
However, despite this growing understanding that public diplomacy plays a crucial role in 
managing public opinion during negotiation processes, the study of referendums in peace 
processes is far from sufficiently researched and theorized in conflict negotiation and 
mediation literature. The existing body of literature is typically case study based (Strauss 
1993; Rynhold and Cohen 2003; Lordos 2009; Lee and Mac Ginty 2012; Somerville and Kirby 
2012; Loizides 2014; Morgan-Jones, Loizides, and Stefanovic 2015), with the exception of 
YǀŽƌƚƌƵƉ ?Ɛ(2012; 2014) broader work on all types of referendums. Although some 
recommendations are made on how referendums can best be used in the context of 
peacemaking (Rynhold and Cohen 2003; Johansson 2009; Lee and Mac Ginty 2012; Loizides 
2015; 2014), studies that aim specifically at understanding how referendums are shaped by 
peace negotiation processes are missing. 
To summarize, the notion of what is a negotiation outcome has evolved from considering 
tangible outcomes, such as cease-fires and other kinds of agreements, to more intangible 
outcomes such as tension reduction, the durability of the peace agreement and the 
improvement of the relationships between the parties and the communities in conflict. As 
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the understanding of what is considered a negotiation outcome changed, different aspects 
of the negotiation process were found to be the most important in bringing about that 
specific outcome. As was shown, when the outcome under focus was getting the parties to 
an agreement, scholars focussed in the study of political leaderships ? negotiating behaviours 
and other aspects within the negotiations. When the outcome shifted to the durability of the 
agreement, the provisions of the agreement and factors external to the negotiation process 
became the focus. However, peace negotiations research and theory has not yet considered 
viewing peace settlement referendums as an outcome of the negotiation process, or a 
measure of its success. Yet, when a referendum is used for peace settlement ratification, its 
result undeniably influences the success or failure of that negotiation process. What this 
thesis proposes, therefore, is a study of peace negotiations as a process that culminates with 
the peace settlement referendum. Again, as it was shown, depending on what was 
considered the negotiations outcome, different aspects of the negotiations were found to be 
most conducive, or have a greater impact, on that type of outcome. Therefore, an analysis of 
a peace negotiation process that considers the referendum results as the negotiation 
outcome can unveil what aspects of the negotiations are more conducive, or have a greater 
impact, on the peace settlement referendum outcome.   
 
 
Referendums in Peace Processes 
 
While research on negotiation and mediation outcomes has not yet integrated 
referendums into their spectrum of outcomes, referendums have important consequences 
for peace negotiation processes and outcomes. On the one hand, it has been shown that the 
referendum experience itself has the potential to re-shape domestic politics by stimulating 
public and political debate on particular issues, thereby, building awareness and educating 
citizens (Smith and Tolbert 2009). For example, Scranton (1993) argues that, although the 
US-imposed democratic constitution was rejected in its referendum in Panama in 1992, the 
referendum encouraged political leaders to work within a democratic process and to build 
democratic habits and institutions. Equally, participation in pre-accession negotiations to the 
European Union and the subsequent integration referendum in 2003, has been found to 
have shaped public debates, views, and opinions in the Czech Republic in favour of 
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Europeanization (Baun et al. 2006, 250, 274). Yet, referendums can also be undemocratic 
experiences. Referendum questions can be formulated to bias results, the electorate 
selection manipulated, or voters coerced to vote in a certain direction in order for the 
referendum to yield a particular result. The Crimean status referendum of 2014, for 
example, raised some of these issues6  ?ŝĞƌƐĂĐŬĂŶĚK ?>ĞĂƌ ? ? ? ? ?ƵƌŬĞ-White 2014). 
When used in peace negotiations, referendums can help political leaders to decide on 
sensitive issues. For example, Loizides (2015) uses the South African referendum case in 
19927 to show that referendums allow political leaders to win legitimacy and credibility from 
the public for their position at the negotiations table. This can help ripen negotiations by 
increĂƐŝŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐand concessions, as well as 
avoid public opinion reversals down the line. However, referendums may also allow leaders 
to not engage in consensus building strategies during the negotiations (Haskell 2001). For 
example, the design of a referendum itself can become a contentious issue during 
negotiations. The UN-mediated negotiations in Western Sahara have stalemated for over 
two decades over the issue of who should be allowed to vote in a self-determination 
referendum (Solà-Martín 2007). Negotiations on a solution to the conflict in Nagorno-
Karabakh have, likewise, stalled over the issue of whether displaced Azerbaijani persons 
should be able to participate in a status referendum (Johansson 2009, 123). Furthermore, 
referendums may exacerbate conflict and lead to violence escalation in the short-term. Two 
examples of this are the South African apartheid referendum of 1992 and the UN-sponsored 
East Timorese independence referendum of 1999. In the East Timorese case the 
international community (the UN and the Australian government in particular) was heavily 
criticised for not having created the necessary security conditions to prevent the Indonesian 
government-supported militias to violently pursue those who were pro-independence 
following the referendums (see Cotton 2007; and Wheeler & Dunne 2001 for a counter 
argument).  
                                                          
6
 The referendum on the status of the Ukrainian province of Crimea was held on the 16th of March 2014, merely five days 
after the Crimean government self-declared its independence from the Ukraine. An overwhelming majority of voters 
supported the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation. TŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂůůĞŐĞĚ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ the 
setting up of the referendum and the circumstances under which the referendum was held have raised questions over the 
legality and legitimacy of the process and its result is not recognized internationally.  
 
7
 The South African Apartheid Referendum of 1992 aimed at getting the ǁŚŝƚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐĞŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ President F. W. 
ĚĞ<ůĞƌŬ ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ on the issue of the end of the apartheid system of discrimination against people 




Critics of the use of referendums in peace processes argue that the referendum 
experience can become another source of rivalry and the referendum result may be 
regarded as yet another conflict-like win-lose situation. For example, Mac Ginty (2003) 
asserts that constitutional referendums are chiefly unsuitable for ethno-national conflict 
because they tend to present zero-sum choices around which ethnic differences can be re-
ignited. The dichotomous either/or nature of voting choices can have an important negative 
impact in conflict contexts. The referendum experience can further polarize already divided 
soĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ ďǇ ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ  ‘ǁŝŶŶĞƌƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ůŽƐĞƌƐ ?. This is because referendum 
campaigns may provide incentives for political leaders and other groups to mobilize support 
for their voting preference by appealing to the very insecurities that caused the conflict in 
the first place (Reilly 2003, 176). As populist-leaders or hardliners inflame public debate, the 
referendum campaign can, thus, become focussed on divisive issues  W and not the central 
issue of the referendum itself  W and further radicalize public opinion.  
Some consensus is emerging around the idea that, in order to avoid referendum failures 
and their negative consequences in conflict contexts, groundwork needs to take place to 
prepare that context for the referendum experience (Lee and Mac Ginty 2012; Loizides 2015, 
134). This is particularly important in the case of peace settlement referendums since they 
are aimed at gĞƚƚŝŶŐ Ă ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ P ƚŚĞ ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? vote. Lee and Mac Ginty 
(2012, 59 W60), for example, found that three factors have led to peace process referendum 
 ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐ ? around the world: lack of broad consultation of important constituencies during 
negotiations, particularly in Guatemala (1999 referendum) and Cyprus (2004 referendum); 
lack of information and time for public debate during the campaigns; and the existence of 
insecurity at the time of the referendum, for example in the Guatemalan and Iraqi (2005) 
constitutional referendums. They, therefore, argue that referendums can only serve 
peacemaking processes if a certain degree of conflict transformation and reconciliation takes 
place on the ground. A re-orientation of third party interventions is required, they argue, but 
without giving practical recommendations.  
Nevertheless, as it was shown, referendums have not yet been studied as a peace 
negotiations outcome. Given that the outcome of the referendum has such high stakes for a 
peace process, and especially considering it can re-ignite the conflict, it becomes crucial to 
understand whether and how the negotiation process itself can shape a referendum 
experience and result. 
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What Determines a Referendum Outcome?  
 
 To understand how peace negotiations can potentially construct a positive referendum 
result, we first need to uncover what shapes a referendum outcome. A significant bulk of 
empirical studies and theoretical development in this area of study has developed through 
research on European Union integration referendums. This literature is particularly relevant 
to the present study because, like in peace settlement referendums, it examines cases of 
elite negotiated treaties that are ratified by a domestic referendum vote. Furthermore, it 
makes sense to draw on literature that studies political and voter behaviours in Europe, 
since the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement cases also fall into this geographical 
region. Overall, this literature focuses on how three interrelated factors shape referendum 
results: voter information and uncertainty about the issues, or the content of the 
agreement, at stake in the referendum; the political parties ? position regarding the 
referendum; and the composition and strength of the referendum campaigns. 
 
Political Party Support and Voter Alignment. Political elites have a significant influence on 
voter behaviour in referendums. The position political parties take on the referendum issue 
and their ability to mobilise ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ? ŵĂŬĞƐ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?
positioning the strongest predictor of a referendum outcome (Hobolt 2006, 641; Baun et al. 
2006, 275; Lubbers 2008, 81). Political leaders are, in many instances, the most important 
information supplier voters have (Leduc 2002, 722). In fact, political parties in government 
may be constitutionally obligated to inform citizens about what is at stake in the 
referendum. This position gives them significant power to influence the way voters frame 
the choice they are being asked to make in the referendum (Hobolt 2006, 641; Vreese 2006).  
A number of both quantitative and qualitative case study-based research has found that 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ had a significant influence on European Community (EC) 
integration referendum results (Pierce, Valen, Henry, and Listhaug 1983, 61; Hobolt 2006, 
641; Baun et al. 2006, 275; Lubbers 2008, 81) ? &Žƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?  ‘&ƌĂŶŬůŝŶ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? posits that 
voting in a referendum is a test to the performance and popularity of governments in power, 
rather than about the issue at hand (Franklin et al. 1994; 1995; Franklin 2002). For example, 
Schneider and Weitsman (1996, 603 W5) ĨŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĂƚǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
performance, as well as their evaluation of the Maastricht Treaty itself, impacted the 
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referendum outcomes in Denmark, France, and Ireland. However, they also argue that, it 
was where information about the content of the treaty was limited that median voters 
tended to make their decisions based on the ƚƌƵƐƚ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ Žƌ ƚŚĞ
opposiƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐ ?dŚĞǇ found that this led to stronger and more competitive 
referendum campaigns. Critics of the theory argue that it views voters as incapable of 
formulating their own opinions, and that the salience of the issue in the referendum also has 
ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŽƌǇ ƉŽǁĞƌ ƚŽ ǁŚǇ ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ? ĨŽůůŽǁ Ă ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĐƵĞ Žƌ ŶŽƚ(Svensson 2002). 
Therefore, the degree to which political elite preferences impact voting behaviours varies 
depending on how informed voters are on the issue/s at stake in the referendum and their 
degree of uncertainty regarding the impact of its outcome.  
   
Referendum Campaigns. Referendum campaigners make use of a variety of activities in 
their attempts to persuade, influence, or simply inform voters. The publication and 
distribution of informational booklets or pamphlets is one example. More organized 
campaigns hold public gatherings, meetings or rallies, make use of traditional media 
(television, radio, and newspapers) or, in our days, the internet and especially social media. 
They usually support one of the voting choices in the referendum, although some hold non-
partisan, purely informational campaigns. Although political leaders and parties are often 
involved in referendum campaigning, they are not the only ones doing it. This varies 
according to the type of referendum and issue at hand. Durham (2009, 192 W93) found that 
in referendums on international treaties civil society organizations play a crucial role in 
informing and mobilizing the community towards engaging in an active debate around the 
implications of the agreement. This ultimately fostered ownership of the agreement at the 
local level.  
Referendum campaigns can have a significant impact on a referendum by way of framing 
the issues at hand by highlighting certain aspects, or shifting the focus of the subject (Leduc 
2002, 716 W19; Vreese 2004). Ultimately, campaigns can play a role in influencing how voters 
interpret the referendum question/s and the voting options available to them. In fact, in 
cases where the public is not well informed about the stakes in the referendum, campaigns 
have been found to have an important impact on voter-decision. This is what Gilland (2002, 
532) found to be the case in the first referendum on the Treaty of Nice in Ireland. Here, a 
 “lacklustre  ‘yes ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚĂ  ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŵĞƐƐĂŐĞŽĨ  ‘ŝĨǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ?ǀŽƚĞŶŽ ? is 
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considered to have tilted the result ŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞǁĞĞŬƐleading 
to the referendum.  
 
Public Information and Uncertainty. ŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ǀŽƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ
and referendum outcomes, are the amount and quality of information that is available to 
them concerning an agreement, treaty, or whichever issues the referendum is consulting the 
public on. Unlike in an election, referendums are not about choosing between political 
parties or particular candidates, but between two or more alternatives regarding a particular 
question, or set of questions. Referendums ask voters to form an opinion on a particular 
issue, or groups of issues, that can potentially affect the rules and conditions under which 
they live in. However, either due to the unfamiliarity or complexity of the issue/s or treaty 
under referendum, to cast a vote can be a particularly demanding experience on voters.  
Information has an important impact on the cost-benefit analysis voters make when 
choosing how to vote. One important factor influencing voter behaviour in treaty, or 
agreement, referendums is their perception of its socio-economic impact. For example, fears 
regarding the impact of EU membership on agriculture, state-owned heavy industry, small 
and medium-sized business, and banking economic sectors have been found to have 
mobilized rejectionists and reduced public support for EU integration in Poland prior to its 
accession in 2004 (Szczerbiak 2001, 114 W15). Notwithstanding, Sciarini and Listhaug (1997, 
431 W33), for example, argue that the Swiss rejection of European Union membership in 
1994, and Norwegian rejection of the European Economic Area in 1992, were due to the fact 
that EU membership was not seen as an economic necessity by voters. In effect, concerns 
for the defence of traditions and national sovereignty became more salient during the 
referendum campaign periods. Similarly, Lubbers (2008, 80 W83) ĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƵƚĐŚ ‘ŶŽ ? to 
the European Constitution in 2005 was strongly impacted by a perception of EU integration 
as a threat to the survival of Dutch culture, particularly among less educated voters.  
Like political leaders and campaigns, the various forms of media are important 
disseminators of information and campaign messages to the masses and have a significant 
impact on the shaping of public opinion during referendums (Vreese 2006, 631 W32; Hänggli 
and Kriesi 2010). It has been found that the less informed voters feel, the more they tend to 
look for voting cues from political leaders, other opinion-makers, or ideologies (Leduc 2002; 
Hobolt 2006). Leduc (2002, 727) finds that the less informed voters are about the issues 
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prior to the referendum, the more they tend to rely on the campaign period for information 
and, hence, the more they will be influenced by them. Consequently, because voters will 
tend make their decision on how to vote closer to the referendum date, the outcome of the 
referendum will become more unpredictable. 
 
A referendum experience and outcome, therefore, is a product of the dynamics created 
by these three interconnected factors. Taken together, the less informed voters are on the 
issues at stake in the referendum, the more they will look to their political leaders and the 
referendum campaigns for information and cues on how to vote. Concomitantly, when 
voters are less informed, the more volatile and unpredictable their voting behaviour will 
likely be, and the more they will tend to leave the decision on how to vote to the campaign 
ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?dŚŝƐƚŚĞŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵŽŶ
voting behaviours, at the same time as it increases the potential influence referendum 
campaign messages can have on the outcome of the referendum. Conversely, the more 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚǀŽƚĞƌƐĂƌĞ ?ƚŚĞůĞƐƐƚŚĞǇǁŝůůƌĞůǇŽŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌ ?ƐĐƵĞƐĂŶĚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐ ?
 
 
How Can Peace Negotiations Influence Referendum Outcomes? 
 
Almost three decades ago, WƵƚŶĂŵ ?Ɛ two-level games theory was pioneering in theorising 
ŚŽǁ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ĂƌĞaffected by public expectations or 
 ‘ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐ ? (Putnam 1988, 454). In effect, Putnam was interested in 
understanding how the prospective of having the agreement ratified through a referendum 
strengthened, or weakened, political leaders ? negotiating positions in international 
negotiations. In fact, the body of literature on how negotiations are influenced by 
 ‘ĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƐ ? Žƌ  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ŝƐ ƐŽ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƚŚĂƚ Ğ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ĐŝƚĞĚ ŚĞƌĞ ĐĂŶ ŽŶůǇ ďĞ
anecdotal (Iklé 1964; Rubin and Brown 1975; Fearon 1994). Yet, as Wanis-St. John (2011, 
274) notes,  the inverse causal relation has not received the same attention.  
As was discussed above, the literature on peacemaking referendums is still novel and 
brief, although significant case study based research exists. Some of these are quantitative 
studies based on public opinion polling that test if certain provisions of the agreement 
influenced voting-behaviours in the referendum (Rynhold and Cohen 2003; Lordos 2008; 
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2009; Somerville and Kirby 2012). Nevertheless, they do not test any other factor pertaining 
to the negotiation process. Yet, some authors have indicated potential ways in which 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŵŝŐŚƚ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ? &Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? DĐ'ĂƌƌǇ ĂŶĚ K ?>ĞĂƌǇ
(2009, 15 W85) contend that it was the Good Friday Agreement ?Ɛ ability to accommodate the 
interests of the main political parties, the UUP and Sinn Féin in particular, that allowed for 
the success of the referendum in Northern Ireland. However, going back to referendum 
literature, political party support for the agreement is only one of the factors found to 
influence voting behaviours in referendums. In their study of the failed Guatemalan 
referendum, Lee and Mac Ginty (2012, 59 W60) suggest that negotiations with referendums 
require broader consultation mechanisms with the people within the communities in 
conflict. Taking from the Northern Ireland and South African referendums, Loizides (2015, 
144) advocates that public opinion polling is one way through which this can be done. Yet, 
we do not know exactly if and why such mechanisms actually have an impact on referendum 
results. 
As was described earlier, referendum results are influenced by the degree of information 
ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐǁŚĂƚŝƐĂƚƐƚĂŬĞŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ǀŽƚŝŶŐ
preferences, and the strength or shape of referendum campaigns. Considering these three 
referendum outcome determinants, other characteristics of peace negotiations can 
potentially have an impact on referendum outcomes. Which political actors are included in 
the negotiation can all ultimately shape whether political leaders and parties support the 
agreement in the referendum. To hold secretive negotiations, on the other hand, is a 
mediation tactic that can influence the degree and timing of the information available to the 
public on the issues under negotiations and the content of an agreement. The strength and 
organization of referendum campaigns can also potentially be influenced by negotiation 
process ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇ ƐŽ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ ? 
tŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ ? ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ĂƌĞ ĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚed in the final agreement can 
determine, not only whether they will publicly support the agreement, but also the amount 
of resources they will invest in their own campaigns. Also, as was mentioned earlier, civil 
society groups are important peace process referendum campaigners, therefore, the degree 
to which they are involved with the negotiation process may have important repercussions 
in the referendum outcome. The inclusion of civil society actors in the negotiation process 
can assure that key constituenĐŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ĂƌĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
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Earlier studies in mediation research found that negotiation processes in which directive 
mediation strategies were employed were more likely to reach partial and full 
settlements/agreements (Bercovitch 1986; Bercovitch & Houston 1993; 2000). These types 
of strategies represent the most powerful form of mediator behaviour, where mediators 
offer incentives and/or issue ultimatums to push the parties into agreement. Those studies 
also found that communication-facilitation strategies were the less effective, but the most 
employed type of mediation strategies. These refer to those types of strategies that are 
essentially part of any mediation process, such as facilitating the exchange of information, 
contact, and cooperation between the parties. Procedural strategies were not found to have 
a significant effect. These strategies refer to ways through which mediations control the 
formalities of the process, such as determining the agenda of the meetings, their time and 
place, and their exposure to outside influences and the media (Bercovitch and Houston 
2000, 175 W76).  
These findings on the higher effectiveness of directive - also called manipulative - 
strategies ǁĞƌĞ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ďǇ dŽƵǀĂů ĂŶĚ ĂƌƚŵĂŶ ?Ɛ(1985, 11 W13) observation that only 
powerful mediators have enough resources to entice or threaten the parties into making 
concessions. To them, this ability to leverage the parties is a crucial mediator asset. 
<ŝƐƐŝŶŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ůĞǀĞƌĂŐŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ /ƐƌĂĞůŝ ĂŶĚ ŐǇƉƚŝĂŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ? ? ? ?-76, by 
threatening Israel with the withdrawal of military support and enticing Egyptian cooperation 
by offering closer military and economic ties with the US, is cited in the literature as proof to 
the theory (Sheehan 1976; Rubin 1981; Stein 1985; Mandell and Tomlin 1991). These 
scholars argued that mediation is a resource-intensive activity that is most effectively 
practiced by resourceful, or even biased (Kydd 2003) mediators, such as powerful states. 
Others, however, counter-argue that  ‘power mediation ? should not be considered mediation 
at all because those types of behaviours question ƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ‘Ɛ role as an impartial broker. 
 With the proliferation of intra-state conflicts in the 1990s, the United Nations emerged 
as a crucial international mediator. RĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŽŶ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂŶĚ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
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mediation efforts found that the more passive communication-facilitation style employed by 
international and regional organizations fostered a greater trust in the mediation process 
(Maoz and Terris 2006). International Organizations (IOs) were also found more effective in 
 ‘ƐŽĨƚĞŶŝŶŐ ƵƉ ? (Greig and Diehl 2006) ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌŝĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐ
conflict tensions in the long-run (Beardsley 2006; Frazier and Dixon 2006). Therefore, if 
States were more effective in bringing about settlements, IOs and regional organizations 
were proving to be effective at managing the conflict. Svensson (2007, 244) further found 
that, while power mediators are more effective at brokering peace agreements, the less 
intrusive pure mediation styles were more likely to yield peace agreements that contained 
provisions found to make agreements in civil wars more durable. Similarly, Beardsley et al. 
(2006, 81) found that the less intrusive facilitative strategies are more effective in reducing 
conflict tensions in the long run. These findings pushed for the overcoming of previous 
existing debates on bias vs impartiality and pure vs power mediation. This led to a growing 
consensus in the field that the different types of strategies are complementary and that, as 
multi-party mediation proponents suggested (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 1999), the key to 
mediation success rests in the adequate or timely combination of both types (Bercovitch and 
Gartner 2009; Carment, Yiagadeesen, and Achkar 2009; Quinn et al. 2006). 
Largely, what these studies show is that, as Beardsley et al. (2006, 81) noted, the 
effectiveness of mediation strategies varies depending on the outcome that is considered. 
Therefore, can some mediator strategies be more effective if we consider a peace 
settlement referendum result as the mediation outcome?  
Secrecy, for example, is a tactic in the realm of procedural strategies that aims to reduce 
the visibility of a negotiation process in order to help the participants talk more openly, 
cooperate more easily, and to save-face. However, secrecy and the associated need to hold 
the negotiations elsewhere has ďĞĞŶĨŽƵŶĚƚŽŚĂǀĞĂĚĞƚƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?
ability to sell the agreement back home. For example, several authors point to the secrecy in 
the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations of the Oslo Accords as cause of its ultimate breakdown at 
the Camp David Summit in 2000, and for the subsequent start of the second intifada. The 
negotiations of the Oslo Accords were led in complete secrecy. To decrease the visibility of 
the talks, the Palestinian Liberation Organization was represented by lower rank elements 
and a team of Academics represented the Israeli government. The secrecy, however, is 
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ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ĚĞďŝůŝƚĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ /ƐƌĂĞůŝ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ƚŽ ŐĂƚŚĞƌ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
agreement at home (Pruitt 1997, 246; Kriesberg 2001; Wanis-St.John 2011).  
Thus, while secrecy can reduce political leaders ? ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ ‘ƐĞůů ?ĂŶĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚ
of a referendum, it can also have an impact on public information. When referendums are 
held to ratify a treaty, or agreement, Durham (2009, 192 W93) argues that successful 
ratification, as well as implementation, is fostered by informing and educating communities, 
and creating a genuine discussion between ordinary people on the implications of ratifying 
the agreement. Political elites play an important role in educating voters on the issues at 
stake in the referendum, but this needs to happen allowing for sufficient time for public 
discussion can take place (Lee and Mac Ginty 2012). The secrecy in which the negotiation 
process is undertaken can potently influence the amount, accuracy, or timing of the 
information available to the public on the issues under negotiation, which, as has been 
described, can have an important impact on voting behaviours in referendums.  
 
Spoiler Management/ Political Inclusion 
 
Who is included in the negotiation process, or if and how agreements accommodate the 
interests of certain stakeholders, can determine whether political parties support an 
agreement in a referendum. This, in turn, can shape the organization and the strength of the 
referendum campaigns. However, whose interests should be accommodated in the 
agreement is an issue of ongoing debate in the literature. Stedman (1997; 2002) advised 
mediators to exclude from peace negotiations those leaders who benefit from the status 
quo and have incentives to oppose a peace process. These spoilers are leaders who perceive 
a peace process as threatening to their power, worldview, or interests, and who (are willing 
to) use violence or other means to undermine it. It has been found, however, that parties 
ŵĂǇ ŶŽƚ ƵƐĞ ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ƉĞĂĐĞ ? ^ƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů  ‘ƐƉŽŝůŝŶŐ ?
impacts the peace process in multiple ways: introducing new issues, diverting attention, 
providing marginalized groups with a voice, delaying or postponing talks, preventing 
implementation, or bringing new actors into the talks (Newman and Richmond 2006, 109). 
Secondly, spoilers may attempt to undermine peace negotiations for reasons that are not 
clearly directed at derailing the peace process, such as to signal their desire to be at the 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚĂďůĞ Žƌ ƚŽ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂtion process 
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(Zahar 2003, 270). Thirdly, spoiling may not be entirely negative since it may be a sign that 
the process is progressing and marginalized groups fear losing their marginal relevance with 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?ƐĞŶĚŝŶŐ(Newman and Richmond 2006, 109).  
The complexity and unpredictably of spoiling is a challenge to any mediator who can 
make a decision on, or has an influence over, which representatives get a seat at the 
negotiations table. To Stedman (1997, 9 W11) ?ƐƉŽŝůĞƌƐǁŚŽŚĂǀĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚŽƌĨůĞǆŝďůĞ ? ‘ŐƌĞĞĚǇ ? )
goals ĐĂŶƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇďĞĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞĚĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ŝŶƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?  ‘dŽƚĂů ?
spoilers, on the other hand, are committed only to hegemonic goals and are unwilling to 
ĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ ?ŚĞŶĐĞ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚ ?ĂŚĂƌ (2003, 118 W22), on the other 
hand, calls attention to the danger of peace negotiations themselves creating spoilers by 
profiling actors as such. The author ĐŽŶƚĞƐƚƐ ^ƚĞĚŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ƚǇƉŽůŽŐǇ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŐƌŽƵŶĚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
attempt to profile an actor as a spoiler is risky and does not consider that the attitudes and 
positions of certain actors or groups are not fixed and may change overtime. To the author, 
Ă ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ŝŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ŝƐ ĐƌƵĐŝĂů ƚŽ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐ ƚŽ
renege during settlement implementation. This can be important in the event of a peace 
settlement referendum. Excluding certain actors can create incentives for these actors to 
campaign against the agreement. Therefore, which political representatives are included in a 
negotiation process can potentially shape political support for the peace settlement and the 
relative strength of the campaigns in the referendum and, thereby, potentially influence the 
referendum results. 
 
 Civil Society Inclusion 
 
The existence of an active civil society has been found to favour agreement 
implementation and the durability of peace. To have a civil society actively engaged in a 
peace process has been found to be associated with the emergence of peace agreements 
that are more balanced and more widely perceived as legitimate (Nilsson 2012). Including 
these actors in peace negotiations has also been found to have had a legitimizing effect on 
mediation processes and resulting agreements in an extensive number of processes, such as 
Kenya (Zanker 2013), Congo or Northern Ireland (Rao 2010). It has also been found to have 
ripened peace negotiations in Sierra Leone (Aljets, Chacko, and Jessop 2008) and Liberia 
(Zanker 2013). dŚĞ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ŽĨ tĞƐƚ ĨƌŝĐĂŶ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?  ?Kt^ ) ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ
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Liberia is a particularly interesting case where representatives of civil society groups were 
invited to take part in the negotiations and were encouraged to pressure the parties8. Their 
direct participation has been found to be associated both with the progress of the 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ >ŝďĞƌŝĂŶ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŽŵƉrehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) (Zanker 2013). Civil society groups have, in fact, led successful peace 
mediation processes in Mozambique9 and, more recently, in Tunisia10.  
Civil society groups can be included in peace negotiations in several ways, ranging from 
direct participation, to being given observer status, or taking part in consultative forums. 
Regardless of the way in which they are included, civil society can serve a peace process in 
multiple ways. Civil society groups are in close contact with the public and can function as 
communication channels between the negotiations and the wider communities. Their 
involvement in negotiations has been found to be advantageous in two ways: first, they can 
more accurately communicate public opinion to the negotiations table and, on the other 
hand, they are able to influence the public to support the peace process (Paffenholz, Kew, 
and Wanis-St. John 2006, 68 W70). Including civil society can guaranty that the interests of the 
ǁŝĚĞƌ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ƚŚĞ ĞůŝƚĞ ?Ɛ ? ĂƌĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ŝŶ the process, which generates 
greater elite accountability and grassroots ownership for the agreement (Ibid, 68, 70). 
Particularly in the case of referendums, civil society organisations have been found to play a 
crucial role in informing and engaging the public in an active debate around the implications 
of the agreement, which ultimately fosters ownership of the agreement at the local level 
(Durham 2009, 192 W93).  
The activities of civil society groups, therefore, have been increasingly found to aid peace 
processes, from ripening negotiations, to favouring implementation. Moreover, if civil 
society groups can shape public opinion during peace negotiations and develop information 
campaigns during referendums, they can also potentially shape support for a peace 
                                                          
8
 ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ DĂŶŽ ZŝǀĞƌ tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ WĞĂĐĞ EĞƚǁŽƌŬ ? ƚŚĞ /ŶƚĞƌ-Religious Council on Liberia, the Liberian Bar 
Association and members of the Liberian Diaspora were invited by the mediator to participate in the negotiations between 
the Charles Taylor government, and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebel groups in 2003 (Zanker 2013). 
 
9
 The Community of Sant Egidio, a lay organization of Catholics, mediated the Rome General Peace Accords of 1992 
between the DŽǌĂŵďŝƋƵĞ>ŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ&ƌŽŶƚ ?Ɛ ?FRELIMO) government and the rebel Mozambican National Resistance, which 
marked the end of an almost two decade-long civil war.  
 
10
 The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, an alliance between the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), the Tunisian 
Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), and the Tunisian 




settlement. The role that civil society plays in peace process referendums, however, has not 
yet received much attention from the field, nor has the question of if and how including civil 




Given that peace settlement referendums typically ask voters if they accept, or support, 
the implementation of the agreement reached during negotiations, the content of an 
agreement can expectedly have a considerable impact on referendum results. As was 
described earlier in this chapter, research concerning the durability of peace agreements 
deepened into the study of what agreement characteristics were associated with successful 
agreement implementation. Whether or not peace agreements contained provisions 
concerning certain issues, such as security guarantees (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; 
Pearson et al. 2006, 121), was found to be associated with whether or not an agreement 
would be implemented. The most extensive body of literature concerning this aspect, as was 
described, has developed around how power-sharing provisions affect durability.  
In the event of a peace settlement referendum, whether or not the provisions of an 
agreement satisfy the interests of the political leaderships negotiating them can naturally 
determine whether or not those political leaders and/or political parties will support it in the 
referendum. It can also determine whether or not they will campaign and, if so, if for or 
against it. Haas (1991) and Stedman (1991) have shown that ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ
commit to an agreement is influenced by their capacity to convince their political allies and 
constituents that the agreement is to their benefit. The arrival at an agreement, they found, 
is dependent ƵƉŽŶŚŽǁǁĞůů ŝƚƐ  ‘ĨŽƌŵƵůĂ ? ŝƐĂďůĞ ƚŽƐŽůǀĞ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉs ? problems in publicly 
committing to an agreement with former enemies. Agreement design, therefore, has an 
important impact on ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ  ‘ƐĞůů ? the agreement to their community in 
the run up to the referendum. For example, supporters of consociationalism tend to draw on 
the Northern Ireland case study to argue that power sharing is key in accommodating groups 
competing interests and is, therefore, the only realistic way to achieve a stable solution to 
conflict in divided societies  ?K ?>ĞĂƌǇĂŶĚDĐ'ĂƌƌǇ  ? ? ? ? ?DĐ'ĂƌƌǇĂŶĚK ?>ĞĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?Ă; 2009). 
Secondly, the content of an agreement ĐĂŶ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ŵŽƌĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ƐŚĂƉĞ ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?
decision-making in referendums. In fact, quantitative studies of referendum outcomes 
42 
 
typically study, through public opinion polling and surveys, what aspects of the agreement 
influenĐĞĚǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making in referendums (Rynhold and Cohen 2003; Lordos 2008; 
2009; Somerville and Kirby 2012). However, explanations that draw on agreement provisions 
assume that voters were fully aware of their details and implications, whereas that might 
not actually be the case. Therefore, it is difficult to get a clear picture on the extent to which 
the voters in each community base their voting decision upon the content or the 
implications of the agreements.  
Agreement design, therefore, can influence the political support a peace settlement 
receives in a referendum and, hence, the strength the referendum campaigns. Depending on 
how well informed voters are of the content of the settlement, agreement design can also 
ŵŽƌĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ƐŚĂƉĞ ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ? ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?An analysis of the referendum experience can 
provide a fuller picture on both cases, and a more accurate portrayal of if and how the 
content of the agreements had an impact on the referendum outcomes.  
 
 
Comparing Explanations of the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement Outcomes 
 
Several scholars hold the hE ?Ɛ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ĂƐ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ for the 
failure of the Annan Plan to be accepted in the referendum in Cyprus. The key arguments are 
centred on three factors: secrecy, arbitration, and pressure. Several authors argue that, 
because the Annan Plan was negotiated secretively between political elites, the mediators 
failed to consider, involve, and gain support from other quadrants of society (Drath 2004; 
Michael 2007; Lordos 2009). The arbitration process, by which the Secretary General 
decided on the issues not agreed at Bürgenstock, is considered to have allowed the political 
leaders to appear unaccountable for the final plan, allowing them to campaign against it 
(Kaymak 2012, 106). In the end, it is argued, the UN over-pressured the leaderships by using 
the EU accession date as a deadline for agreement (Drath 2004, 349). However, although the 
same strategies applied to Turkish Cypriots, authors tend use them to explain Greek Cypriot 
rejection without considering Turkish Cypriot acceptance. Michael (2007, 597 W98) is an 
exception to this in arguing ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŵĂũŽƌ ĨůĂǁ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘Annan ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? was that UN 
mediators used these strategies to side-line the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, whilst 
naively taking Greek Cypriot support for granted. In contrast, the strategies used by the 
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mediators have been considered to have contributed to the success of the GFA in Northern 
Ireland. The three-strand negotiation process design, and the decoupling of the 
decommissioning issue from the main negotiations, are two procedural strategies that are 
considered to have positively impacted the process (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 135 W37).  
EĂƚƵƌĂůůǇ ? ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ƚĂŬĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? Žƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? to mean the agreement 
being accepted or not in the referendum. However, there is usually no analysis of the 
referendum process, whilst academic research on voting behaviours in referendums has 
found that the referendum campaign period can have a profound impact on public opinion. 
Therefore, these assessments of the impact of mediation strategy may not actually explain 
referendum results as some claim to do.  
The transformation of spoilers into agreement stakeholders has also been found to 
explain successful agreement implementation in Northern Ireland, specifically regarding the 
inclusion of Sinn Fein in the GFA negotiations (Darby 2001, 15 W26). In fact, the overall 
inclusivity of the negotiations is considered to have facilitated agreement by strengthening 
the more moderate positions and political parties (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 150 W51). 
Additionally ?ďǇ ‘ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞŚĂƌĚůŝŶĞƌhWĂŶĚh<hWƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƚŽůĞĂǀĞ and continuing the 
negotiations, George Mitchell is seen to have successfully side-lined potential spoilers 
(Durkan 1999, 36 W43). In the Annan Plan negotiations case, the side-lining of Turkish Cypriot 
leader, Rauf Denktash, is considered to have been a necessary means to a final agreement 
being reached (Michael 2007, 598). However, these explanations concerning the inclusion 
and exclusion of political groups are only actually explaining why the negotiation processes 
succeeded in getting the parties to an agreement, but not necessarily the impact that 
political inclusion/exclusion had on the referendum results.  
ŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?Ɛ ŝŶǀolvement and public engagement is indicated as an important 
explanatory factor of the referendum outcomes in Cyprus and Northern Ireland. In Northern 
Ireland, civil society effectively contributed to forging intercommunal contacts and back-
channel communication avenues during the negotiations (Hancock 2001; Cochrane 2000; 
2006). Plus, the civil society-ůĞĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ in Northern Ireland is considered to have 
been vital in raising the  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǀŽƚĞ in the Unionist community (Hancock 2011). The lack of 
engagement with the grassroots and of civil society inclusion are, on the other hand, seen to 
have contributed to the failure of the Annan Plan in Cyprus, with the public having a very 
limited influence on the negotiation process (Lordos 2009). The scarcer civil society 
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initiatives in Cyprus, it has been argued, were not properly recognized as a valuable policy 
option at the political level (Hadjipavlou 2002, 15). However, a more developed and active 
Turkish Cypriot civil society is seen as imƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŝŶ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŚŝŐŚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? vote in North 
Cyprus (Bryant 2004). In fact, during the Annan Plan negotiations, the Turkish Cypriot 
community engaged in mass demonstrations in support for the process. 
Civil society mobilization has explanatory potential for the positive result in Northern 
Ireland and the negative referendum result in Cyprus, and can potentially explain the 
differences in the support given by the two Cypriot communities. Did the negotiation 
process involve or stimulate civil society differently in the two cases? How can 
understanding the participation of civil society in the GFA negations and their impact on the 
referendum experience help understand how the same dynamic did, or did not, develop in 
the two separate and simultaneous referendums in Cyprus? 
The design of the agreements has been found in the literature to explain the Annan Plan 
and GFA ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? ?ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ?dŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ
GFA has been said to have allowed the leaders on both sides to better sell the agreement to 
their constituencies. Yet this explanation does not account for the 40 per cent difference 
between the support given to the GFA by each of the two communities in Northern Ireland. 
Mac Ginty (2000, 124 W28, 133) argues that the far-reaching security sector reforms provided 
by the GFA have been considered as crucial for the high support from the Nationalist 
community. Additionally, he argues, 'ĞƌƌǇ ĚĂŵƐ ? ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉĞĂĐĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ĨŽƌ
political propaganda ĐŽůůĂƚĞƌĂůůǇĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ
sense of ownership of the peace process, while making Unionists regard provisions of the 
agreement as republican victories. In the Cyprus case, the security provisions of the Annan 
Plan are frequently indicated as the cause for the GƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ. In fact, the 
main reasoŶƐƚĂƚĞĚĂƚĞǆŝƚƉŽůůƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ? votes among Greek Cypriot voters was security, 
namely the desire for the complete withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island (Lordos 
2009). However, this was the very reason that President Papadopoulos pin-pointed when 
asking Greek Cypriots to vŽƚĞ ‘ŶŽ ? in the referendum (PIO 2004a).  
In sum, mediation strategies, political inclusion, civil society inclusion, and agreement 
ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƌĞĂůůƉĂƌƚŽĨĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĨĂŝůĞĚ ?ŶŶĂŶWůĂŶƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ
 ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?Good Friday agreement referendums. However, upon a closer analysis, existing 
explanations tend to equate success or failure in getting the political leaderships to an 
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agreement at the negotiations table, with the success or failure of the agreement being 
accepted in the referendum. Drawing from research and literature on referendum 
outcomes, with a few exceptions (Michael 2007; Kaymak 2012), one can criticise such 
explanations for assuming that there is a perfect political party alignment in voter behaviour 
in peace process referendums. Although this might actually be the case, without 
acknowledging that this assumption is being made, mediation and/or negotiation-focused 
explanations neglect that the referendum campaign period can deeply shape voting 
behaviours. On the other hand, while explanations drawn from opinion polls can reveal how 
certain provisions of the agreement shaped voting behaviours, they have a limited ability to 
uncover the impact other negotiation and mediation process conditions had on the 
referendum results. A link between one type of explanation and the other is missing. 
Additionally, the fact that some of the explanations presented for the failure of the Annan 
Plan are not considered when authors explain the success of the GFA and vice-versa suggests 
that comparing the two cases has the potential to allow the cases to inform each other.  
 
In reviewing the academic literature on peace negotiations and referendums, this chapter 
has shown that there is a gap between the two literatures that can be bridged to build an 
understanding on how negotiations shape referendum outcomes. As was demonstrated, this 
gap is due to the fact that research on peace negotiations has not yet studied peace process 
referendum results as a negotiation outcome. It is also due to the fact that academic 
research and literature on peace process referendums is a relatively new field of inquiry. As 
was shown, although scholars writing on peace process referendums often make 
recommendations on how negotiation processes can potentiate a positive referendum 
result, their impact on the latter has not yet been consistently studied. The comparison of 
the case studies ? literature also evidenced the larger gap in the literature. Existing 
ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? Žƌ  ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ, it was 
demonstrated, seldom analyse referendum campaign periods and voting behaviours. 
While the review of the wider academic literature on referendums was used to ascertain 
what determines a referendum outcome, peace negotiations literature was used to find 
which specific aspects of the negotiations can potentially shape those determinants. Both 
greatly inform the research design and methodology of the research, which is described in 
detail in the next chapter. 
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2. Research Design and Methodology 
 
The previous chapter has demonstrated that there is a gap in academic research and 
literature concerning how peace negotiations shape referendum outcomes. This chapter 
proposes a research design that sets out to bridge this gap. In order to answer the question 
do peace negotiations influence support for peace settlements in referendums and, if so, how 
(?), the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations and referendums were 
selected for a qualitative comparative case study analysis. This chapter will carefully describe 
and discuss all the methodological choices that were made in designing and conducting this 
type of research. It will further report how the research was carried out and discuss the 
advantages and limitations of the data collected. 
The first methodological choice made concerned the option for a qualitative research 
design and methodology. Studies of referendum results have been done both employing 
quantitative and qualitative methods. While quantitative studies involve public opinion 
polling and surveys, qualitative studies are based on the study of the referendum campaigns 
(for example, Strauss 1993; Schneider and Weitsman 1996; Gilland 2002). Although studies 
based on public opinion polls and surveys will be relevant to the data analysis done here, 
quantitative methods cannot sufficiently answer the research questions posed. A qualitative 
study is needed to explore the links between the negotiations and campaign processes, 
whose complexity cannot be assessed by merely asking and determining what influenced 
individual voting decisions. The disadvantage of a qualitative study of referendum outcomes, 
however, is that it does not allow a claim to be made that the detected casual mechanisms 
are sufficient to explain the referendum outcomes in terms of support percentages. 
Conversely, one of its advantages is that, by exploring which conditions may affect the 
outcome, suggestions can be made on how public opinion research can help better 
understand what characteristics of the negotiations shape support for peace processes and 
settlements.  
Importantly, the in-depth study of both the negotiation process and the referendum 
campaign periods allows for a richer understanding of how peace negotiations may shape 
the broader peace settlement referendum experiences. In doing so, it allows this thesis to 
uncover how characteristics of peace negotiations may have an influence on whether peace 
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settlement referendums are more or less polarizing experiences for the divided societies in 
which they take place.  
The second significant methodological decision made concerned opting for a comparative 
study. A two-case comparison, in particular, has the advantage of allowing for a more 
detailed study than a larger, or even statistical, analysis would. At the same time, it allows 
for greater care to be taken in considering how changes in the wider socio-political and 
international context might have impacted the outcomes under examination. Although this 
ƐŵĂůůĞƌĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶŽŶůǇĂůůŽǁƐĨŽƌ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?(Collier et al. 1996, 56 W91), or 
in other words, for results that are applicable only to socio-political contexts that are similar 
to the ones selected here, it has the advantage of producing results that are more reliable 
and generalizable than a single case study analysis would. Certainly, comparability issues can 
be argued, which are inherent to the fact that there are no two social or political realities 
that are exactly the same. However, there is a serious attempt made here to make use of 
more comparable cases of peace negotiations with settlement referendums. This is 
discussed in the next section.  
 
 
Case Study Selection and Comparability 
 
The comparison between the Cyprus and the Northern Ireland conflicts is increasingly 
common in the study of divided societies as well as in the field of negotiation and mediation 
(for example: Byrne 2000; Irwin 2005; Tannam 2012; Moore et al. 2013; Kocadal 2016). As it 
will be shown here, the comparison of the Good Friday Agreement and Annan Plan 
negotiations and referendums is particularly valuable to understanding what shapes 
referendum results in peace processes. In fact, there are few existing cases of peace 
settlement referendums that could be selected for comparison. The referendums in 
Guatemala in 1999, East Timor in 1999, Iraq in 2005, and South Sudan in 2011 were other 
possible cases. Yet, these do not offer the comparability benefits of the regional focus that 
Cyprus and Northern Ireland offer. On the other hand, the referendums in Bosnia in 1994, or 
those in the Basque Country and Catalonia were not universal plebiscites, with only certain 
groups eligible to vote - the Serbs in the Bosnian case, and the citizens of the (thereafter) 
autonomous regions in the Spanish case. In addition, the referendums in East Timor and 
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South Sudan were independence referendums and not constitutional. The referendum in 
Quebec in 1992, on the other hand, was a non-binding referendum, unlike the Annan Plan 
and the GFA referendums, which can potentially have influenced the referendum 
experiences and results differently.  
More importantly, the two cases were selected for comparison based on the variation of 
the outcome of interest: they are two instances of mediated full settlements placed for 
ratification through referendums, where one was accepted and the other was not. The 
selection of two cases with opposing outcomes aims to overcome potential selection bias 
effects that could result from choosing cases with equal results, which could lead to the 
overestimation of certain explanatory factors (Landman 2003, 45).  
The case selection follows the logic of a most similar systems design (Faure 1994). Both 
cases took place in democratic political systems (although differences in democratic 
credentials could be argued between the cases) and both were shaped by European Union 
enlargement. Specifically, the GFA negotiation process was shaped by ƚŚĞh<ĂŶĚ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
accession to the EU, and the Annan Plan negotiations, profoundly so, by dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚ
accession, as well as ǇƉƌƵƐ ? ŽǁŶ ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ. Secondly, regarding conflict-context 
characteristics, the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus exhibit several similarities 
regarding their origins, characteristics and dynamics. As was described in the introductory 
chapter, they share similar causes, particularly a British colonial history and subsequent local 
struggles for self-determination and political independence. In both, the conflict emerged 
between two communities that are divided along ethnic lines and that are asymmetrical in 
size: the Unionist and Greek Cypriot communities are majoritarian, while the Nationalist and 
Turkish Cypriot communities are the minorities. They are/were both longstanding intractable 
conflicts, where physical separation lines have further increased segregation and 
intractability. An important factor enhancing this intractability has been the involvement of 
external actors. The Nationalist and Unionist communities regard Ireland and Britain, 
respectively, as supporters of their mutually exclusive interests, and as their guardians 
against a perceived threatening  ‘other ?community. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
regard Greece and Turkey, respectively, as protectors and supporters of their causes.  
One important difference between the cases, however, is that while the Cyprus conflict is 
a frozen conflict, where violence has not taken place since 1975, paramilitary violence was a 
feature of the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process well beyond the referendum 
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(although there was a change in intensity and type of violence with the start of the 
negotiation process). Another vital distinction is that, while the Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot communities have not lived together since the buffer zone was created in 1975, this 
has not been the case for the communities in Northern Ireland. Although there were 
segregated areas, it can fairly be stated that the communities in Northern Ireland have lived 
together. The Cypriot communities, on the other hand, only regained limited contact after 
the first crossing point was opened in the buffer zone in 2003. The most significant impact of 
these differences is that, while in Cyprus there were two referendum processes  W one in 
each of the communities  W there was no such division in Northern Ireland.11 These contextual 
differences undoubtedly shaped the negotiations and referendums in each of the cases and 
their impact is considered in the case study analyses performed in thesis.  
Fourthly, regarding the mediation processes, both took place in a post-Cold War context, 
where the international community became committed to the peaceful management of 
conflict and to democratic transition (Maney et al. 2006). In effect, both the Good Friday 
Agreement and the Annan Plan offered a democratic solution and both provide for power-
sharing consociational forms of government. Both negotiation processes faced stalemates 
over issues and time-consuming negotiations over procedural matters, evaders, or media 
leakages, and keeping the negotiations ongoing became an important concern and goal for 
both mediators and their teams ( Mitchell 1999; United Nations 2003). However, the reasons 
for this differed. George Mitchell needed the negotiation process to survive and succeed in 
order to avoid the re-escalation of paramilitary violence, while Annan and De Soto needed it 
in order to seize what was perceived as a historically ripe moment for agreement with 
ǇƉƌƵƐ ? ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂĐǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ h ? hŶĚĞƌ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ƚŽ ŐĞƚ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ĂŶ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? ƚŚĞ
mediators employed different mediation strategies and tactics. These differences are 
important to the present research since it aims to test if and how these behaviours shaped 
the referendums. 
In terms of the referendum outcomes, the comparison of these cases is interesting not 
only because one was rejected and the other accepted, but also due to other factors. Voter 
turnout in both cases was over 80 per cent (United Nations 2004, para. 72; Melaugh and 
McKenna 1998). Adding to the pertinence of the comparison, the differences in the rates of 
support between the communities in the two cases are similar. Although the Annan Plan was 
                                                          
11
 The implications of this difference are discussed when the cases are compared in chapter 5. 
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ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚĚƵĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ůŽǁ  ? ?ƉĞƌ ĐĞŶƚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?
won with 65 per cent of the votes in the Turkish Cypriot community (United Nations 2004, 
para. 72). Similarly, while approximately 96-97 per cent of the Nationalist community voted 
 ‘ǇĞƐ ? in the GFA referendum, there was a lower 51-53 per cent support rate given by the 
Unionist community (Melaugh and McKenna 1998). Therefore, the difference between the 
rates of support given by each of the two communities in their respective referendums is 
similarly of around 40 per cent. In fact, considering the Annan Plan case, it would be 
inaccurate to state that the agreement was rejected completely in the referendum. As was 
stated earlier in this thesis, this study will take into account that the majority of Turkish 
Cypriots actually supported the Plan, which is often neglected. This study, therefore, aims to 
explain both the overall outcomes of the referendums and the differences in support 
between the four communities, namely, the Nationalist and Unionist communities in 
Northern Ireland, and the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus. While in 
the Annan plan case a majority from each of the communities was required for the 
agreement to be ratified, the same was not the case in the GFA referendum. However, it was 
only formally that the GFA referendum only required an overall majority. As Rynhold and 
Cohen (2003, para. 90) argue, it was crucial for the legitimacy of the agreement, and a 
concern during the referendum campaign period, that a majority in both communities 
supported it, as will be described later in this thesis. Therefore the ratification of the 
agreements was, to an extent, dependent on majority support rates from each of the 
communities in both cases. 
Applying the research question to the two case studies, therefore, this research asks did 
the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations lead to opposing referendum 
outcomes and the differences in support between the different local communities and, if so, 
how (?). Common analysis of peacemaking referendum outcomes examine the causes for 
the approval or rejection of a peace settlement. However, to look into what influenced 
support in each of the communities provides insight into what polarizes support. 
Additionally, this disaggregation of the analysis into the results from across the four 
communities allows for a full spectrum of results to be studied. Presented in a descending 
order, they are: 
- the Nationalist community ?s support for the GFA as case of very high support for the 
agreement (96 - 97 per cent); 
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- the Turkish Cypriot ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛhigh support for the Annan Plan (65 per cent); 
- tŚĞhŶŝŽŶŝƐƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐĚŝǀŝĚĞĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞGFA (51- 53 per cent); 
- tŚĞ'ƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐůŽǁƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŶĂŶWůĂŶ ?24 per cent). 
Therefore, the secondary question is to be understood as asking, not only what explains the 
differences between the rates of support given between the two communities within each of 





The main aim of this research is to demonstrate that negotiation process conditions 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƉĞĂĐĞ ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵƐ ?Therefore, the 
analyses of the negotiation process and campaign periods aim at examining how referendum 
outcomes (DV) were influenced by negotiation process conditions (IV). The period of analysis 
in both cases begins at the start of the negotiations until the settlement referendums. In the 
Annan Plan case, it focuses on the period starting with Kofi Annan's appointment as United 
Nations Secretary-General on the 1st of January 1997, until the Annan Plan referendum on 
the 24th of April 2004. The period of analysis in the Northern Ireland case considers the 
events between the elections to the Peace Forum on the 30th of May 1996, until the day of 
the Good Friday Agreement referendum on the 22nd of May 1998. Importantly, the periods 
of time from the day the agreement is reached until the day of the referendum are referred 
to as referendum campaign periods and are not to be confused with referendum 
campaign/s, which refers to the ĂĐƚƵĂů ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ. The referendum campaign 
period in the Annan Plan case took place from the last round of negotiations on the 31st of 
March 2004 until the day of the referendum. In the GFA case, it refers to the period of time 
between the day the agreement was reached on the 10th of April 1998 and the day of the 
referendum.  
The controlled comparison method of George and Bennett (2005) is followed to compare 
the two cases. To ensure the comparability of the individual case findings, each of the case 
study analyses are focused on answering strictly the same research question and objectives, 
and exactly the same variables are analysed in each of the cases. Therefore, the Annan Plan 
and GFA referendum case studies will first be analysed individually. The results of the 
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individual case analyses are then compared in a separate chapter. Each of the individual case 
analyses are strictly structured in the same way and, for additional clarity, its results 
presented in the same order in each of the three chapters. In both the individual case study 
analyses and their comparison it is examined and compared how mediation strategies, 
political inclusion, civil society inclusion and agreement design influenced the referendum 
results. This is done by demonstrating how each of these characteristics of the process 
influenced any of the three referendum outcomes determinants put forward by 
referendums literature, namely, political party support for the agreement, the composition 
ĂŶĚƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶŽ ?ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽ
the public on the issues at stake in the referendum. 
Although the structure of the chapters presents the analysis of each of the negotiation 
process variables independently, it by no means aims to suggest that they have an 
independent impact on the referendum outcome. As it will become evident in the analyses 
themselves, there are significant interactions between these variables that are crucial to 
understanding how the negotiations shaped the referendum results. Additionally, as has 
already been mentioned, there is no intention to claim that only these particular 
characteristics of the negotiation process shaped the referendum outcomes. Rather, it is to 
test if and how these specific aspects had a significant influence. Further, it must be 
acknowledged that the referendum outcomes were influenced by external factors that do 
not pertain to the negotiation process. While there is an effort to consider the impact of 
contextual factors on the referendum outcomes, they are not the focus of this research, 
although their impact is considered and discussed where relevant.  
 
Negotiation Process Variables 
 
Mediation Strategies. One of the aims of this research is to explore and test how and 
what kind of mediator behaviours can potentially influence support in a referendum. 
Therefore, this variable is to be understood in broad terms and to encompass all types of 
mediator behaviours, not only to the three types of mediation strategies typified in the 
literature. One aspect included in this variable is the arbitration, or meditration, procedure 
used in the Annan Plan negotiations, which has not been categorised in the existing types of 
mediation strategies. This is because it is not consensual among scholars whether the use of 
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arbitration practices in Cyprus, and also in Kosovo, surpass or not the boundaries of a 
ŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ?ƐƌŽůĞ ?ƐĞĞ ?for example, Belloni, 2009; Ker-Lindsay, 2009; Ross & Conlon, 2000).  
Communication and coordination with external parties with close relationships to local 
communities is fundamental to the progress and success of a mediation initiative, and crucial 
mediator task. For this reason, this variable is also sensitive to how the mediators involved 
ƚŚĞ ‘ŬŝŶstates ?in the negotiations. dĂŬŝŶŐ<ŽĐĂĚĂů ?Ɛ (2016, 172) definition, the term refers to 
 ‘ƚŚŽƐĞ ƐƚĂtes whose dominant ethnic group identifies with a co-ethnic population that 
ƚƌĂŶƐĐĞŶĚƐƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĂƚƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?The degree to which Greece and Turkey were involved 
in the Annan Plan negotiations was substantially different to what was the case during the 
GFA negotiations. In Northern Ireland, Britain and Ireland were pragmatic in working 
together to expedite the arrival at an agreement during Mitchell's mediation and, for this 
reason, ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ  ‘ƋƵĂƐŝ-ŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌƐ ? (Byrne 2000). Understanding if and how 
these ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂĨĨĞĐƚƐ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉĞĂce settlement in 
the referendum is therefore considered in the analyses of the impact of mediation 
strategies.  
 It must be noted that, both in the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations, 
the roles played by De Soto and Mitchell are not officiĂůůǇ ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ƚŽ ĂƐ  ‘ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?. In 
Cyprus, De Soto provided the  ‘good offices ? of the Secretary General, while George Mitchell 
chaired the All-Party talks. Nonetheless, they both played mediating roles and, like 
commonly done in the literature (for example, Curran & Sebenius, 2003; Curran et al., 2004; 
Michael, 2007; Richmond, 1998), they are referred to and analyzed in this thesis as such.  
 
Political Inclusion. Another aim of this research is to ascertain whether differences in the 
participation of political stakeholders in each of the cases had an impact on the referendum 
outcomes. This variable, therefore, refers to if and how the different political parties across 
the political spectrum in each of the cases were included in the negotiation process. This 
research is, however, also interested in investigating beyond formal forms of participation. 
Therefore, a political party or political leader, will be considered to have been included in the 
negotiations if more indirect or covert forms of participation took place, specifically informal 
Žƌ ĨŽƌŵĂůĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌƐ ?&Žƌ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ? ŝƐƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽ
 ‘ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ƐŝŶĐĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇ ƌĞĨĞrs to having a seat at the 
negotiations table. However, political inclusion has here a slightly different meaning to that 
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meant by DĐ'ĂƌƌǇĂŶĚK ?>ĞĂƌǇ(2006b, 256 W57). In their work, the authors used the term 
 ‘ŝŶĐůƵƐŝǀŝƚǇ ?ĂƐĂƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐin this thesis it 
is used as a quality of the negotiations per se. Although one stems from the other, the 
considerations the authors make about inclusivity are about the implementation of the 
agreement and not the negotiation process as it is meant here. 
 
Civil Society Inclusion. The term civil society can be understood to encompass a varying 
array of actors depending on how the concept is defined. For example, the United Nations 
ĚĞĨŝŶĞƐĐŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƚŚŝƌĚƐĞĐƚŽƌ ? of society, distinct from government and business 
(United Nations, n.d.). The World Bank dĞĨŝŶĞƐ Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ĂƐ  ‘a wide array of non-
governmental and not-for-ƉƌŽĨŝƚ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?that publicly express the ethical, cultural, 
political, scientific, religious or philanthropic interests and values of their groups (World 
Bank, n.d.). Civil society actors, therefore, can encompass many kinds of individuals or 
organisations, from private citizens to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), or from 
citizens associations to religious organisations, or worker and business unions.  
Paffenholz and Spurk (2006, 13) find that civil society develops seven types of functions: 
protecting citizens; monitoring political accountability; advocacy and public communication; 
socialization; community-building; intermediation and facilitation between citizens and 
state; and providing services to citizens, particularly in cases where the state has become 
unable or unwilling to do so. Further, although the term civil society is commonly associated 
with constructive, non-coercive and non-violent practices, not all authors agree on this 
point. For example, Cochrane's (2006, 255) definition of civil society includes non-
governmental groups or associations which can negatively affect a peace process, such as 
paramilitary or certain ethnocentric organisations. Despite this perspective, armed groups 
are not considered as part of the fabric of civil society in this thesis for two reasons. First, 
while armed groups may emerge within a similar dynamic as civil society groups, groups who 
take up arms have claims to political power, whereas this is not typically the purpose or aim 
ŽĨĐŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ. Secondly, and more specifically in this study, paramilitary 
groups in Northern Ireland were represented, albeit never assumedly in the case of Sinn 
Féin, by political parties in the negotiation process. Therefore, their inclusion in the peace 
negotiationƐŝƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĞĚĨŽƌŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ?
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For the purpose of testing if and how the inclusion of civil society actors has an influence 
on the referendum outcomes in the selected cases, the term civil society is defined here to 
comprise non-violent organizations or groups (both civil society organizations and non-
governmental organizations), whose civic voluntary activities are separate from state 
institutions, but not necessarily political parties. This derives from the need to include the 
EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ, since the party 
was created precisely ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ŽĨ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ ǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?
interests at the negotiations. Again, to be highly sensitive to the existence of any type of 
contact and relationship between civil society actors and negotiators or mediators, inclusion 
is understood in broad terms. Taking from Paffenholz (2014, 76 W77), the following forms of 
participation or interaction will be considered as forms of inclusion of civil society actors in 
the negotiation process, ordered from the most to the least direct: direct representation at 
the negotiations table; observer status at the negotiations (informal presence at the 
negotiations); participation in official consultative forums that run parallel to the 
negotiations; less formal consultations with negotiators and mediators; inclusion in post-
agreement implementation mechanisms; and high-level civil society initiatives that aim at 
supporting the negotiation process. The author also considers any kind of mass action, like 
protests, demonstrations or petitions, as forms of civil society participation. Further forms of 
public participation include, for example, public hearings or public opinion polls and 
referendums. However, this research takes the view that forms of public participation are 
better understood as a category of their own, rather than a form of civil society 
participation. Therefore, forms of wider public participation are not included in the civil 
society inclusion variable. 
 
Agreement Design. Peace settlement referendums typically ask voters whether they 
accept or reject the agreement reached in the negotiations. Given that the text of the 
agreement is the central focus of the referendum, it is relevant to investigate if and how the 
types of issues negotiated and the compromises reached during the negotiations shape the 
referendum campaign periods and its outcome. This variable, therefore, encompasses all the 
negotiated issues reflected in the final agreement, which vary depending on the conflict 
context at hand. Nonetheless, negotiated settlements typically contain provisions on issues 
relating to territory, security, power-sharing institutions, or human rights.  
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Referendum Outcome Variables 
 
TŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ?ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞrendum result will be determined by 
analysing if and how each of them shaped political support for the agreement, the shape and 
strength of the referendum campaigns, and public information and uncertainty. Although 
the impact of the negotiation process variables on each of these determinants is studied and 
presented individually, the referendum outcome is rather a product of the interplay 
between them. As explained in the previous chapter, the less informed the public is about 
the issues under referendum, the higher the likelihood that voters will follow their political 
parties and leaders' position in the referendum and the more competitive and influential the 
campaigns will be. This interplay will be considered in the analyses.  
 
Political Party Support. Studies on referendums using quantitative methods frequently 
ůŽŽŬĂƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌǀŽƚĞƌƐĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞŝƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐŽƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ǀŽƚŝŶŐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶ
ƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ?ŝŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?political alignment. Through the qualitative research 
done here, however, it was not possible to determine whether voters followed their political 
parties or not. Nevertheless, this has already been done for the two cases (Lordos 2008; 
Hayes and McAllister 2001). The research presented in this thesis, therefore, investigates its 
antecedent condition of whether or not political parties supported the agreement in the 
referendum and, hence, is what is to be understood by political party support. Therefore, 
this study examines ŝĨ ĂŶĚ ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ƐŚĂƉĞĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ? dŚĞ ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ
quantitative studies on voter political alignment, nonetheless, will be used to critically assess 
ĂŶĚ Ĩŝůů ĂŶǇ ŐĂƉƐ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?Ɛ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ? By differentiating political party support from 
voter political party alignment, this research is sensitive to the fact that whether political 
leaders support an agreement does not necessarily translate to votes in the referendum, 
which is often confused in the analysis of peace negotiations. 
 
Referendum Campaigns. Political parties are important campaigners in referendums, but 
they are not necessarily the only ones campaigning. As was stated in the previous chapter, 
civil society actors play a crucial role as campaigners in informing and mobilising a 
community towards engaging in an active debate around the implications of the agreement, 
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(Durham 2009, 192 W93). Depending on who is involved in them, how well organized they 
are, and the resources that they use, campaigns can be more or less effective in influencing 
voters. Therefore, this research looks at how those negotiation process conditions might 
have shapeĚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĂŶd  ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐŝŶƚŚĞƚǁŽĐĂƐĞƐ ?
The composition of the campaign refers to which political or civil society actors were active 
in them. Strength is measured through the resources available to them and their capacity to 
mobilize people. 
 
Public Information and Uncertainty. Given that a qualitative study is being conducted, this 
research is concerned primarily with whether the information was available to the public. 
Nonetheless, this study also makes use of quantitative surveys in order to ascertain whether 
or not the public was informed. Given the nature of the type of referendums under 
examination, the texts of the agreement are categorized as public information since it is the 
agreement itself that is being placed for referendum. However, despite the public nature of 
an agreement, the secrecy of the negotiation process can potentially affect both when and 
how much information is available to the public prior to the agreement being made public. 
Therefore, this research is interested not only in the availability of information about the 
text of the agreement during the referendum, but also in the information available about 
what was being negotiated during the process.  
 
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The interview data analysed in this thesis was collected through semi-structured face-to-
face and telephone interviews conducted in Cyprus and Northern Ireland during the first 
semester of 2014. A total of 46 semi-structured interviews were conducted with political 
leaders, civil society groups and individuals involved in the negotiations or campaigns, as 
well as academic experts and journalists. Interviews were selected as the main method of 
data collection for several reasons. Firstly, it was crucial for this research to uncover the 
political decision-ŵĂŬŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐďĞŚŝŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝons to support 
or not support the agreement in the referendum. These elite interviews were also critical to 
test the theory beyond official accounts. Interview-making allowed for information to be 
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acquired that only the people involved in the negotiation process and referendum 
campaigns could provide: how they behaved and how they explain/justify their own 
behaviour during the negotiations and referendum; what a negotiator remembered and 
perceived of other ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐbehaviours and why; how they understand and explain the 
trajectory of the negotiation process and referendum results and why; what succeeded or 
ĨĂŝůĞĚ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƉŽŝŶƚ ?Secondly, it was thƌŽƵŐŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞƌƐ ?
personal accounts that this study was able uncover how negotiation process conditions 
influenced the organization and strength of the referendum campaigns. This was done by 
asking interviewees what helped or constricted their ability to develop their campaigning 
activities and to organise and mobilise the people in support, or against, the agreement.   
While the personal accounts collected through interview-making are the more suitable 
data for the analysis intended by this research, other sources, such as official documents, 
memoirs, and media reports, are used in the case study analyses particularly to test 
interview data through triangulation. The interviews also served to provide new information 
to advance (and bridge) research on mediation and referendum processes and to 
demonstrate the casual relations between them. Above all, interview data allowed a 
reconstruction of the negotiations and the referendum campaign periods  W targeted in the 
interviews through direct and focused questions  W that was sensitive to the potential causal 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ? dŚŝƐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ƚŚŝƐ ƐƚƵĚǇ ƚŽ  ‘ƐƚŝƚĐŚ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚs with other sources that serve to produce a more detailed 
picture of those relationships.  
  
Interview Subject Selection 
 
 The interview subjects were selected based on the independent and dependent 
variables. This meant that subjects were selected for either having participated in the 
negotiation process or having been involved in the referendum campaigns. In addition, 
journalists who reported on the negotiations and referendums were interviewed for two 
reasons. First, this allowed for the secrecy of the negotiation processes to be tested by 
comparing the access journalists had to information on the negotiations in each of the cases. 
Additionally, it was important to take into account and compare the role that the media 
played in each of the referendums, given that the media can play a significant role in 
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informing the public and shaping opinion during the referendum campaigns. Academics and 
other officials, including members of the UN Good Offices Mission in Cyprus, were 
interviewed for their expertise as well as to explore alternative perspectives and 
explanations.  
Of the 46 interviews undertaken in 2014, 22 were conducted either face-to-face or via 
telephone with political leaders. Among these were a total of 20 members of the Annan Plan 
and GFA negotiation teams. The remaining 26 interviews were conducted with 
representatives of civil society groups and indiǀŝĚƵĂůƐǁŚŽǁĞƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶŽ ? 
campaigns, journalists and academics.  
The fieldwork in Cyprus was conducted from the 15th of January to the 28th of February 
2014. A total of 27 face-to-face interviews were conducted both in the Republic of Cyprus 
and the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). 13 were conducted with 
political party representatives from both communities, including 3 who were members of 
the Greek Cypriot negotiation teams and 2 of the Turkish Cypriot negotiating team. Another 
2 interviewees were current staff of the UN Good Offices Mission, however not part of the 
mediation team during the Annan Plan negotiations. 16 were individuals or representatives 
of Civil Society and NGOs ǁŚŽǁĞƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶŽ ? campaigns or bi-communal 
activities about the Annan Plan, as well as academics and journalist.  
The fieldwork in Northern Ireland was carried out from the 27th of May to the 6th of July 
2014. A total of 19 interviews were conducted, from which twelve were political party 
delegates representing the several political parties who negotiated the GFA. Two NI 
tŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŝnterviewed both for their activity as politicians and as 
civil society representatives. The remaining subjects were other civil society activists - one of 
which was the director of the civil society-ůĞĚ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ - journalists and academics.  
The sampling process was done differently on the two variables. On the negotiation 
process variable, subjects were specifically targeted for having participated in the 
negotiations as members of a negotiation team/delegation. Although this represented a 
wide political spectrum in the Northern Ireland case, this was not the case in the Annan Plan 
negotiations. In Cyprus, politicians from political parties who did not directly participate in 
the negotiations were also interviewed. Their testimony was still relevant because their 
parties led referendum campaigns and, most importantly, because it was an aim of this 
research to determine if they were included in the negotiations in an informal way. At this 
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political level, therefore, the selection of interview subjects aimed at including all the 
political parties existing during the periods of analysis, meaning, during the negotiations and 
up until the referendums. The selection was, of course, also determined by accessibility and 
availability of the target (elite) population at hand.  
In both cases, all political leaders were interviewed for information regarding the 
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ ?dŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĂƐŬĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŝƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ
in the referendum, as well as their campaigning activities. Additionally, because not only 
politicians were involved in the campaigns, individuals and groups who were active in the 
referendum campaigns were selected through a snowballing process. The aim here was to 
access those who were most active during, and able to provide information about, the 
referendƵŵƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ǇĚŽŝŶŐƚŚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝĞůĚ ? informed the researcher on potential sources 
of information and interview subjects. As a result, representatives of civil society and NGOs, 
as well as individuals who were active iŶƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐǁĞƌĞƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚĨŽƌĂŶ
interview. Civil society actors were specifically asked about their possible involvement in the 
negotiation process. This was significant since it is one of the variables of interest in this 
research.  
/ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ĂŶ ĞĨĨŽƌƚ ƚŽ ĐŽůůĞĐƚ ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵ ďŽƚŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶŽ ?
campaigns from each of the communities. The resulting sample of participants is in itself 
significant. It was not possible to find  ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽŝĐĞƐ in the Nationalist community and attempts 
ƚŽĐŽŶƚĂĐƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐǁŚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞdƵƌŬŝƐŚǇƉƌŝŽƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇǁĞƌĞ
fruitless. The sample, however, reflects the fact that there ǁĂƐŶŽ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ
National community and, in the other case, that there was a reduced number of actors in 
the  ‘no ? campaign in the Turkish Cypriot community - which was mainly led by one political 
party. Furthermore, it reflects the weight of the referendum results in each of the 
communities. Therefore, the resulting sample selection does not present any significant bias 
concern.  
 To increase the transparency and convey the validity of the samples made, a table of 
interview subjects is provided for each case in annexes 1 and 2. The resulting sample was 
also constrained by a few factors. Some of the preferential interview subjects were already 
deceased, for example, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Papadopoulos and 
Denktash. It was also not possible to find contact information to reach some of the subjects, 
or some did not respond to contacts. Only one of the persons contacted declined the 
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request for an interview due to illness. Interestingly, there was a very positive rate of 
acceptance to participate in the interview research among political leaders. As a result, this 
research has gathered rich interview data from members of the negotiating teams in both 
cases. The great majority of the interviews were performed in Nicosia and Belfast. 
 
Access to Subjects and Data Collection Methods 
 
 All interviewees consented to the interview in writing. Each subject was asked to consent 
to an audio recording of the interview as well as to the publication of their identity. 
Anonymity was provided upon request. The majority of the interviewee data was recorded 
in digital audio files, unless permission to record was not granted. In such cases, which 
amounted to only 3 interviews, information was collected through written notes.  
Several strategies were used to reach interview participants. The great majority of 
subjects, especially in Cyprus, were contacted first via e-mail and the meeting arranged 
through e-mail exchanges. Several contacts were established through snowballing or by 
casual contact with local people. Interview participants at the grassroots level and personal 
integration with the local and academic community were crucial to gaining access to some 
political figures. When contact information was provided by a third person, most frequently 
ƉŚŽŶĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐ ?  ‘ĐŽůĚĐĂůůƐ ?ǁĞƌĞ made to the prospective participant. No interviews were 
declined when subjects were contacted via telephone. Overall, interview participants 
themselves were extremely helpful, both in Cyprus and Northern Ireland, in reaching other 
potential interview subjects.  
To ensure the comparability of the data acquired in both studies, the same interview 
scripts were used for the interviews conducted in Cyprus and Northern Ireland. Scripts of the 
interviews are presented in annexes 3 and 4. The length of the interviews varied, depending 
on the time constraints of the participant or the amount of information he/she was 
able/willing to provide. The shortest interview is 21min long and the longest took place over 







Interview Data Analysis 
 
Since this research's focus is on the (historical) process that begins with the negotiations 
of the text of the agreements and culminates with the days of the referendums, the 
interviews served to uncover a chain of events. More importantly, interviews were 
necessary to learn about the subjects' experiences and motivations. Interview data was 
generated, not to serve as mere illustrations of the cases at hand, but as evidence. 
Therefore, care was taken to generate reliable information and to perform a rigorous 
analysis of the interview data. Towards this end, a critical evaluation of the subjects was 
made during the sampling process: who they are, to whom and for what purpose they are 
speaking  W agenda  W and the circumstances and position they are speaking from (George and 
Bennett 2005, 99).  
Both before and during the analysis and documentation of the findings, an assessment of 
the data gathered was undertaken, as suggested by Davies (2001). During this, hearsay was 
discarded and first-hand information was valued. The access of the interviewee to the 
ĞǀĞŶƚƐǁĂƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ?ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞ ?ƐƚƌĂĐŬƌĞĐŽƌĚŽĨƌĞůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ  Wthis was 
ascertained by gathering information on subjects and enquiring about them in the larger 
field. Additionally, as suggested by Dexter (2006), the comprehensibility, plausibility and 
consistency of the testimony given was controlled. This critical assessment of the reliability 
and validity of the data, whether documental or interviewee data, will allow the level of 
uncertainty of the findings to be discussed and established. Additionally, the multitude of 
sources for data collection aims at improving this very reliability of the findings since a wide 
range of, sometimes competing, perspectives were gathered. The reliability of the findings is 
also believed to have been improved by the way the sample was drawn ƚŽĐĂƉƚƵƌĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ŶŽ ? ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ  ?ďĞŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌ ƐƵůƚŝŶŐ ƐĂŵƉůĞ have already been 
considered).    
To assure the most rigorous research possible, there was an effort in this thesis to convey 
that reality is being reported in the analysis (Bleish and Pekkanen 2013). In this sense, 
quotations are not used as an adornment but to communicate and represent what was, or 
was not, the direction of a participant's response. Some quotations are made to compare 
responses in order to detect agreement, expose extremes amongst responses, or to explain 
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the participant's actions. Uncertainty about the data is reported by displaying divergence, or 
range of dissonance, of opinion in responses. 
The two case studies will be analysed in depth in the two upcoming chapters. The 
interview data collected in each of the two locations will be analysed together with other 
documental data to demonstrate first, how the Annan Plan negotiations shaped the 
referendum results in Cyprus. This analysis will, actually, show that the negotiation process 
and referendum experiences were different in each of the communities and these 
differences in the negotiation experiences can explain the divergent referendum results 
between the Cypriot communities. The chapter thereafter will follow the same research 
procedures and abide by the same structure in presetting the findings on the Northern 




3. The Annan Plan Negotiations and Referendum 
 
The rejection of the Annan Plan in its referendum is precisely an example of the re-
occurring problematic event in peace negotiations that this thesis addresses. In the search 
for an understanding on how negotiations influence peace settlement referendum 
outcomes, this chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the Annan Plan negotiations and 
referendum in Cyprus. The aim of the analysis is to ascertain if the specific characteristics of 
the negotiation process under study shaped the overall result of the referendum. However, 
because the Annan Plan was rejected due to Greek Cypriot, but not Turkish Cypriot rejection, 
this chapter also aims to determine if the features of the negotiation process considered in 
this study ŚĂĚĂŶŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞŝŶƚŚĂƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ. 
 The Annan Plan negotiations were launched by the UN Good Offices mission in 1999 in 
an effort to reach a peace settlement that would allow Cyprus to join the European Union 
(EU) as a united country. From 1999 until March 2004, Secretary General Kofi Annan and his 
Special Representative, Álvaro de Soto, mediated the negotiations between the Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders. As agreed in the negotiations, the final text of the 
agreement did not require their endorsement. Rather, it was left to each of the communities 
at large to refuse or accept it in separate, but simultaneous, referendums - north and south 
of the divided island. The Annan Plan referendums were held on the 24th of April 2004 and 
were the first ever referendum experience in Cyprus. For the Plan to come into force a 
ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? vote was required from the both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot 
communities to the question: 
Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its Annexes, as well as the 
constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to 
the laws to be in force, to bring into being a new state of affairs in which Cyprus 
joins the European Union united?  
 
The results were nearly polar opposites: in the Greek Cypriot-administered Republic of 
Cyprus, the plan was rejected by 75.8 per cent of voters, while 64.9 per cent of voters in 
North Cyprus voted in favour (United Nations 2004, para. 72). In fact, the physical and 
psychological separation between the two communities allowed for, not only very different 
results in each of the communities, but also two very different referendum experiences that 
will be ĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?dŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ? given to the Plan by the Greek Cypriot community 
on the 24th of April prevented the island from unifying prior to the date set for EU accession. 
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A divided Cyprus acceded to the European Union and, although the EU takes the whole of 
the territory of the island to be part of the EU, only the Republic of Cyprus has enjoyed full 
membership, later becoming part of the EURO currency area.12  
Characteristics of the negotiation process, such as the arbitration procedure, the secrecy 
of the process, the use of the EU deadline to apply pressure, and the failure to involve civil 
society groups in the negotiations, have all been pin-pointed as explanations of why the 
Annan Plan was rejected (Lordos 2009; Drath 2004; Michael 2007). However, these 
explanations are limited in two ways. First, while they help us understand how the 
negotiations shaped the outcome in the Greek Cypriot community, they do not for the 
Turkish Cypriot. This chapter will demonstrate that the negotiations mediated by the UN 
Good Offices Mission helped shape the differing referendum experiences and results on 
each side of the island. It will show that political party support for the plan, the shape and 
ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽǀŽƚĞƌƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
one-month campaign period, between the last round of negotiations and the day of the 
referendum, differed in the communities.  
 Secondly, with a few exceptions (Kaymak 2012; Michael 2007), authors typically do not 
analyse the referendum campaign periods. Given these deficiencies, existing explanations of 
ǁŚǇ ƚŚĞ ŶŶĂŶ WůĂŶ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ  ‘ĨĂŝůĞĚ ? ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ĨƵůůǇĞǆƉůŽƌĞ ŚŽǁ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ĂƐpects of the 
negotiation shaped the campaign period and, potentially, voting behaviours. The case study 
analysis done here will demonstrate that mediation secrecy, coupled with the arbitration 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ ? ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ the Annan Plan in the 
referendum, but also helped the highly politically-ďĂĐŬĞĚ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĂƉŽŽƌůǇ
engaged and poorly informed Greek Cypriot community. The reverberation of negative 
ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ŝƚis argued, was counteracted by a 
more inclusive process, and a much earlier start of public and media debate on the Annan 
Plan in the Turkish Cypriot community.  
This chapter begins by describing the Annan Plan negotiation process, from the first 
round of proximity talks in 1999, until the final round of negotiations at Bürgenstock, 
Switzerland, in March 2004. It then proceeds to analyse how those aspects of the 
negotiations under comparison, namely, how the mediation strategies, political party 
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 A number of EU programs have, nonetheless, financially supported the economic development and infra-structure 
development in North Cyprus in an effort to reduce the economic gap between the communities.  
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inclusion, ĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ƐŚĂƉĞĚƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵƐŝŶƚŚĞ
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. It concludes with a synthesis of the case 




The Annan Plan Negotiations 
 
/Ŷ  ? ? ? ? ?ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚ ŐƌĂŶƚĐĂŶĚŝĚĂĐǇƐƚĂƚƵƐƚŽdƵƌŬĞǇ ?
Kofi Annan and his Special Adviser, Álvaro de Soto, launched a new effort to reach a 
settlement that would, hopefully, allow for the Treaty of Accession to the EU to be signed by 
a reunited Cyprus. When the talks began, the Greek Cypriot community was represented by 
President Glafkos Clerides, the leader of the centre-right Democratic Rally (DISY). Clerides 
ďĞĐĂŵĞ WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ŝŶ Ă ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ĨŽƌŵĞƌ WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ sĂƐƐŝůŝŽƵ ?Ɛ ĐĞŶƚƌĞ-left 
United Democrats (EDI). Rauf Denktash, the head of the centre-right National Unity Party 
(UBC), represented the Turkish Cypriot community, as he had since UN-sponsored talks 
ďĞŐĂŶ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ?  ĨŝǀĞ ƌŽƵŶĚƐ ŽĨ  ‘ƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ
ƚĂůŬƐ ? ǁĞƌĞ ŚĞůĚ ŝŶ 'ĞŶĞǀĂ ĂŶĚ EĞǁ zŽƌŬ ? dŚĞƐĞ ƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ ƚĂůŬƐ ǁĞƌĞ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?
unsuccessful in getting the leaders to agree to hold face-to-face negotiations on a 
ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ?ůŽĐŬŝŶŐƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞhEƐƚĂƚĞĚ ?ǁĂƐĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?ƐĚĞŵĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ
the TRNC be recognized as an independent state before any direct talks take place. 
Denktash believed that the UN Security Council had put Turkish Cypriots at a disadvantage 
in the negotiations by recognizing the Republic of Cyprus as a legitimate state, and thus not 
treating both parties on an equal basis (United Nations 2003, para. 24).  
It was not until December 2001 that Denktash would agree to hold direct talks. The 
breakthrough was possible due to two events: first, the Secretary General ?Ɛ ƉƵďůŝĐ
ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĞƋƵĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐ ? of the two parties must be recognized in the final plan; and 
sĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ? ĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?Ɛ ŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ h ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ƐǁĂǇĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
statement that it would accommodate any special arrangements needed to reduce 
economic disparities between the two sides (United Nations 2003, paras. 30 W32). It was 
thereafter agreed that the talks would start ǁŝƚŚ ‘ŶŽƉƌĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚǁŝth all issues back 
on the table. Procedurally, the negotiations would rely on the issuing of draft proposals by 
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the UN Good offices mission that would continuously be revised after consultation with the 
parties. They would take place ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŝƐĂŐƌĞĞĚƵŶƚŝůĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐŝƐ
ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ?(United Nations 2001).  
In Paris in November 2002, the Secretary General presented the  ‘Basis for Agreement on 
a Comprehensive SĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǇƉƌƵƐWƌŽďůĞŵ ? to both Cypriot leaders, and the Prime 
Ministers of Greece and Turkey. According to the document, the negotiations would take 
place in a three-track framework: track I negotiations between the Cypriot leaders; track II 
negotiations on security issues between Greece and Turkey regarding their military 
presence on the island; and track III negotiations on specific issues between technical 
committees. During the negotiations, technical committees were created to work on 
cooperation and agreement in specific conflict issues. This allowed for the main political 
negotiations process to focus on core issues.13 Importantly, all parties would commit to 
reaching a final agreement by the 28th of February 2003, to then submit the plan to separate 
and simultaneous referendums on the 30th of March 2003. This would allow for a reunited 
Cyprus to sign the Treaty of Accession to the EU at the Copenhagen European Council 
Summit on the 16th of April of 2003 (United Nations 2003, para. 43).  
The decision to have the final agreement ratified by a referendum and not by the leaders, 
the Secretary General ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ǁĂƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶ  ‘ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ  ? Q )ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨƌĞƵŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
Cyprus should be an act not of the leaders ďƵƚŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞŽŶĞĂĐŚƐŝĚĞ ? (ibid, para. 72). 
However, Michaelis Papapetrou, ǁŚŽǁĂƐĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨůĞƌŝĚĞƐ ?ĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? stated in the 
interview conducted for this research, that to hold a referendum was a decision aimed at 
ďǇƉĂƐƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĞĚ ĨŽƌ ĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?Ɛ ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĂů ƉůĂŶ (Papapetrou 2014). The 
document, therefore, was designed to have the leaders sign, not the entire agreement 
itself, but a two-page commitment to submit it to the separate and simultaneous 
referendums (United Nations 2003, para. 55).  
The events that took place at the Copenhagen summit, however, marked an important 
shift in the dynamics of the negotiation process. Denktash declined to attend the final round 
of negotiations set to take place in the days preceding the Summit (United Nations 2003, 
para. 47). At the Summit, with Greece threatening to veto the 10 country accession 
package, EU leaders accepted Cyprus as a new member. This meant that, since reunification 
                                                          
13
 The Committee on Missing Persons, for example, has been considered the most successful committees in the 
negotiations (Kovras 2014, 46). 
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was no longer a pre-condition for accession, the strategy originally devised by Holbrooke to 
use EU accession as an incentive for the leaders to reach a political solution to the Cyprus 
problem was no longer in place. 
Track I negotiations resumed in January 2003 and were briefly interrupted by the 
Presidential elections in the Republic. Christophoros Fokaides, who was interviewed in the 
quality of spokesperson for DISY at the time ĂŶĚ ĞǆƉĞƌƚ ŽŶ ůĞƌŝĚĞƐ ? ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĐĂƌĞĞƌ
(Fokaides 2014b)14, explained that, due to old age, Clerides had promised to not run for 
another term and suppoƌƚůĞĐŽƐDĂƌŬŝĚĞƐ ?ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂĐǇĨŽƌ /^z ?ƐƉĂƌƚǇůĞĂĚĞƌ ?However, due 
to external pressures, Clerides decided to re-run to govern for the 19 months necessary to 
finish the Annan Plan negotiations and reunify the island (Fokaides 2014). With the DISY 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐǇĚŝǀŝĚĞĚŽǀĞƌDĂƌŬŝĚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚůĞƌŝĚĞƐ ?ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂĐŝĞƐ ?lerides lost his re-election 
to Tassos Papadopoulos, the leader of the right-wing and traditionally nationalistic 
Democratic Party (DIKO). With the support of AKEL, the communist party led by Demetris 
Christofias, Papadopoulos ran his presidential campaign affirming that, like Clerides, he 
wished that Cyprus accede to the EU as a united country, but that he could get Greek 
Cypriots a better agreement (Fokaides 2014a; Faustmann 2014; Hadjidemetriou 2014).  
On the 10th of March 2003 at The Hague, Papadopoulos and Denktash were to decide on 
the signing of the two-page covering-document that committed them to putting the plan to 
a referendum. Papadopoulos agreed to sign the document, as long as the gaps regarding 
federal legislation and constituent state constitutions would be filled before the 
referendum. Denktash had fundamental objections to the plan and requested a re-start of 
negotiations from square one, since the Greek Cypriot counter-part had changed (United 
Nations 2003, para. 57). Faced with the deadlock, Kofi Annan announced the end of the 
negotiation process and held Denktash responsible for its dismay (ibid, para. 135-138).15 
However, he left the Plan  ‘on the table ? in case the leaders were to have the political will to 
carry it forward in the future (ibid, para. 60). 
Despite the failed negotiations, the Treaty of Accession to the EU was signed by 
Papadopoulos on the 16th of April 2003. In North Cyprus, the lost opportunity to become 
part of the EU fuelled ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?Ɛ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ  ?ůĐŝů  ? ? ? ? ) ? /ŶĂŶ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ to 
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 Christophoros Fokaides is also the current Minister of Defense of the Republic of Cyprus. 
 
15
 Kofi Annan describes Denktash position as one that, being consistent throughout the decades, failed to recognize the 




appease his community, Denktash took the unilateral decision to open crossing points along 
the Green Line. For the first time since 1974, the communities were able to visit the other 
side of the island. Still, the parliamentary elections later that year would reflect DenŬƚĂƐŚ ?Ɛ
decreasing popularity, when pro-solution politician Mehmet Ali Talat was elected Prime 
Minister. To form a government, however, Talat, leader of the pro-solution Republican 
Turkish Party (CTP) had to form a coalition with the Democratic Party (DP) led by Serdar 
Denktash, son of Rauf Denktash. In parallel, in January 2003, Recep Tayyip Erdogan had 
become Prime Minister of Turkey and began actively pursuing EU membership, which was 
dependent upon a solution to the Cyprus problem. Consequently, Turkey no longer 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?ƐƵŶĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐƚĂŶĐĞĂƚƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ďƵƚ ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚĐŚŽƐĞƚŽďĂĐŬ
the opposition and pro-solution parties in the TRNC. ConƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ? ĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ
within the Turkish Cypriot delegation was progressively reduced (Talat 2014), as will be 
further demonstrated in this chapter. 
With the new political configuration on the Turkish side, Annan invited the respective 
leaders to New York in February 2004. The goal was now to ensure that the negotiations 
would be completed by the 31st of March to allow the referendum to take place before the 
1st of May - the day the treaty of accession to the European Union would come into force. 
Both sides would come to agree that a first phase of negotiations would take place in Cyprus 
until the 22nd of March. If by then no agreement had been reached, the Secretary General 
would call on the participation and collaboration of Greece and Turkey for a final round of 
negotiations in Bürgenstock, Switzerland (United Nations 2004, para. 10). This three-phased 
negotiation ?ŶŶĂŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ǁĂƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚďǇĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?ƐĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽǁŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐdĂůĂƚĂŶĚ
Serdar Denktash) and envisioned the novel arbitration procedure. In the case that no 
finalized agreement was reached, and after consultation with the parties, the Secretary 
'ĞŶĞƌĂůǁĂƐŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌƚŽ ‘ĨŝůůŝŶƚŚĞďůĂŶŬƐ ? of the agreement and present a final plan 
that the leaders would place for referendum in their respective communities (ibid, para. 12). 
During phase one, however, a volte-face occurreĚ ? <ŽĨŝ ŶŶĂŶ ǁƌŽƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŚŝůĞ  ‘ Q ? ƚŚĞ
dƵƌŬŝƐŚǇƉƌŝŽƚƐŝĚĞ ?ǁĂƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞŽŶ'ƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ? Q )ĂŶĚ
sought to make counter-ŽĨĨĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ĚĞĂůƐ ? (ibid ? ƉĂƌĂ ?  ? ? ) ? WĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?
delegation was ƐƚĂůůŝŶŐ ďǇ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ  ‘ĚĞŶƐĞ ĂŶĚ ůĞŶŐƚŚǇ ƉĂƉĞƌƐ ? ŝŶ ĂƉĂĐĞĚ ŵĂŶŶĞƌ ĂŶĚ
 ‘regularly insisted on fuůůƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚƐĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ Q ?(ibid, para. 22).  
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With still no agreement reached and breaking the previously agreed deadline of March 
22nd, the talks moved to phase two. A fourth version of the Annan Plan was presented to 
the Cypriot leaders in Bürgenstock, on the 27th of March 2004. As planned, the Prime 
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŐƵĂƌĂŶƚŽƌƉŽǁĞƌƐ ? ?'ƌĞĞĐĞ ?dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞh< ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ
of the European Commission for Enlargement, joined in this final round of negotiations. 
Under pressure from Turkey and his own community, Denktash declined to participate in 
this final round of negotiations, but gave Prime Minister Talat and Foreign Affairs Minister 
Serdar Denktash full negotiating powers. Papadopoulos, however, refused to hold face-to-
ĨĂĐĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐǁŝƚŚdĂůĂƚ ?ƐĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ(United Nations 2004, paras. 31 W40). A communiqué 
from the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus reads that Papadopoulos 
refused to negotiate after being pressured by the UN Secretariat to negotiate new demands 
from Turkey (PIO 2004a), a version of events that is not corroborated by the UN. 
Negotiations then moved to the final third phase, at which it was left to the Secretary 
General to finalize the Plan. Important issues relating to the sovereignty of the federal state 
and the powers given to constituent states, the functioning of the executive, the territorial 
delimitation of the constituent states, property and residency rights, and security guaranties 
were left to be decided by the Secretary General (United Nations 2004, paras. 65 W122). The 
fifth and final version of the plan was presented to the parties by the Secretary General on 
the 31st of March. Roughly a month later, the Annan Plan was rejected by Greek Cypriots and 
accepted by Turkish Cypriots in the separate and simultaneous referendums. The Secretary 
General condemned Greek Cypriots for the loss of a significant opportunity to solve the 
Cyprus problem and called on the Security Council and all States to work to eliminate Turkish 
Cypriot isolation (United Nations 2004, 1 W2). The Republic of Cyprus has since enjoyed full 





The Annan Plan mediation process is an especially rich case in terms of the range of 
mediation strategies that were employed. Chiefly, the process was unique in allowing for a 




Annan Plan initiative (Drath 2004; Lordos 2004; Michael 2007; Kaymak 2012). Indeed, the 
 ‘ĨŝůůŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŐĂƉƐ ? ďǇ ƚŚĞ ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ? ŝƐ ƉŝŶ-pointed as one of its problematic 
features. It is seen, on the one hand, as leading the UN Good Offices Mission to produce an 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ(Drath 2004) or, on 
the other hand, to have allowed Papadopoulos to appear unaccountable for the agreement, 
enabling him to campaign against it (Kaymak 2012). Additionally, authors argue that because 
the Annan Plan was negotiated secretively between political elites, the mediators failed to 
consider, involve, and gain support from other quadrants of society (Drath 2004; Michael 
2007; Lordos 2009).  
However, beyond generating a negotiation process that did not engage with other 
stakeholders and groups outside the negotiations, secrecy shaped an important aspect of 
the referendum. Interviews in Cyprus suggest that, in the Greek Cypriot community, secrecy 
and lack of engagement with the public meant that voter education did not significantly 
occur until the start of the referendum campaign period  W which was set off by 
WĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂů ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶŶĂŶ WůĂŶ ? &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ
mediation conditions applied for the Turkish Cypriots, authors tend to use them only to 
explain Greek Cypriot rejection, but not Turkish Cypriot acceptance. As it will be argued 
here, if arbitration and secrecy can explain the low level of support from the Greek Cypriot 
community, the earlier and greater engagement with the negotiations in the North helps 
explain why the Turkish Cypriot community was not equally affected.   
 
Impact on Political Leaders Support and the Referendum Campaigns 
 
Upon his return from Switzerland, Papadopoulos spoke to the Greek Cypriot media 
ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ Ăƚ ƺƌŐĞŶƐƚŽĐŬ ?  ‘dƵƌŬĞǇ ĂĚĚĞĚ ĞůĞǀĞŶ ŶĞǁĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ  ? Q ) ? dŚĞƐĞ ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ?
through the procedure of the Secretary-General using his discretion to finalize the text were 
met ĞŝƚŚĞƌĨƵůůǇŽƌƚŽƐŽŵĞĞǆƚĞŶƚ ? (PIO 2004a). This set the tŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶƚŚĞ
Republic of Cyprus, whose main messages were that the plan was unfair and being imposed 
on the community (Kentas 2014; Petasis 2004; Faustmann 2014; Epaminondas 2014). The 
various politicians and ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞƌƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ? vote that were interviewed for this 
research ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚdƵƌŬĞǇŚĂĚ ‘ǁŽŶ ?ĂƚƺƌŐĞŶƐƚŽĐŬĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh<
and the US, the Good Offices mission were biased in favour of the Turkish side when drafting 
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the agreement (Kentas 2014; Petasis 2004; Tzionis 2014; Lillikas 2014). To them, the Annan 
Plan was a biased agreement produced by a biased arbitration process. For example, Tasos 
Tzionis, who was a ŵĞŵďĞƌ ŽĨ WĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? delegation and an opponent of the Annan 
Plan, stated:  ‘He (De Soto) expected at the end to be allowed to fill the gaps, meaning that 
he would be able to impose his will  ? Q ) ? and that the UN, pressured by the United States, 
 ‘wanted a victory for Erdogan, anĚŚĞǁĂƐƚƌŝƵŵƉŚĂŶƚĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚ ? ? (Tzionis 2014). The same 
view was expressed by Aris Petasis, an academic who actŝǀĞůǇ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? P
 ‘dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?/ƚǁĂƐĂďŝŐĨƌĂƵĚ ? ? Q )dŚĞǇǁĞƌĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƚŚĞďůŽĐŬto 
arrive at the result theǇŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ? ? (Petasis 2004). 
 However, it was only in his report to the Security Council in May 2004, a month after the 
referendum, that the Secretary General described in detail how the gaps between the two 
sides on the issues left unagreed at Bürgenstock were filled (United Nations 2004). 
Information on how the gaps were filled by the mediators was, therefore, not available 
during the referendum campaign and the only other potential source for this information 
were the members of the Greek Cypriot delegation themselves. Thus, this did not allow the 
public to effectively judge whether there was mediator bias, as was claimed by the Greek 
ǇƉƌŝŽƚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?EŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?WĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐƌĞ ŽŶĂƚĞd with the Greek Cypriot 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐĨĞĂƌƐƐŝŶĐĞ ?ĨŽƌŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞƚǁŽǇƉƌŝŽƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞ ?ĂŶĚƐƚŝůů
ĂƌĞ )ĚŝƐƚƌƵƐƚĨƵůŽĨĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞǇƉƌƵƐƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?16 
If arbitration allowed Papadopoulos to campaign against the Plan, the same was the case 
in the Turkish Cypriot community, ǁŚĞƌĞ ĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ĂůƐŽ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ǀŽƚĞ ?
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞ dƵƌŬŝƐŚ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶ
diametrically different to the Greek Cypriots ?. Sener Elcil, leader of the Turkish Cypriot 
Teachers Union (KTOS) and influential figure in Turkish Cypriot civil society, recalled that 
ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶŐƌŽǁŝŶŐƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? and that the breakdown 
of the negotiations at The Hague meeting in 2002 triggered a series of demonstrations. 
Eager to put an end to its isolation and dependency on Turkey through EU membership, a 
ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŐƌĞǁŝŵƉĂƚŝĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ(Elcil 2014; 
Özuslu 2014). The  ‘dŚŝƐ ŽƵŶƚƌǇ ŝƐ KƵƌƐ ? platform was created initially by 47 civil society 
organizations, business groups and political leaders in 2000, with the aim of putting pressure 
                                                          
16
 The Zurich-London Agreements that led to the creation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 were agreed between the UK, 
'ƌĞĞĐĞ ĂŶĚ dƵƌŬĞǇ ? ĂŶĚ ĂƌĞ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ďĞĞŶ  ‘ŝŵƉŽƐĞĚ ? ŽŶ ƚhe Cypriot communities. American and Russian 
involvement during the Cold War increased the pool of actors towards whom the communities have grown distrustful. 
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on Denktash to negotiate. The platform became the arena for a close cooperation between 
the pro-solution political party leaders on the left and civil society, particularly Ali Talat and 
Mustafa Akinci17 (Elcil 2014; Talat 2014; Akinci 2014).18 Referring to the period between 
December 2002 and the referendum, Talat stated when interviewed for this research: 
 ‘Mobilizing the people was very important because it actually caused ĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?ƐǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ?
(...) Every day and every night there was something for the Annan Plan ?(Talat 2014). By the 
time the Bürgenstock negotiations took place, the Turkish Cypriot community was already 
largely mobilized and collectively organized to support the negotiations and the Annan Plan 
in the referendum. 
PŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĐĂŶ highly shape referendum campaigns 
and affect referendum results. Therefore, an agreement that is not endorsed by important 
political figures in the community  W and especially by those who negotiated it  W can naturally 
struggle to receive support in the referendum. This is one of the main lessons from the 
Annan Plan process that authors have put forward (Kaymak 2012; Drath 2004). However, the 
lack of support from leaderships alone does not suffice in explaining the negative outcome in 
the Greek Cypriot community, especially since the Turkish Cypriot leader also campaigned 
against it and the Plan still received the support of 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriot voters. The 
arbitration procedure, by itself, might not have been as flawed as portrayed in the literature. 
It, in fact, accomplished its original aim of reŵŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ
Plan to allow for the Turkish Cypriot community to decide in the referendum on whether 
they wanted an agreement or not. On the other hand, if the arbitration process allowed 
Papadopoulos to appear unaccountable for the agreement and to campaign against it 
(Kaymak 2012), this does not explain if and why the Greek Cypriot community potentially 
followed their leader. The lack of the information needed to more critically evaluate the  ‘ŶŽ ?
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?Ɛ ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐ regarding the bias and unfairness of the mediation process explains 




                                                          
17




 For a more detailed account of the political transformation and civil society mobilization in North Cyprus during the 
Annan Plan negotiations see Kizilyürek (2012). 
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Impact on Public Information and Uncertainty 
 
^ĞĐƌĞĐǇ ǁĂƐ ĂŶ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ hE ?Ɛ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ƉĂrticularly during the 
proximity talks of the early stages of the negotiations. Between June 1999 and April 2003 no 
reports on the Good Offices mission were issued by the Secretary General and the Security 
Council was only orally briefed on the negotiation process (United Nations 2003, para. 2). 
Arguing for the advantages of secret negotiations, Álvaro de Soto stated in an interview in 
2002: 
 ‘Just as there exists the fog of war in which the first victim is the truth, there 
should exist the fog of diplomacy, or the fog of Good Offices, in which the truth 
should only coŵĞŽƵƚŝŶƚŚĞĞŶĚƌĞƐƵůƚ ? ? 
De Soto (2002, 89) 
Throughout the course of the negotiations, the Good Offices mission would only provide 
limited information to the media regarding the proceedings. The journalists interviewed for 
this research explained that the UN mediators would rarely talk to the media. Consequently, 
politicians became the main source of information for journalists on both sides of the divide 
(Özuslu 2014; Pavlowitch 2014; Kutay 2014). The choice for secrecy, however, allowed 
political leaders to withhold, or misgive, information on the negotiation process. In an 
interview given to two Cypriot TV channels on the 9th of February of 2004, Álvaro de Soto 
claimed that there was a disparity between what the political leaders were communicating 
to the public and how the negotiation process was progressing: 
 ‘ QĨƌŽŵŚĞĂƌŝŶŐǁŚĂƚŽŶĞƐŝĚĞŽƌ the other says in public, you get the impression 
that nothing is happening at all. And there again, I believe that that impression is 
deceptive. I would not ƌĞůǇŵƵĐŚŽŶŝƚ ? ? 
De Soto (2004a).  
DĂƌŝŽƐƉĂŵŝŶŽŶĚĂƐ ?ǁŚŽĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞZ ƉƵďůŝĐŽĨǇƉƌƵƐ, stated that 
the secrecy of the negotŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĂůůŽǁĞĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐƚŽ ‘keep the people ignorant about what 
ǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚ ? ? ‘blame the other side for everything that goes wrŽŶŐ ?, as well as the 
UN mediators (Epaminondas 2014). Similarly, Maria Hadjipavlou, an academic, civil society 
ĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞƌ ?ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽŶŚŽǁƚŚĞŵĂŝŶŝƐƐƵĞƐ
were being discussed at the negotiations prevented public debate and discussion to begin 
before the referendum in the Greek Cypriot community (Hadjipavlou 2014). Additionally, the 
physical separation between the two communities was believed, by several interviewees 
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ǁŚŽǁĞƌĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ?ƚŽŚĂǀĞŵĂĚĞŝƚĞĂƐŝĞƌĨŽ'ƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐƚŽǁŝƚŚŚŽůĚ
or misgive information about the negotiation process, since there was no counter-
perspective from the other side of the Green Line reaching their community (Pavlowitch 
2014; Pericleous 2014; Epaminondas 2014).  
If during the negotiations there was a lack of information available to the public, the 
referendum campaigns in the Greek Cypriot community were permeated with 
misinformation. Kosta Pavlowitch, journalist and editor of the Cyprus Mail at the time of the 
Annan Plan negotiations and referendum, stated that at the Bürgenstock negotiations, he 
witneƐƐĞĚ 'ƌĞĞŬ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ ũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚƐ  ‘not cross-checking of sources and running stories on 
leaks that were made in order ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ? (Pavlowitch 2014). This 
misinformation by the media was also found by Yiouli Taki (2009, 187 W88) in her analysis of 
the Greek Cypriot broadcast media reports on the Annan Plan during the referendum 
campaign. She writes that, particularly on television broadcasts, there was a reliance on 
distorted information coming from unnamed sources, as well as presentation of uncorrected 
misinterpretĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞWůĂŶ ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐĨĂǀŽƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ůƐŽ strongly linked 
to political parties, with the exception of Politis, Alithia and the Cyprus Mail, the majority of 
the Greek Cypriot printed press ǁĂƐ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ǀŽƚĞ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ
campaign period.  
In fact, and too late to overturn it, in the week leading to the referendum, De Soto asked 
Papadopoulos to publicly dispel misinformation being given by government officials. This 
misinformation regarded potential negative implications of the Annan Plan regarding civil 
servants job security in the new state which ďŽůƐƚĞƌĞĚƚĞĂĐŚĞƌƐƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?
campaign. Papadopoulos categorically refused to ĨƵůĨŝů Ğ ^ŽƚŽ ?Ɛ ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ. He wrote to De 
Soto on the 20th of April:  
 ‘You ask me publicly to state through the media that the public and the civil 
service are being misinformed. I do not believe that your assignment gives you 
any legitimate right to ask me or suggest what my position shoƵůĚŽƌŶŽƚďĞ ? ? 
 
Papadopoulos (2004) 
After this exchange of letters, and just a few days before the referendum, De Soto was 
prevented from speaking on the state-funded Greek Cypriot television channel CYBC (De 
Soto 2004b). Reporting to the Security Council after the referendum, Kofi Annan mentioned 
this event and stated ƚŚĂƚ  ‘The efforts of the United Nations to provide explanations and 
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clarifications about the plan to the public at large were hampered by the media climate on 
ƚŚĞŝƐůĂŶĚ ? (United Nations 2004, para. 71).  
In North Cyprus, on the other hand, by the time the Bürgenstock negotiations took place, 
the community was already largely mobilized in support of the negotiations. Furthermore, 
unlike in the Republic of Cyprus, the majority of Turkish Cypriot media was supportive of the 
Annan Plan. Sami Özuslu, working for SIM at the time, a private radio station that was 
popular during the referendum, explained that the media cooperated with politicians, 
academics, and civil society organizations to inform and engage the community in a 
discussion of the benefits and shortcomings of the Plan (Özuslu 2014). Consequently, 
especially in the weeks leading up to the referendum, a well-oƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚ ‘ǇĞƐ ? campaign was 
effectively reaching the community and framing the Annan Plan as offering a better future 
for Turkish Cypriots as citizens of the European Union (Kutay 2014).  
If negotiation secrecy made for a poorly engaged and misinformed Greek Cypriot 
community, the same did not occur in the Turkish Cypriot community. The communal 
ƵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?Ɛbrought the negotiation into public discussion as early as 2002. If 
the use of arbitration and the secrecy of the negotiation process ǁŽƌŬĞĚ ƚŽ ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞ  ‘ŶŽ ?
supporters that, as Papadopoulos publicly stated, the Plan was a negative outcome for Greek 
Cypriots, this was not the case in the North. There, in spite of the secretive negotiations, 
Turkish Cypriots became engaged and mobilized by the prospect of uniting with the south 
and becoming part of the EU. Ergo, while secrecy prevented public debate on the Annan 




Political Inclusion  
 
Since the UN-led negotiations first started in 1964, the two Cypriot communities have 
been traditionally represented by their elected leaders. As a result, the respective 
delegations are, to this day, formed by the governing party, or coalition of parties who 
happen to be in power at a given time. The political parties in the opposition would formally 
be informed on the content and progress of the negotiations through members of the 
delegations and seldom by the UN Good Offices Mission in both communities (Fokaides 
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2014a; Akinci 2014). During the Annan Plan negotiations, as per tradition in the South, the 
Presidents convened National Council meetings to brief all political leaders and former 
Presidents, as well as receive advice regarding the negotiations. In the North, members of 
the delegations prepared reports that were made available to all political parties in the 
Parliament (Akinci 2014).  
The exclusion of other parties held, and still holds important consequences for the 
negotiations. First, as twice occurred during the Annan Plan process, negotiations were 
delayed or interrupted by election periods. The election of new leaders has hindered 
compromises previously made by other leaders, or even took negotiations back to square 
one, as Denktash wanted when Papadopoulos was elected. Furthermore, while elections in 
the North allowed for a more pro-solution and cooperative Turkish Cypriot negotiation 
team, a more conservative and less compromising the Greek Cypriot team was put in place.  
As will be described in this section, compared with the Greek Cypriot community, political 
circumstances and mediator behaviours made for an overall more politically inclusive 
negotiation process in the Turkish Cypriot community. Both, it is argued, shaped political 
paƌƚŝĞƐ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ďŽƚŚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ŽŶ whether to support the agreement in the 
referendum and, consequently the organization and strength of their campaigns. 
 
Impact on Political Party Support and the Referendum Campaigns 
 
After Bürgenstock, the political parties across Cyprus began to publicly display the 
direction of their support for the peace settlement. In the Republic of ǇƉƌƵƐ ?WĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?
public positioning against the Annan Plan was determinant to the positioning of the 
remaining political parties. With the anti-Annan Plan sentiment growing in the Republic, 
AKEL leader, Demetris Christofias, struggled to maintain the ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌĂƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?
ĞĨŽƌĞĂŶŶŽƵŶĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ?Christofias had unsuccessfully 
requested that the Security Council offer a guarantee that Turkey would respect the Annan 
Plan. He asked the Secretary General to delay the referendum until after the date of 
accession to the EU (Papapetrou 2014). A delay, however, could have jeopardized support in 
the North (Erel 2014). As AKEL switched its traditionally pro-solution stance ƚŽ Ă  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ŶŽ ? 
(AKEL Politician 2014), the move was mimicked by the centre-left Movement for Social 
Democracy (EDEK).  
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/Ŷ /^z ? ƚŚĞ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǁĂƐ Ă ĚŝǀŝƐive one. Christoforos Fokaides 
explained that, ǁŚĞŶ/^zůĞĂĚĞƌƐĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞ ?ƚŚĞǇŚĂĚĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƉŽůůƐ
indicating that the  ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞǁŽƵůĚďĞŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ ? ?per cent. Yet, unlike what might have 
been the case within AKEL, the party members took a vote and decided to suƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?.
This decision, he stated, was influenced by ClerideƐ ? political stance and the fact that he was 
the historic leader of the party, as well as former President of the Republic, who had, 
inclusively, negotiated the first versions of the plan (Fokaides 2014a). However, the decision 
led some of its members to abandon the party and campaign ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ǀŽƚĞ ? dŚĞ ƐƉůŝƚ 
ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇǁĞĂŬĞŶĞĚ ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ƐŝŶĐĞ ?ĂƐ&ŽŬĂŝĚĞƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ?  ‘DISY was 
carefƵůŶŽƚƚŽŝŵƉŽƐĞƚŚĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞWůĂŶǁĂƐĨƌĂŵĞĚĂƐĂ
recommenĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?. ConseƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ?ŚĞ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ?  ‘ QŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƚŽ develop a 
full-ĨůĞĚŐĞĚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? (Fokaides 2014a).  
During the referendum campaign in the Greek Cypriot community, therefore, the political 
leaderships of DIKO, AKEL, EDEK and DISY dissenters sƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ǀŽƚĞ ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? 
camp ƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞŽŶůǇƚǁŽƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ůĞƌŝĚĞ ?Ɛ/^zĂŶĚĨŽƌŵĞƌWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚsĂƐƐŝůŝŽƵ ?s centre-left 
United Democrats (EDI). Although they collaborated in a few campaign events, DISY and EDI 
led their own independent campaigns (Hadjidemetriou 2014; Vassiliou 2014).  
In the Turkish Cypriot community, a split similar to the one in the DISY beset Serdar 
ĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?Ɛ ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ WĂƌƚǇ ? leading him to expel prominent members of the party just 
three days before the referendum (PIO 2004b) ?dŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ ŝŶƚŚĞŶŶĂŶ Plan 
negotiations challenged its traditional hard-line stance against the federal solution enshrined 
in the agreement. Levent Kutay, a journalist for the VRT (national) Broadcast corporation 
during the referendum, explained that the party eventually adoptĞĚĂ ‘ƐŽĨƚŶŽ ?ƐƚĂŶĐĞĚƵƌŝŶŐ
the referendum campaign and advised constituents to decide for themselves (Kutay 2014). 
/ŶĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶǁĂƐ ůĞĚďǇƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůhŶŝƚǇƉĂƌƚǇ  ?ĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌŵĞƌƉĂƌƚǇ )
and elements of the Turkish military present on the island (Özuslu 2014) ? >ŝŬĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ŶŶĂŶ WůĂŶ ĂŶĚ
distributed pamphlets door to door. However, as Talat explained, ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ǁĂƐ
ŵŽƌĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶďĂƐĞĚŽŶůŽŶŐ-term continuous 
mobilization at the grassroots level (Talat 2014). /ŶĨĂĐƚ ?ĂůůŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?
campaign in North Cyprus described it as taking place, not only during the one month time-
span between the Bürgenstock final round of negotiations and the day of the referendum, 
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but as occurring across a wider period starting as early as 2003, or even 2002 (Talat 2014; 
Akinci 2014; Elcil 2014).  
While in the Greek Cypriot community the political parties outside the negotiations 
waited until the final version of the agreement was made public to announce their position, 
in the Turkish Cypriot community ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?public support for the Annan Plan was 
known much earlier. In fact, it had been the pro-Annan Plan/EU election campaign that led 
dĂůĂƚ ?ƐCTP to victory in 2003 (Hatay 2004). Additionally, not only did the last negotiation 
team include political leaders from three different parties, Talat and Akinci were consulted 
by the UN Good Offices mission personnel before Talat was elected Prime Minister (Talat 
2014; Akinci 2014). Talat stated that  ‘Actually, the opposition was negotiating the Plan with 
the UN instead of the Turkish ǇƉƌŝŽƚ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? (Talat 2014). Akinci further 
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞŵĞƚǁŝƚŚĞ^ŽƚŽ ?ƵƉŽŶĞ^ŽƚŽ ?ƐƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ ?ĚƵƌŝng the negotiations to talk 
 ‘ Q not about the details, but to give me a general understanding of where the negotiations 
ƐƚŽŽĚ ? (Akinci 2014). Therefore, there was a greater and earlier inclusion of Turkish Cypriot 
political parties in the negotiations than was the case towards Greek Cypriot political parties.  
ŽŵƉĂƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ǁĂƐmore politically backed in the 
SŽƵƚŚƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?hŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĐƌĞĂƚĚďǇWĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ƐƚƌŽŶŐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ
against the agreĞŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ Ă ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƉƵďůŝĐ ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ? <> ?Ɛ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ?
ǀŽƚĞĂŶĚ/^z ?ƐƐƉůŝƚŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚůittle political support in the South. In the 
Turkish Cypriot community, where political parties outside the negotiations had been 
engaged with the negotiation process - and were, in fact, informally consulted by the UN 
Good Offices mission at earlier stages of the negotiations - ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ
Annan Plan was more evenly distributed.  
 
 
Civil Society Inclusion 
 
UN mediation in Cyprus had never formally included civil society groups and the Annan 
Plan negotiations were no exception. Albeit, as already described, the Annan Plan period 
witnessed an uprising of civil society movements in support of the negotiations and the Plan 
in the Turkish Cypriot community. In the South, civil society did not engage with the 
negotiations to the same extent, nor became particularly mobilized during the referendum 
campaign period, with the exception of a few groups. Beyond differences in the size and 
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activity of the civil societies in each of the communities, the interviews conducted in Cyprus 
revealed that civil society leaders in North Cyprus participated in informal consultations with 
UN Good Offices personnel. Furthermore, they were generally more mobilized under an 
ƵŵďƌĞůůĂ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƚŚĂƚ was born out of the This Country is Ours platform. On the other 
hand, the cŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ŝn the South faced significant 
difficulties in reaching the Greek Cypriot community during the referendum campaign 
period. 
 
Impact on the Referendum Campaigns 
 
In August 2002, with the aim of putting pressure on Denktash to negotiate, eighty six 
Turkish Cypriot civil society organizations wrote a declaration of support for the negotiations 
to the Secretary General. Created within the This Country is Ours platform, The Common 
Vision of the Turkish Cypriot Civil Society urged that a solution be found before the 
December Copenhagen Summit  W where Cyprus ? accession was decided. The civil society 
leaders interviewed, who were signatories of The Common Vision declaration, stated that 
they attended meetings with Good Offices Mission personnel, including De Soto, while the 
negotiations were ongoing (Erel 2014; Elcil 2014). During the meetings, Sener Elcil, head of 
ƚŚĞdƵƌŬŝƐŚǇƉƌŝŽƚdĞĂĐŚĞƌ ?ƐhŶŝŽŶĂŶĚĂĐƚŝǀĞŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞdŚŝƐŽƵŶƚƌǇŝƐKƵƌƐƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵ ?
explained:  
 ‘They were giving us (the platform) information about the negotiations, on their 
expectations on progress and the benefits of a solution, but there was no 
information about positions or compromises that were being made. Just general 
informaƚŝŽŶ ? 
Elcil (2014).  
The Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce served as the meeting point. Ali Erel, who was 
the head of the Chamber ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚ  ‘We had Mr. De Soto visiting us 
very often, and then Thomas Weston, the representative of the USA was speaking to us as 
well, and all the aŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƐŽĨƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?. The civil society and opposition party 
leaders who participated in these meetings were, Erel added, informing the mediators of 
 ‘ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶĂů ƉŽŝŶƚ ŽĨ ǀŝĞǁ ? and  ‘helping them, in a way, to recognize the needs of the 
peopůĞďĞƚƚĞƌ ? (Erel 2014).  
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In his reports to the Security Council, Kofi Annan rarely mentions civil society. However, 
the following citation, referring to the period before the Copenhagen summit, confirms the 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐ ? ƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇƚŚĂƚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůĐŽŶsultations did take place during the period when 
Denktash was refusing to negotiate: 
 ‘Regrettably, the substantive input from the Turkish Cypriot side was extremely 
general and largely conceptual  W leaving the United Nations to seek inspiration 
for concrete improvements from concerns publicly voiced by a cross section of 
dƵƌŬŝƐŚǇƉƌŝŽƚĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ? 
Annan (United Nations 2003, para. 45) 
The Secretary General confirms, therefore, that not only input from civil society leaders in 
the North was taken, but that it also ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ?
During the referendum campaign in the Turkish Cypriot community, the same unions and 
organizations, as well as political parties, who were part of the This Country is Ours platform 
ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ Ă ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇ ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? Between December 2002 and 
March 2004, among other activities, the Platform organized demonstrations, rallies, and 
 ‘ƉĞĂĐĞ ĨŝƌĞƐ ? where people linked to the Platform would gather locals to talk about the 
Annan Plan (Talat 2014; Elcil 2014). In addition, the campaigns created and distributed 
pamphlets that explained the Annan Plan in a one hundred question-and-answer format.  
As far as this research was able to find, the same contact between political leaders or the 
mediation team members and civil society did not take place among the Greek Cypriot 
community. This may be explained by the fact that only a handful of NGOs, involved in 
peacebuilding activities, were found to have mobilized in support for the Annan Plan 
negotiations as part of their reconciliation work in Cyprus (based on statements by 
Faustmann, 2014; Hadjipavlou, 2014; Potier, 2014).19 Marios Epaminondas, who campaigned 
ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ŝŶ the Greek Cypriot community, described the campaign as being loosely 
organized and mainly enacted  W ĂƐŝĚĞĨƌŽŵ/ĂŶĚ/^z ?ƐůĂĐŬůƵƐƚƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ- by individuals 
and NGOs fostering bi-communal activities (Epaminondas 2014). Yet more importantly, 
those who campaŝŐŶĞĚŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨƚŚĞŶŶĂŶWůĂŶǁĞƌĞĂƚƚĂĐŬĞĚďǇƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉ ?^ĞǀĞƌĂů
Interviewees described how in the weeks leading up to the referendum there was a 
 ‘ĚĞŵŽŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǀŽƚĞ(Epaminondas 2014; Hadjipavlou 
2014; Papapetrou 2014; Hadjidemetriou 2014). Papapetrou (2014), who campaigned for the 
                                                          
19
 The opening of the crossing points, and the Annan Plan referendum experience would, however, have a bolstering effect 
on civil society mobilization in the south after the referendum (Hadjipavlou and Kanol 2008, 18 W19). 
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 ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǁŝƚŚ / ? ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ ĂŶĚ E'K ?Ɛ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǁĞƌĞ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ďǇ
politicians in thĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ĐĂŵƉ ŽĨ ďĞŝŶŐ  ‘ƚƌĂŝƚŽƌƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƐĞƌǀĂŶƚƐ ŽĨ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?. Maria 
Hadjipavlou an academic and civil society activist who also campaigŶĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ŐĂǀĞĂ
personal account:  ‘The  ‘yes ? ǀŽƚĞďĞĐĂŵĞƚŚĞƵŶƉĂƚƌŝŽƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞ ? Q ) ?/ƚǁĂƐƚĞƌƌŝďůe. I felt that I 
ǁĂƐ Ă ƚƌĂŝƚŽƌ ? ? (Hadjipavlou 2014) ? /ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? camp did, in fact, describe the 
 ‘ǇĞƐ ? campaign as being enacted and financially backed by external actors, mainly the United 
States and Britain, in an attempt to impose the Plan upon Greek Cypriots (Kentas, 2014; 
Lillikas 2014; Petasis 2004). 
ŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĂůƐŽ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĞŬ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ
community. The Orthodox Church of Cyprus, although it did not engage in campaigning 
activities, was publicly against the Annan Plan (US Senate, 2004, 316). The Pancyprian 
Citizens Movement ƉůĂǇĞĚ ĂŶ ĂĐƚŝǀĞ ƉĂƌƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ďǇ ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌŝŶŐ Ğǀ nts and 
distributing campaign materials (Kentas 2014). The group had been created in 2002 and was 
ŶŽƚŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŶŶĂŶWůĂŶ ?'ĞŽƌŐŝŽƐ<ĞŶƚĂƐ ?ǁŚŽǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
leaders explained:  ‘tĞŚĂĚĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?tĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚƌĞũĞĐƚƚŚĞWůĂŶƵŶƚŝů ŚĞĨŝŶĂůǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨ
ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ƐƵďŵŝƚƚĞĚ ? (Kentas 2014). Therefore, although the intent of the movement was to 
mobilize people against the Annan Plan from the start, it was not until the start of the 
referendum campaign that it became publicly ƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?  
Therefore, although civil society was not as mobilized in the Greek Cypriot community as 
it was in the Turkish Cypriot, there were groups and individuals who were involved in the 
 ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ ?However, the greater mobilized civil society in the North made for 
a comparably more civically inclusive mediation process than in the Greek Cypriot 
community, even if unintentionally. Although it cannot be said that it was their inclusion per 
se that caused civil society to engage in the campaign, this suggests that the presence of an 
engaged civil society, that collaborates and mobilizes the community around the 





Officially titled The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, tŚĞ  ‘ŶŶĂŶ WůĂŶ ?
provided for the foundation of ƚŚĞ  ‘hŶŝƚĞĚ ǇƉƌƵƐ ZĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?, a federal state with two 
constituent states of equal political status (United Nations 2004, para. 42). Taking from the 
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Swiss and Belgian constitutions, the Annan Plan proposed a state with a single international 
personality and sovereignty, where partition and secession were prohibited, but without 
hierarchy between federal and constituent state law-making (United Nations 2003, paras. 
74 W76). On the functioning of the executive government, again inspired by the Swiss 
constitution, the Annan Plan provided for a Presidential Council with a rotating Presidency, 
meaning that the Presidency would alternate between the election of a Greek Cypriot and a 
Turkish Cypriot (United Nations 2004, para. 44). The Plan furthermore provided for a gradual 
lifting of limitations on the freedom of settlement on the island and a scheme of incentives, 
compensations, and bonds for displaced or dispossessed land owners that would need to 
give up their properties in the other constituent state to current occupants (ibid, para. 48-50, 
55). Given that the previous provision would have been most unfavourable to Greek 
Cypriots, it was compensated by a territorial adjustment that had the UK ceding Sovereign 
Base Areas mainly to the Greek Cypriot constituent state (United Nations 2003, para. 116). 
The Plan laid groundwork for a longer transitional period in the application of the aquis 
communautaire in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state to favour the growth of its fragile 
economy (United Nations 2004, para. 57). On security guarantees, Greece, Turkey, and the 
UK would remain as guarantor powers. The number of foreign troops present on the island 
would be progressively reduced to symbolic numbers, even in the event of TurkeǇ ?Ɛ
accession to the EU (ibid, para. 47). A UN peacekeeping operation would monitor the 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ibid, para. 45).  
Especially after the referendum, scholars from each of the communities in Cyprus have 
examined the merits and shortcomings of the Annan Plan (see, for example, Coufoudakis 
and Kyriakides 2004; Moulakis 2007; Loizides 2009). At the root of the debate is the question 
of whether the Annan Plan was a balanced and fair outcome to both communities. However, 
the information gathered from the interviews conducted in Cyprus suggests that the content 
of the Plan itself, because it was extensive and complex, might not have directly influenced 
the Cypriot public on both sides. One reason was that it was an almost 200 page-long 
complex text of the agreemenƚ ƚŚĂƚ <ŽĨŝ ŶŶĂŶ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘Ă ƚƌƵůǇ ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂů ?(United Nations 2003, para. 61). In fact, the Secretary General himself was 
concerned with how the Annan Plan was being portrayed to the public and the potential 
impact this could have on the referendum. Less than two weeks before the referendum, he 
wrote to the Security Council:   
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 ‘The outcome (of the referendum) is far from certain. The plan is complex and 
delicately balanced. Inevitably, as in any negotiation, it is a compromise. The 
presentation of the contents of the plan to the public has not always been 
equally balanced. ? 
Annan (United Nations 2004, para. 51) 
While the text of the agreement can inevitably and directly shape political leaders ? and 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? support for an agreement in the referendum, its impact on voting behaviours 
depends on how well informed voters are about its content and potential implications. 
Therefore, the extent to which the provisions of the agreement itself have an impact on 
voter decisions in the referendum, as well as whether voters were more influenced and 
informed by the campaigns, must be questioned. 
 
Impact on Political Leader/Party Support and the Referendum Campaigns 
 
The fact that the Annan Plan did not require the Cypriot leaders ? endorsement proved to 
be a significant hindrance for political support for the Annan Plan and is indeed one of the 
most often pin-pointed reasons for the Annan Plan ?s demise (Kaymak 2012; Drath 2004). 
Both Papadopoulos and Denktash publicly stated that the agreement did not accommodate 
ƚŚĞŝƌ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ďŽƚŚ ǁĞƌĞ ƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ŝƚ ?  ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŽƌ ŝŶ WĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ƚĞĂŵ
stated that the Greek Cypriot leader, as well as DIKO, did not support the Annan Plan 
because the UN Good Offices mission failed to create an agreement that sufficiently 
addressed Greek Cypriot interests. He argued: 
 ‘We never accepted Turkish guarantees and the continuation of the stationing of 
Turkish troops on the island and bi-zonality as interpreted by the UN. (...) When 
we accepted a bi-zonal and bi-communal federĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁĞŵĞĂŶƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĞůƐĞ ? ?
Tzionis (2014) 
 
This account suggests that Papadopoulos and DIKO did not support the Annan Plan because 
it did not ĂůůŽǁƚŚĞŵƚŽ ‘ƐĞůů ?ŝƚƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵŵunity. However, as was discussed earlier in this 
chapter, this might have not actually been the case. Among the political leaders interviewed, 
there was a common perception that Papadopoulos mislead those involved in the 
negotiation process into believing that he would support the agreement (Papapetrou 2014; 
Talat 2014; Hadjidemetriou 2014; Vassiliou 2014; AKEL Politician 2014; Demetriou 2014). 
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Former President George Vassiliou and EDI politician Takis Hadjidemetriou, who were 
involved in the negotiations on the provision of the agreement for the EU harmonization 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĚĂŶĚĨĞůƚ ‘ĐŚĞĂƚĞĚ ?ǁŚĞŶWĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůos announced 
he was against the Plan after Bürgenstock (Vassiliou 2014; Hadjidemetriou 2014). In fact, it 
was widely believed among the politicians interviewed in the Greek Cypriot community that 
Papadopoulos was unwilling to agree on a solution that would not provide for a unitary state 
where Greek Cypriots would enjoy majority rule and led all to believe that he supported the 
creation of a bi-zonal and bi-ĐŽŵŵƵŶĂůĨĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?ƐŝŶƚƌĂŶƐŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?ƐŽŵĞĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?
had allowed Papadopoulos to maintain a cooperative appearance during the negotiations 
(AKEL Politician 2014; Hadjidemetriou 2014). For this reason, they also believed that 
Papadopoulos did not negotiate with the aim of getting an agreement that he would be 
willing to support. For example, Hadjidemetriou described Papadopoulos ? ĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
negotiating behaviour as follows: 
 ‘I noticed that they were examining the Annan Plan in a very strict way, they 
were scrutinizing everything. In the beginning I thought that this was a good way 
of negotiating and that a negotiator needs to find all the weak points and 
negotiate them. Actually, their aim was just the opposite: it was to undermine 
and destroy the Annan Plan ? ? 
Hadjidemetriou (2014) 
 
On the other hand, those parties who supported the Annan Plan believed that it was not 
perfect, but that its deficiencies could be addressed after the referendum. For example, 
Panayiotis Demetriou, deputy-leader of DISY ĚƵƌŝŶŐůĞƌŝĚĞƐ ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ ? ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ
that DISY leaders had concerns regarding the implementation of the Plan, but believed it 
could be improved during its implementation (Demetriou 2014). As was already described, 
ďŽƚŚ/^z ?ƐĂŶĚ/ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŶŶĂŶWůĂŶŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵŚĂĚƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚ
issues of accountability for having been part of its negotiations. This was not the case, 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĨŽƌ<>ĂŶĚ< ?ǁŚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀ ƚĞ ? 
dŽ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ 'ƌĞĞŬ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐto support the plan based only on 
whether or not the agreement accommodated their interests is unsatisfying. The fact that 
the parties announced their positioning on the referendum later in the campaign, lends 
some support to a thesis that the political parties outside the negotiations felt pressured to 
position themselves against the Annan Plan due to the anti-Annan Plan propaganda that 
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grew in the Republic following Bürgenstock. The text of the agreement might not have been 
the central cause. 
Like Papadoupoulos, Denktash purportedly did not support the Annan Plan because, 
according to his ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂĚǀŝƐŽƌ ƌŐƺŶ KůŐƵŶ ?  ‘ QŚĞ ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
agreement did not make it sustainable in ƚŚĞ ůŽŶŐƌƵŶĨŽƌƚŚĞƚǁŽƐŝĚĞƐ ?(Olgun 2014). He 
further explained that Denktash believed residential properties should belong to the 
communities administrating the territory, which was not the case in the Annan Plan, and 
that he was not satisfied with the economic inequality safeguards therein (Olgun 2014). 
However, unlike Papadoupoulos, Dentash did not negotiate the final version of the Annan 
Plan. As has been described, by the end Talat was leading the negotiation team with 
dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ(Talat 2014). Akinci ?Ɛ WD ƉĂƌƚǇ ŬĞĞŶůǇ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚan agreement that 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ QĂƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶƉƵƚĚŽǁŶĨŽƌŵĂŶǇ
years, such as bi-zonality, bi-communality, political ĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ? Q )ǁĞǁĂŶƚĞd a solution along 
those lines ? (Akinci 2014). 
It has been argued that, by bypassing the need for the leaders to endorse the agreement 
before the referendum, or the use of the arbitration procedure itself, the UN Good Offices 
ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ĨĂŝůĞĚ ƚŽ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ĂŶ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĞŬ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?
interests and concerns (Drath 2004). However, there is doubt that Papadopoulos would have 
ďĞĞŶ ǁŝůůŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ‘ƐĞůů ? ĂŶ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ĨŽƌ Ă ĨĞĚĞƌĂů ƐƚĂƚĞ ? /Ŷ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ
believed that his team did not negotiate with the intent of finding an agreement that would 
ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ ‘ƐŽůĚ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?  
 
Impact on Public Information and Uncertainty 
 
Irrespective of their community and the direction of their support, all the individuals 
interviewed for this research in Cyprus believed that the content of the Plan itself, being too 
long and extensive, was not a significant source of information for the general public. Hubert 
Faustmann, an academic and President of the Cyprus Academic Forum, explained that Greek 
Cypriots were faced for the first time with what a solution to the Cyprus problem looked like 
in the Annan Plan referendum (Faustmann 2014). Chrysostomos Pericleous, a free-lance 
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journalist during the referendum and President of the Cyprus Academic Dialogue20 at the 
time of the interview, explained that Greek Cypriot political leaders had always held a 
nationalist rhetoric and failed to tell the people that a federal state was the solution being 
negotiated, rather than the return to a unitary centralised state (Pericleous 2014). Kosta 
Pavlowitch, editor of the Cyprus Mail at thĞ ƚŝŵĞ ? ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ QƚŚĞƌĞ ŚĂĚ ŶŽƚ been any 
debate about it, therefore it came as a shock ƚŽƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? (Pavlowitch 
2014). Álvaro de Soto himself has more recentlǇ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ǀŝĞǁ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ Q'ƌĞĞŬ
Cypriots had not fully understood, from lack of explanation from their leaders, what a 
ĨĞĚĞƌĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ? ? (De Soto 2012, 402). ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ? ƉĂŵŝŶŽŶĚĂƐ ? Ă  ‘ǇĞƐ ?
campaigner, also described how he faced resistance when he attempted to distribute 
booklets explaining the Annan Plan.21 He ƐƚĂƚĞĚ P ‘They (Greek Cypriots) were positive that it 
ǁĂƐĂďĂĚWůĂŶĂŶĚ  ? Q ) ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶŽƚready ƚŽ ůŝƐƚĞŶƚŽĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ? (Epaminondas 
2014). Therefore, and returning to the argument made earlier in this chapter, the Greek 
Cypriot community was likely not well informed, and was rather misinformed about the 
content and implications of the Annan Plan. 
^ƚƵĚŝĞƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐƵƌǀĞǇƐŚĂǀĞĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞŝŶƚŚĞ
'ƌĞĞŬ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ĐŽŶǀĞǇĞĚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
plan, such as those relating to Turkish military presence on the island, financial, property 
issues, or providing citizenship to Turkish settlers (Georgiades 2007; Lordos 2008). However, 
these studies have two limitations. First, they do not consider when or how those opinions 
were formed. Secondly, they do not account for the possibility that, because the surveys 
were conducted after the referendum, ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ? ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶs on the content of the Plan 
might have been influenced by the campaign period. Lordos (2009; 2004) does tap into the 
issue of whether Greek Cypriots were informed voters, however, the findings are based on 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?self-assessment of whether they consider themselves to have been informed 
about the Annan Plan or not, whereas it would have been important to ask what was/were 
the respondent ?ƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? For example, dissatisfaction with how the Plan dealt 
with security issues, particularly the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island, has been 
                                                          
20
 The Cyprus Academic Dialogue is a pro-unification, bi-communal organization of academics that, since 2010, makes 
proposals to political leaders and the UN on intractable issues and confidence building measures with the goal of 
influencing policy-makers and the Cypriot communities alike (Pericleous 2014). 
 
21
 The booklet has been published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo and can be found under the reference: Alexiou, 
Alexis; Gürel, Ayla; Hatay, Mete; & Taki, Yiouli (2003) The Annan Plan for Cyprus: A Citizen's Guide. Oslo: PRIO. 
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ĨŽƵŶĚƚŽŚĂǀĞĚĞĞƉůǇƐŚĂƉĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĂŶĚWĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ
made their case against the Plan by fuelling those precise fears. Less than two weeks before 
the referendum, in a tearful televised speech, Papadopoulos pleaded with the Greek Cypriot 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇǀŽƚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? to the Annan Plan. The arguments he used would deeply 
ƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞĂŵŽŶŐ ‘ŶŽ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ?especially that the ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŚĂĚ ‘ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐŽďƐĐƵƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? 
regarding the issue of security and the presence of Turkish troops on the island. These, he 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? ǁŽƵůĚ ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ dƵƌŬŝƐŚ  ‘ĐŽůŽŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? and dŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?  ‘With 
ƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůŶŶĂŶWůĂŶǇƉƌŝŽƚƐŚĂǀĞŶŽƚďĞĞŶƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌdƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐƉƵƌƐƵŝƚ ƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽů
and dominate Cyprus haƐďĞĞŶĨƵůůǇŵĞƚ ?, Papadopoulos stated (PIO 2004a). Therefore, it is 
not clear that Greek Cypriots in general were dissatisfied with those provisions of the plan or 
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞǇ  ‘ůĞĂƌŶĞĚ ?the concern during the campaign. The alternative explanation that 
Greek Cypriot community was uninformed or misinformed about the agreement is more 
convincing. 
While the inteƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐǁŚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ? vote in the Republic of Cyprus believed 
that the one month period between Bürgenstock and the referendum was insufficient to 
inform the public or lead a sufficient public debate about the plan (Fokaides 2014; 
Hadjipavlou 2014), it was not seen to have negatively impacted the results in the North 
(Talat 2014; Elcil 2014). In the Turkish Cypriot community, interviewees believed that the 
community generally understood the document because it was deeply discussed, 
particularly on the radio and in newspapers during the two years prior to the referendum 
(Akinci 2014; Talat 2014; Özuslu 2014; Elcil 2014). Sami Özuslu, a journalist who led a TV 
show dedicated to the Annan Plan, explained that the media cooperated with politicians and 
civil society in informing the community about the Plan. Politicians and academics, he 
recalled, would read and analyse the different versions of the Plan on the radio and in the 
newspapers (Özuslu 2014). Scholars who have written on the Turkish Cypriot perspectives 
and experience in the Annan Plan referendum also defend that Turkish Cypriots were 
informed voters (Bryant 2004; Kaymak 2009), and that this was a direct consequence of the 
dissemination of information on the Plan since 2002 (Kaymak 2009, 143; Hatay 2004). In the 
North, therefore, a more engaged community, with a more collectively mobilized civil 




Comparing the two communities, the much earlier public debate and civil society 
engagement in the Turkish Cypriot community suggests that this community was more 
familiarized with the content of the Plan at the time of the referendum than the Greek 
Cypriot. A lower level of public information and debate about the negotiations and the 
content of the plan in the Greek Cypriot community, on the other hand, suggest that the 
Greek Cypriot vote was more influenced by political party support and campaign cues.  
 
 
Process Determinants in the Annan Plan Referendum: a Tale of Two Stories 
 
What emerges from the analysis made in this chapter is that the Annan Plan negotiations 
and referendum consisted, in fact, of two distinct experiences for the two communities in 
the north and south of the Cypriot divide. The Annan Plan referendum is, in fact, not only a 
case of rejection of the peace agreement, but also one of approval. Therefore, it was 
sensible to consider, not only ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĞŬ Ǉpriot 
rejection of the Plan, but also Turkish Cypriot approval. Surprisingly, it was found in this 
research that there were differences in mediator behaviours towards each of the leaderships 
and the communities. Scholars have been fast in judging Kofi AnnaŶ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ Ğ ^ŽƚŽ ?Ɛ
mediation through the rejection of the Plan and not its acceptance by Turkish Cypriots. The 
fact that these differences in mediator behaviours and in political and civic engagement 
during the negotiations could be found, further empirically strengthens the overarching 
argument of this thesis that referendum results are also influenced by how peace 
negotiations are conducted. 
The findings in the analysis partially supported arguments in the literature that mediation 
strategy contributed to the rejection of the Annan Plan (Drath 2004; Lordos 2004; Michael 
2007; Kaymak 2012). However, existing analyses typically did not fully explain how those 
aspects of the negotiations actually shaped the campaign period and, potentially, voting 
behaviours. If arbitration effectively allowed President Papadopoulos to not be accountable 
for the final settlement as is argued in the literature (Kaymak 2012, 106), this chapter 
contended that it ĂůŽŶĞ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ǁŚǇ 'ƌĞĞŬ ǇƉƌŝŽƚƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ?
campaigns ? arguments. The secrecy of the negotiation process, it argued, potentially allowed 
WĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ƵŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ towards the Plan to be perceived as legitimate. In fact, the 
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ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐǁĞƌĞƉĂƌƚŽĨ ‘ŶŽ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐŝŶŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ
that the Annan Plan was a biased imposition from abroad and a bad outcome for Greek 
ǇƉƌŝŽƚƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞhE ?ƐĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇĂƐĂŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌǁĂƐƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ?The campaign period, in 
ƚƵƌŶ ?ǁĂƐĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇĂ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ŚĞĂĚĞĚďǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĂƚĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝǌĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ
lack of information available to the public to discredit the mediation process. Therefore, if 
arbitration allowed political leaders to appear unaccountable for the process and outcome 
of the negotiations, secrecy predisposed an ill-engaged and ill-informed community to follow 
the cues of the stronger and highly pŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇďĂĐŬĞĚ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽa stifled 
 ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? 
As previously stated, the argument that Greek Cypriots did not support the Plan because 
it did not sufficiently address Greek Cypriot concerns is, in view of this research, too 
simplistic. On the one hand, the Annan Plan was created after four decades of negotiations, 
with the issues on the table exhaustively negotiated. The argument that the plan was 
unbalanced is also dangerous for two reasons: it takes responsibility away from political 
leaders to negotiate agreements that correspond to the will of the majority of people they 
represent, and secondly, it risks us forgetting that an agreement is a compromise. On the 
other hand, the interviewees ? reports suggested that the content of the Plan itself  W 
extensive and complex  W was not directly in the hands of the Cypriot public on either side of 
the Green Line. What was communicated about the Plan, or the perceptions created about 
it, thus contributed more to shaping support for the plan in the referendum than the 
content of the Plan itself.  
Like the Greek Cypriot community, Turkish Cypriots were also involved in the same 
mediation process with arbitration and secrecy. Furthermore, like Papadopoulos, the Turkish 
Cypriot leader, Denktash, ĂůƐŽ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ? ĞǀĞŶ ĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐ Ă ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ
(Bryant 2004). Still, the majority of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the Plan. This chapter 
found that several factors explain the outcome in the Turkish Cypriot community. The 
ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ h ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǀŽƚĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ dƵƌŬŝƐŚ
Cypriot community at a time of economic turmoil (Bahcheli 2004; Lordos 2008). Yet, it also 
triggered an upsurge of political and civic mobilization that affected the negotiation process 
and shaped the referendum experience in the North. Such an explanation goes further than 
existing arguments that state Turkish Cypriots supported the Annan Plan because EU 
accession would bring their decade-long isolation and economic dependency on Turkey to 
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an end. This diminishes the fact that the implementation of the Annan Plan also signified 
that Turkish Cypriots would have to live together with Greek Cypriots, from whom they 
historically feared domination. Secondly, it dismisses the remarkable mass mobilization that 
took place in North Cyprus in support, first for the negotiations and thereafter for the 
resulting agreement in the referendum. One additional aspect that contributed to support 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ? ŝŶƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚǁĂƐƌĚŽŐĂŶ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŶŶĂŶWůĂŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƐĞĞŶƚŽŚĂǀĞ
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǀŽƚĞ ĂŵŽŶŐ dƵƌŬŝƐŚ ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?The fact that the agreement 
provided the possibility of citizenship in the new federal republic to a considerable portion of 
these settlers, was considered by Talat to have also played an important role in having a 
ƉŽƌƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŵ ǀŽƚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?  ?dĂůĂƚ  ? ? ? ? ) ?Additionaly ? ĂƐ ^ĞŶĞƌ ůĐŝů ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?
campaign in the North also particularly targeted Turkish settlers (Elcil 2014). 
What had not been considered before is how the negotiation process was comparatively 
more inclusive in the Turkish Cypriot community than in the Greek Cypriot community. In 
the Greek Cypriot community, the secrecy of the negotiation process and the lack of public 
ĚĞďĂƚĞ ůĞĨƚĂŶƵŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĂŶĚĚŝƐĞŶŐĂŐĞĚƉƵďůŝĐ ƚŽ ƌĞůǇŽŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌ ?ƐĐƵĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
campaign period to make their voting decisions. In the Turkish Cypriot community, on the 
other hand, there was a much higher and earlier engagement of opposition parties and civil 
society groups with the negotiations that successfully mobilized the community in support of 
the Annan Plan. In the North, by the time the referendum took place civil society had been 
ŚŝŐŚůǇŵŽďŝůŝǌĞĚŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞƉůĂŶĂŶĚĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶĂƐƚƌŽŶŐ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ůů
while Denktash had been effectively side-lined by Talat and Turkey in the negotiations. In 
turn, the earlier and higher degree of engagement with the negotiations allowed for a 
ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ďĂĐŬĞĚďǇĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ƚŽƌĞĂĐŚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
referendum.  
Some of the aspects and dynamics found to have shaped the victory of tŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞŝŶ
North Cyprus, it will be shown in the next chapter, evidence strong similarities with the Good 
Friday Agreement experience. As it will be described, the negotiation process in Northern 
Ireland also included a larger number of political stakeholder and civil society, and both are 
ĨŽƵŶĚƚŽŚĂǀĞĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ? 
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4. The Good Friday Agreement Negotiations and Referendum  
 
  After the analysis of how the negotiations shaped the rejection of the Annan Plan and 
the sharp difference in support between the two Cypriot communities in the referendum, 
ǁĞŶŽǁƚƵƌŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌŝƐŚĐĂƐĞ ? As in the previous chapter, the main aim of 
the analysis of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) negotiations and referendum is to 
understand how specific characteristics of the negotiations shaped the referendum results. 
The same features of the negotiations that were studied the Annan Plan case will be 
investigated in this chapter, which is done for the purpose of allowing the findings in each 
case to be compared in chapter 5. Equally to the Annan Plan analysis, this chapter aims to 
uncover if these features of the negotiations can explain the difference in support given to 
the GFA by the Unionist and Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland.       
The Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, also known as Good Friday 
Agreement or Belfast Agreement, was painstakingly mediated by United States Senator 
George Mitchell amidst ongoing disruptive paramilitary violence. It was negotiated between 
an elected group of Northern Irish political parties and took place in Belfast over a period of 
two years  W from June 1996 to April 1998. The tumultuous negotiation process would, 
however, culminate with the unexpected announcement on the 10th of April of 1998 that a 
peace agreement had been reached. On the 22nd of May, roughly a month and a half later, 
the agreement was placed for referendum. Unlike the Annan Plan, the GFA received the 
support of 71.1 per cent of voters in Northern Ireland. However, while 96-97 per cent of the 
EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇǀŽƚĞĚ ‘ǇĞƐ ? ŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ?ƚŚĞ ? ?-53 per cent support from the 
Unionist community is comparatively lower (Melaugh and McKenna 1998)  W a similar 
difference to that observed between the Cypriot communities in the Annan Plan 
referendum. Although the implementation of the agreement was dependent only on an 
overall majority vote, as will be described in this chapter, it was important for the legitimacy 
and implementation of the agreement that it received a majority of voter support in each of 
the communities. 
This chapter begins with a description of the GFA negotiation process, from early 1996 to 
the day the agreement was reached in April 1998. The GFA negotiations became possible 
and were deeply shaped by the negotiation attempts led by the British and Irish 
governments in the decades prior. For this reason, scholars use different starting points 
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when describing the peace process that led to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. 
The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, or the previously established Sunningdale 
power-sharing system in 1973, are commonly pin-pointed as the start of the process. 
Indeed, as it will be described, these events undoubtedly shaped the negotiations agenda 
and the content of what would come to be the Good Friday Agreement. However, since the 
focus of this research is on the dynamics of the negotiation process from which the 
referendum unfolds (and is an inherent part of), the description of the negotiation process 
begins with the elections to the Peace Forum in 1996, which determined which parties 
would be part of the All-Party talks. Following the description of the negotiation process, the 
chapter investigates the impact mediation strategy, political party inclusion, civil society 
inclusion, and agreement design had on the GFA referendum outcome in that order. It, 
therefore, mirrors the structure of the previous chapter. The findings are then summarized 
and discussed with existing academic literature on the case study. 
Several characteristics of the mediation/negotiation process have been found to have led 
ƚŽƚŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŝŶEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?'ĞŽƌŐĞDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐƚǇůĞ
(Curran and Sebenius 2003; Curran, Sebenius, and Watkins 2004), the fact that the 
negotiations included a majority of the political parties in Northern Ireland (McGarry and 
K ?>ĞĂƌǇ  ? ? ? ?Ă; Horowitz 2002), the ground-work led by civil society (Cochrane 2006; 
ŽĐŚƌĂŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?ŽĐŚƌĂŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?ĞůůĂŶĚK ?ZŽƵƌŬĞ ? ? ? ? ), or the institutions designed in the 
agreement (Horowitz 2001 ? DĐ'ĂƌƌǇ ĂŶĚ K ?>eary 2006b), have all been shown to have 
ĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ /ƌŝƐŚ  ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?. It will be demonstrated in this chapter that, indeed, 
some of these aspects also favoured support for the agreement in the referendum. 
Straightforwardly, the fact that the process accommodated the interest of several political 
parties meant that political support for the Good Friday Agreement was high during the 
referendum campaign. It will be demonstrated that inclusivity challenged the secrecy of the 
process, as well as for the participation of civil society actors. This aspect is, in fact, novel in 
the literature. The less secretive and more inclusive and participatory character of the 
negotiations, it will be argued, shaped a referendum campaign period where the majority of 
ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞ ?ĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞĂǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇƉƌŽĨĞssionalized civil 
society-ůĞĚ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?Also, in accounting for what aspects of the negotiations and the 
referendum could help explain the difference in support given by the two communities, the 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ ŝƐseen in a less positive light than they have in the 
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literature. The pressure applied on Ulster Unionist Party Leader, David Trimble, to accept the 
agreement and the ambiguity of the text of the agreement are both found to have 
hampered ƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶŝƐƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ support in the referendum.  
 
 
The Good Friday Agreement Negotiations 
 
The GFA negotiations marked a departure from previous attempts led by the British and 
Irish governments to manage the Northern Ireland conflict. The failure of the Sunningdale 
power-sharing experience of 1973-1974 brought the realization that an agreement would 
not be sustainable without the inclusion of the political parties associated with the 
paramilitary groups (Horowitz 2002, 194 ?  ? ? ? ? DĐ'ĂƌƌǇ ĂŶĚ K ?>ĞĂƌǇ  ? ? ? ?ď, 262). 
Consequently, and recapturing what was already described in the introductory chapter, the 
decommissioning of the paramilitaries and their pledged rejection of violence became the 
preconditions for this more inclusive approach. Yet, while Unionist parties and the British 
government demanded that paramilitary organizations give up their arms before any 
negotiations began, the PIRA defended that it would not hand-in any arms prior to the start 
of the talks (Mitchell 1999, 29). In an attempt to break the stalemate, an independent 
commission was set up. United States Senator George Mitchell was invited by President 
Clinton to chair the International Body on Arms Decommissioning. The Mitchell Commission, 
as it became known, reported on the 22nd of January 1996 recommending that a 
simultaneous and parallel decommissioning of the republican and loyalist paramilitaries take 
place, alongside the talks (art.34, 47).  
TŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ƌĞƉŽƌƚalso recommended that elections be held to decide which 
political parties would participate in the forum for All-Party talks, where discussions on a 
political settlement would take place (art.56). The elections to the Northern Ireland Forum 
for Political Dialogue, also known as the Peace Forum, were held on the 30th of May 1996. 
Five seats were ascribed for each Westminster Parliamentary constituency of Northern 
Ireland, under the D'Hondt method of party-list proportional representation, and an extra 
two seats were ascribed for the ten parties polling most votes. The electoral system was 
designed by the British government in order to allow the small loyalist parties to participate 
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in the negotiations, since it was expected that Sinn Féin22 would get enough votes, being the 
fourth largest political party in Northern Ireland at the time (Mitchell 1999, 43). In the 
election, 10 political parties were granted seats at the Forum and the mandate to negotiate 
in the All Party Talks, where representatives of the British and Irish governments would be 
present for consultation. The parties and the size of their delegations were as follows:  
 
Political Party Number of delegates 
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 30 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 24 
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 21 
Sinn Féin 17 
Alliance Party 7 
United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP) 3 
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 2 
Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) 2 
EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ 2 
Labour Party 2 




Headed by David Trimble, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), was the largest Unionist 
political party at the time and, hence, gained the highest number of seats in the Forum. The 
UUP was reluctant to accept any form of power-sharing with the Nationalist community, 
especially with Sinn Féin, or to allow the involvement of the Irish government in Northern 
Ireland politics. The second largest party, founded the Presbyterian Church leader Reverend 
Ian Paisley, was the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The DUP pursued a harder political line 
in advocating for the dominance of unionism and of the Ulster identity in Northern Ireland. 
                                                          
22
 Sinn Féin is widely believed to be the political arm of the PIRA, although the connection between the two has always 
been denied by its leaders.   
 
23




The DUP and the smaller United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP), led by Robert McCartney, 
were ideologically resistant to power-sharing.  
As a result of the electoral system, the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) (linked to the 
Ulster Volunteer Force and Red Hand Commandos) and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) 
(linked to the Ulster Defence Association) gained seats at the negotiations. Having a loyalist 
paramilitary constituency, the release of prisoners became an important issue for these 
parties when the topic was introduced by Sinn Féin later in the negotiations. Also, unlike the 
remaining Unionist parties, the PUP and the UDP accepted ^ŝŶŶ &ĠŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ
government (Horowitz 2002, 208). 
The two existing Nationalist parties, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and 
Sinn Féin, both gained seats in the Forum. Led by John Hume, the SDLP was the largest 
Nationalist political party at the time. Born out of the civil-rights movement of the 1970s, the 
party professed a more moderate version of Irish nationalism that did not preclude the end 
of Stormont (McGrattan 2010, 39). SDLP supporters were, nonetheless, divided over 
whether unity with the Republic of Ireland should be understood as the long-term goal, or 
whether they preferred to remain in the United Kingdom. The second largest party, Sinn 
Féin, originally represented the republican stance of immediate unity with Ireland and 
promoted the strategic necessity of the PIRA armed struggle against British rule (Ruane and 
Todd 1996, 67,70). By the start of the GFA ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ
softened and articulated as being part of an Irish Peace initiative aimed at removing the 
need for violence (Adams 1997). 
Two moderate, but organically different, political parties also gained seats in the Forum, 
namely; the older bi-communal Alliance Party and the, also bi-communal but civil society-
led, EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ  ?E/t ) ? dŚĞ ůůŝĂŶĐĞ WĂƌƚǇ ǁĂƐ ĨŽƵŶĚĞĚ ŝŶ Ɖƌŝů
1970 by members of the Catholic and Protestant communities who were against political 
sectarianism (Close 2014). Promoting the unity of the two Christian Churches and gathering 
support across the two communities, the Alliance Party supported a pragmatic union with 
Britain within a power-sharing arrangement, and represented a small percentage of the 
Protestant community (Ruane and Todd 1996, 60 W61) ? dŚĞ ůůŝĂŶĐĞ WĂƌƚǇ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?
capacity to communicate with both sides made the party leaders, Lord John Alderdice and 
Deputy-leader Seamus Close, key participants in the negotiations (Mitchell 1999, 44).   
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dŚĞEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŽŶƚŚĞother hand, was set up for the specific 
purpose of participating in the negotiations. A group of Catholic and Protestant women 
created the party in 1996 in a bid to take advantage of the electoral system created for the 
Peace Forum, which favoured the inclusion of smaller parties in the negotiations. Their main 
aim was to have women participating in the negotiations to represent and advocate for 
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŝƐƐƵĞƐ. TŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐǇǁĂƐĐŽŵƉŽƐĞĚŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ from both 
denominations who were active in civil society. The internal structure of the party was that 
of a Coalition - not a traditional party  W with two leaders, Monica McWilliams, a Catholic, and 
Pearl Sager, a Protestant. Its members were originally concerned about the absence of 
women in politics, and particularly in the negotiation process ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚǇ ?s 
negotiating agenda broadened as the negotiations progressed, explained Avila Kilmurray and 
:ĂŶĞDŽƌƌŝĐĞ ?ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ(Kilmurray 2014; Morrice 2014). 
Morrice stated: 
 ‘We did not ǁĂŶƚƚŽƉŝŐĞŽŶŚŽůĞŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐŝŶƚŽŽŶůǇĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?
 ? Q )dŚĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ũŽďƐ ?ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ĂŶĚǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ?ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƐŽƌƚŽĨ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ
we thought should have been on the negotiations table, not just the military and 
ƉĂƌĂŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƐƵĞƐ ? ? 
Morrice (2014) 
The treatment of victims, the integration of former prisoners, integrated education, and the 
participation of civil society in political life became important issues during the course of 
negotiations for the party (Kilmurray 2014).  
Although the elections to the Peace Forum determined which parties would negotiate the 
agreement, the negotiation process which eventually produced the GFA did not, in fact, take 
place in the Peace Forum24. While the Peace Forum discussed some of the issues under 
negotiations and put forward proposals to the main talks, the agreement was actually 
negotiated between the delegations of the different parties in the All Party talks. In addition 
to the representatives of the Northern Ireland Political parties, representatives of the British 
and the RepubliĐŽĨ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞpresent at the talks. In fact, the groundwork 
and basis for agreement of the All-Party negotiations had been laid by the agreements 
reached between the governments in the decades prior. They determined that Northern 
                                                          
24
 The Peace Forum, nonetheless, contributed to the inclusiveness of the process. To the PUP in particular, the possibility of 
making proposals to the All-Party talks through the Forum, allowed those connected to the PUP to become involved in the 
negotiations and to feel part of the political process (Irvine 2014). In the DUP and UKUP case, because the Nationalist 
parties refused to participate in the Forum and, therefore, Sinn Féin did not take its seats in the Forum, it allowed it to 




Ireland would be based on a power-sharing model, and that there would be North-South and 
British-Irish institutional arrangements to facilitate a three-way cooperation between the 
two governments and the local government in Northern Ireland. Therefore, in terms of 
substance, the All-Party talks focused on negotiating the detail of how those overarching 
institutions would come to be.  
Procedural aspects of the negotiations were agreed between all the parties before the 
first session of the talks. Subsequently, just as the Annan Plan negotiations would come to 
be years later, the negotiations in Northern Ireland weƌĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƚŚĂƚ ‘nothing 
is agƌĞĞĚƵŶƚŝůĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐŝƐĂŐƌĞĞĚ ?. Another important procedure suggested by the British 
and Irish governments and agreed by the parties in Northern Ireland was the three-strand 
negotiation structure. The separation of the negotiations into three strands meant that each 
strand encompassed negotiations between different actors: Strand One covered the 
negotiations between political parties of Northern Ireland regarding relationships within 
Northern Ireland; Strand Two referred to negotiations on the relationship between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; and, finally, Strand Three referred to negotiations on the 
relationships between the British and Irish Governments. Yet, unlike in the Annan Plan 
negotiations, it involved a triple-lock ratification system that required both the political 
leaderships ? ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƉůƵƐƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽ
governments. The triple-lock system25, set that the process of ratification would be 
incremental: first it would have to receive the support of the political parties in the 
negotiations; then from the British parliament and the Irish government and parliament; and 
lastly, it would have to be supported by a simple majority of the people of Northern Ireland 
in a referendum.   
After chairing the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, George Mitchell was 
invited by the British and Irish governments to chair the plenary sessions of the All-Party 
talks (Mitchell 1999, 45). Once more, he teamed-up with his co-chairs from the Commission 
on decommissioning: John de Chastelain, a Canadian diplomat retired from the Canadian 
Defence Forces chosen by the British government, and Harri Holkeri, a former Finish Prime 
Minister chosen by the Irish government. The first plenary session of the talks took place on 
the 10th of June 1996 at the Castle Buildings in Stormont, Belfast. Since the loyalist 
                                                          
25dĂŬĞŶ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ  ‘Consultation Paper - Ground Rules for Substantive All-WĂƌƚǇ EĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? issued by the British 
Government on Friday 15
th
 of March 1996. 
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paramilitaries had maintained their cease-fire, the political parties associated with them 
were allowed in the talks. However, Sinn Féin was excluded for the PIRA ?Ɛ ďƌĞĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
1996 cease-fire (Fitzduff 2002, 128 W29). The cease-fire was restored in 1997, allowing Sinn 
&ĠŝŶƚŽĞŶƚĞƌ ?ƚƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?/ĂŶWĂŝƐůĞǇ ?ƐhWĂŶĚƚŚĞh<hWƌĞĨƵƐĞd to take part in 
the negotiations including Sinn Féin and abandoned the talks. This meant that a fringe 
portion of the Unionist community would not be represented at the peace talks from then 
on.  
 The distrustful relationships between the Nationalist and Unionist leaderships, and 
continued paramilitary violence, meant that the negotiation process did not produce any 
commitments on specific issues until the last week of the proceedings. Additionally, while 
ƚŚĞ ‘nothing is agƌĞĞĚƵŶƚŝůĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐŝƐĂŐƌĞĞĚ ?ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ allowed the parties to negotiate 
more freely, it also allowed them to not commit to any concessions or proposals during the 
negotiations, as SDLP delegate Sean Farren explained: 
 ‘ Q the parties could re-open an issue in the light of further developments and it 
ǁĂƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĂƚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞďĞƚŚĞƌĞ ?/ƚƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚĞĚĞǀĞƌǇƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?
What was happening, however, was that the parties were not committing 
themselves to what was on the table and it was important that the Chair state 
that it was time to ĐŽŵŵŝƚ ? ? 
Farren (2014) 
In earůǇ  ? ? ? ? ? DŝƚĐŚĞůů ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĂŶ ĞĂƌůǇ ? ŚĂƌĚ ĚĞĂĚůŝŶ ? was necessary (Mitchell 
1999, 143). The deadline, however, was not impŽƐĞĚ ? ,Ğ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ŝŶ ŚŝƐ ŵĞŵŽŝƌ P  ‘ Q/ ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ
ŝŵƉŽƐĞĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? /ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŽ ?dŚĞǇĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚƚŚĞĚĞĂĚůŝŶĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
they were eagĞƌĂƐ/ǁĂƐƚŽŐĞƚĂŶĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? (Mitchell 1999, 146). The calendar agreed on 
by all, was that the parties would meet continuously from the 30th of March to the 9th of 
April, the deadline for agreement. During this period, all parties and governments would 
communicate their final comments on the agreement to the mediation team. In between, a 
first draft of the comprehensive agreement would be drawn by the mediation team and 
presented to the parties on the 3rd of April. It would then be reviewed after consultations. A 
second draft would be presented on the 6th and the final 4 days (and nights) would be 
dedicated to the final negotiations. These would culminate with agreement on the 9th of 
April, on Easter weekend (ibid, p.145). The date was an important religious celebration for 
both communities, but more importantly, Mitchell (1999, 145) wanted the referendum to be 
held in late May and for the new power sharing Assembly to be in place before the peak of 
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the July parades, or marching season, which typically brought an upsurge of violence in 
Northern Ireland. 
The final 48 hours of negotiations were the most crucial to the outcome. The 
independent authority given to the North-South bodies agreed by the governments on 
strand two arrangements was unacceptable to Trimble. It raised Unionist ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? fears that 
it would become the precursor of a united Ireland and had to be renegotiated. The early 
release of paramilitary prisoners was another divisive issue, with both Sinn Féin and the 
loyalist parties pushing for it, against the hhW ?Ɛ ƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ ƌĞŵĂŝned a 
crucial issue as well. Unlike what the Mitchell Commission had recommended, no arms were 
decommissioned during the negotiation process. The UUP insisted that a provision be 
included in the agreement, that would set decommissioning as a requirement for 
participation in the new Assembly, which was unacceptable to Sinn Féin and did not feature 
in the final agreement (Mitchell 1999, 171 W81). Despite these differences, an agreement was 
reached on the 10th of April 1998, just one day after the previously set deadline.  
The referendum campaign took place over the one month period between the 
announcement and the day of the referendum, the 22nd of May. All the political parties who 
were signatories of the agreement ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǀŽƚĞ ? ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ hW ĂŶĚ h<hW
ďĞĐĂŵĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? As part of the agreement, it was required that the Republic 
remove its constitutional claim to Northern Ireland, and because any change to the 
constitution of the Republic of Ireland required a referendum, the GFA referendum was held 
simultaneously with a constitutional referendum in the Republic. In the south, 94 per cent 
ǀŽƚĞĚ ŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĐůĂŝŵŽŶEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?tŝƚŚĂŚŝŐŚ
81.1 per cent turnout, 71.1 per cent ŽĨ ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ŝŶ EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ǀŽƚĞĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
implementation of the agreement (Northern Ireland Elections 2001). The referendum 
campaign period and how it was shaped by negotiation process conditions is analysed next.  
 
 
Mediation Strategies  
 
Among the several members of the different party delegations interviewed for this 
research, there was an overall extremely positive view of George Mitchell and his 
contribution to the peace process. Interestingly, they do not regard Mitchell as a mediator 
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because his facilitative and procedural mediation strategies are not considered to be 
mediation per se. As will be demonstrated in this section, the negotiation delegates 
interviewed for this research rather view the role of a mediator as one where the actor 
exercising mediation has more power over the process. The British and Irish governments, 
on the other hand, are regarded as having been the powerful agents in the process. In 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƚŚĞůĂŝƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝƐƐĞĞŶƚŽŚĂǀĞŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞĚǁŝƚŚDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞh^ ?
the Irish government and the British government provided crucial incentives and pressure 
for an agreement to be reached - and even later in the implementation of the agreement. 
However the pressure applied to the UUP during the last phase of negotiations, it will be 
shown, shaped the referendum and particularly affected the Unionist ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ support 
for the agreement. The British and Irish governments were instrumental in getting the 
political parties of Northern Ireland to accept the agreement. However, when the impact 
this had on the campaign period and the outcome of the referendum is considered, the 
consequences of the role played by the Blair government in particular can be seen as less 
benign.  
Another aspect of the negotiations analysed here, is the negotiations secrecy and how it 
shaped public information and uncertainty in the referendum. Secrecy was a significant 
feature of the peace process in Northern Ireland. The back-channel secret negotiations 
between the British government and the republican movement have been found to have 
played a crucial role in forging communication and trust between the two actors, which 
ultimately favoured the politicization and inclusion of Sinn Féin in the peace process (O ?<ĂŶĞ
2015; Dochartaigh 2011). Nonetheless, and surprisingly, the degree of secrecy of the All-
Party talks themselves has been given little attention in the literature. It is argued here that, 
although the GFA negotiations in Northern Ireland were typically political-elite-driven 
negotiations, they cannot be said to have been secret. The findings suggest this and other 
features of the process allowed for there to be information available to the public and less 
uncertainty about the outcome of the negotiations, and hence the issues at stake in the 







Impact on Political Party Support and the Referendum Campaigns 
 
'ĞŽƌŐĞ DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?Ɛ ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ƐŬŝůůƐ ĂƌĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚered to be 
largely associated with the success of the negotiations by all the negotiations delegates 
interviewed for this research. SDLP delegate, Alban Maginnes referred to his neutrality and 
credibility: 
 ‘ QŚis character, gentle but firm, professional and realistic. I think that people 
built up confidence in him as a Chair, that he was genuinely neutral and 
concerned with their individual political positions and wanted to try and do his 
ďĞƐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵ ? ?   
Maginnes (2014) 
UUP chairman, Lord Empey, emphasised his personal skills:  ‘George was excellent. He had 
been a judge and he understood processes and the minutia of our arrangements and he and 
his team served us well ? ? Jane Morrice, delegate for the NIWC, referreĚ ƚŽ Śŝŵ ĂƐ  ‘an 
amazingly valuable mediator (Morrice 2014) ? dŚĞ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ƚĞĂŵ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ǁĂƐ ? ŝŶ ĨĂĐƚ ? ƐŽ 
highly appreciated that Jeffrey Donaldson, a UUP delegate in the negotiations, believed that 
it should have continued onto the implementation process becaƵƐĞ ‘ ? Q )ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƚŚĞŽŶĞƐ
who acquired the knowledge and understanĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĞĚƐ ŽĨ ďŽƚŚ ƐŝĚĞƐ ? (Donaldson 
2014). 
IŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ ?ĂůůŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŽƌƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?Ɛrole in the talks as ƚŚĂƚŽĨĂ ‘facŝůŝƚĂƚŽƌ ? ?
ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ Ă  ‘ŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ?. Yet, the descriptions provided by the interviewees match the 
facilitative and procedural mediator strategies categorized in the literature. For example, 
Lord Empey, ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚDŝƚĐŚĞůůĚŝĚŶŽƚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚŚĞĚŽĞƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?Ɛ
work aƐĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂů P ‘to coordinate the talks, to have a process, to ensure that 
meetings were called, held, recorded properly, and to some extent you were batting ideas 
across the table ? (Empey 2014) ?^ĞǀĞƌĂůŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ-
facilitation skills, such as his ability to listen and then ƐƵŵ ƵƉ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ
 ‘encapsulating all in a fĞǁ ǁŽƌĚƐ ƚŽ ĂůůŽǁ ƵƐ ƚŽ ŵŽǀĞ ŽŶ ?, said Alliance Party delegate 
Seamus Close (Close 2014). NIWC delegate Avila Kilmurray further explained how this 
allowed the parties to focus on what was being said instead of who was saying it, which 
helped find common ground ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ (Kilmurray 2014). 
Among the negotiators interviewed, however, there was a consensual perception that 
Mitchell was limited by the two governments during the last week of negotiations, when 
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Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern joined the talks in Belfast. Lord Alderdice (2014), 
leader of the Alliance Party at the time, explained that Mitchell was limited by the fact that 
he came to mediate as a request from the two governments, which made it difficult for him 
 ‘to make an agreement proposal that the twŽŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?ĂŶĚĂůůŽǁĞĚ
ƚŚĞŵƚŽ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞ ? with his work (Alderdice 2014). The UUP delegates interviewed believed 
that Mitchell was pressured and side-lined by the governments after the setting of the 
ĚĞĂĚůŝŶĞ ? /ŶĚĞĞĚ ? ŝŶŚŝƐŵĞŵŽŝƌ ?DŝƚĐŚĞůů ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
draft proposal on strand two arrangements be put forward to the parties when he 
personally believed the proposal was unacceptable to Trimble: 
 ‘To add to my already high anxiety, the government officials now requested on 
behalf of the prime ministers that we include in our comprehensive document 
what they had agreed on without any changes. They did not want a single word 
or a single comma altered. And we were told it should go in as our draft, not 
ƚŚĞŝƌƐ ? ? 
 Mitchell (1999, 160) 
Mitchell also writes that he and his team deĐŝĚĞĚ ƚŽ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ
because they understood that part of their job as mediators was ƚŽ ‘ĂďƐŽƌďďůĂŵĞ ? (Mitchell 
1999, 156).  
On the day the agreement was reached, Trimble put the agreement draft to a vote within 
the UUP delegates. A small majority supported the agreement (Donaldson 2014) and just 
hours before the agreement was announced, the media reported on UUP delegates 
abandoning the Castle Buildings. Two of these delegates (today in the DUP) believed the 
agreement was biased towards the Nationalist community (Weir 2014; Donaldson 2014). 
Peter tĞŝƌ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘it was biased towards those who were connected with 
paramilitary activity. It certainly did not create a level play between Unionists and 
ZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶƐ ? ? To them, the Irish and British governments side-lined George Mitchell and took 
over the negotiations during the final week of the talks, where Prime Minister Tony Blair 
pressured David Trimble into supporting an agreement that was bad for the Unionist 
community: 
 ‘The dynamic of the peace process for the British government, and probably for 
the Irish government, was to keep Sinn Fein on board. Their priority was not 
about satisfying UŶŝŽŶŝƐƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐďƵƚĂďŽƵƚƐĂƚŝƐĨǇŝŶŐ^ŝŶŶ&ĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞ





 ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ Ăůů ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐďŽƚŚ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ  ?ĂĨƚĞƌ Ăůů ? ƚŚĞ
agreement required legislation from Dublin and Britain) and positive, the UUP delegates 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚ ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĞĂŐĞƌŶĞƐƐ ƚŽ ƉƵƚ ĂŶ ĞŶĚ ƚŽ ƚŚe 
paramilitary threat to Great Britain, pushed Unionists to concede more than they were ready 
to at the time (Weir 2014; Empey 2014). The ƐƉůŝƚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhhW ?Ɛ
support for GFA in the referendum was divided. Members of the party did not participate in 
the campaign and others were publicly vocal on their views against the agreement. 
Consequently, the campaign period had an important impact on the referendum results and 
has been found to have deeply shaped the Unionist ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐǀŽƚĞ ? Hayes and McAllister 
(2001, 78 W80) demonstrate that right after the agreement was reached, public opinion polls 
showed a higher than 80 per cent rate of support for the agreement. Overall support then 
markedly dropped to between 50-60 per cent due to a decrease in support in the Unionist 
community. They argue that support in the community shifted when Ulster Unionist leaders 
began to publicly express reservations towards the agreement.  
DĐ'ĂƌƌǇĂŶĚK ?>ĞĂƌǇ(2006a, 48 W54) do recognize that pressure was responsible for the 
lack of support from  ‘unionism ? ƚŽƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ ‘ QƌĞŵĂŝŶƐŝƚƐĐŚŝĞĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐ ?. 
Nonetheless, this negative impact is largely downplayed via the argument that it allowed an 
agreement to be reached. While applying pressure can be effective in getting negotiation 
parties to arrive/accept an agreement, this can have significant implications on support for 
the agreement in a referendum. As was the case in the GFA negotiations, pressure created 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞhůƐƚĞƌhŶŝŽŶŝƐƚƉĂƌƚǇƚŚĂƚŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇǁĞĂŬĞŶĞĚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
for the agreement, its campaign and, ultimately the Unionist ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ
agreement.  
  
Impact on Public Information and Uncertainty 
 
With the exception of the  ‘ůŽĐŬ-ĚŽǁŶ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐthe last 48h hours of negotiations, during 
which none of the delegates were allowed to leave the Castle Buildings, all of the Northern 
Ireland delegates interviewed for this research rejected the idea that the GFA negotiations 
were held in secret. For example, tŝŶƐƚŽŶ/ƌǀŝŶĞ ?ĂĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞĨŽƌƚŚĞWhW ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘They 
weƌĞƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƐĞĐƌĞƚ ? ?(Irvine 2014), but confidentiality was the term preferred by 
virtually all the delegates interviewed. For example, within the UUP delegation, Peter Weir 
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ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ŝƐ ƚŚĞŵŽƌĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚĞƌŵ ? Q ) ?(Weir 2014) and Lord Empey 
alsŽ ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘There rather was Ă ĚĞŐƌĞĞ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ  ? Q ) ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƚĂůŬƐ. 
Confidentiality was described as necessary by all. For example SDLP delegate Alban 
Maginness stated:  
 ‘Confidentiality was important. I would not ĐĂůůŝƚƐĞĐƌĞĐǇ ? ? Q )WĞŽƉůĞŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞ
able to talk frankly. However, if they talk frankly and it is leaked and exposed, it 
ĐĂŶďĞǀĞƌǇĚĂŵĂŐŝŶŐ ? ? 
Maginness (2014) 
Sinn Féin delegate Alex Maskey agreed: 
 ‘There are times you need to have conversations which might be uncomfortable 
ĨŽƌĂŶǇďŽĚǇŽƌĞǀĞƌǇďŽĚǇ ? ? Q )dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶĞĞĚĨor people who are involved in a 
negotiation to, A, get to know each other, B, to ĞǆƉůŽƌĞĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?
 
Maskey (2014) 
Nonetheless, keeping confidentiality was still problematic. Mitchell valued the secrecy of the 
talks because leaks could lead to increases of violence, which would disturb the negotiations 
by generating distrust and resentment between participants. However, he states in his 
ŵĞŵŽŝƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇ ?  ‘The leaks became so common that we joked about them ? 
(Mitchell 1999, 145). 
^ƚŝůů ? ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ǁĂƐ  ‘a balance to be struck because you have to manage 
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?, explained Jeffrey Donaldson (Donaldson 2014), but also to keep the public 
informed. For example, SDLP negotiator Sean Farren (2014) perceived the negotiation 
process as being relatively open because the parties were eager to give daily accounts to the 
media on the negotiations progress. The Alliance Party, as well, was keen to have the media 
ĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ P  ‘We wanted, as far as possible, for the community to know what 
was going on ĂŶĚƚŽĨĞĞůƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĂƚ ?, Lord Alderdice explained (Alderdice 2014). 
/ƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽ ƐƉĞĂŬ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĚŝĂ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ
necessarily accrue to there being more information available to the public about the 
negotiations since, as Mark Devenport, who was a BBC correspondent to the GFA 
negotiations explaineĚ ? ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘ƐƉŝŶ ? information to influence public 
opinion: 
 
 ‘When you are covering negotiations you have to be aware that some of the 
things that you are being told are maybe the truth of what was happening, some 
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of the things are being said in order to influence the progress of negotiations 
ŝŶƐŝĚĞƚŚĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ? 
Devenport (2014) 
However, the number of participants in the talks was believed to have favoured journalistic 
access to information on the negotiations. For example, when comparing the GFA 
negotiations to the Haass talks26, Devenport stated that it was easier to get information on 
the negotiations during the former than the latter, because the former had a greater 
number of participants (Devenport 2014).  
The inclusion of more political parties, therefore, meant that it became harder to control 
what would become known to the public about the negotiations and that there were more 
sources of information for journalists. Additionally, including a more varied type of political 
parties meant that these parties related differently with their constituencies and some were 
ŬĞĞŶĞƌŽŶŝŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ
would request expert opinions on specific negotiation issues from the civil society and E'K ?Ɛ
that were part of its constituency. As NIWC delegate Avila <ŝůŵƵƌƌĂǇĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ? ‘The purpose 
was both to get expert views from the outside, but also to get buy-in for the (negotiations) 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? (Kilmurray 2014). Other interviewees also described a closer engagement with their 
constituencies during the negotiations, particularly the smaller parties. This was the case 
with Sinn Féin and the PUP (Irvine 2014; Maskey 2014). Sinn Féin delegate Alex Maskey 
(2014), explained that the party organized local area and town hall meetings where party 
leaders would feel the need to filter and demystify information circling in the media about 
the negotiation process: 
 ‘We would go to the social club and community centre and invite people who 
were our supporters. They would be keen to know where things were at and 
what was happening at the moment, within the boundaries of the confidentiality 
Žƌ ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇ  ? Q ) ?tĞ ŚĂĚ Ă ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŽƵƌ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ŽƵƌ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ
should not have any surprisĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? 
Maskey (2014) 
 
Overall, precisely due to their size, the smaller parties of Northern Ireland were more 
engaged with their constituents, and were more consistently informing and engaging with 
them during the negotiations, mainly to draw and keep their support.  
                                                          
26
 At the time the interviews in Northern Ireland were conducted in 2014, the All-Party talks on remaining divisive issues of 
ĨůĂŐƐ ?ƉĂƌĂĚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ ?ŚĂĚĐŽŵĞƚŽĂŶƵŶƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĞŶĚ ?dŚĞƚĂůŬƐǁĞƌĞŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĚďǇ'ĞŽƌŐĞDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌĂƐ
United States Special Envoy to Northern Ireland, Richard Haass and are commonly referred to as tŚĞ ‘,ĂĂƐƐƚĂůŬƐ ?.   
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Additionally, the overall lines of agreement were not new to the people in Northern 
Ireland. As was stated earlier in this chapter, the agreements that had been reached over the 
previous decades between the British and Irish governments laid the foundations for the 
GFA. Therefore, the constitutional issues had been in the realm of public discussion as far 
back as the signing of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973. Furthermore, public opinion polls 
were conducted to aid the negotiations and the agreement drafting process. They also had 
the intent of increasing public participation and the transparency of the process (Irwin 2001, 
62). Confidentiality, nonetheless, allowed the most controversial aspects of the agreement 
to be announced to the public as a whole, or a package  W which was a necessary 
ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞŝŶŐ ůĞĚƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ŝƐĂŐƌĞĞĚƵŶƚŝůĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ŝƐ
ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ?ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?One of these aspects was the release of prisoners, whose impact on the 
referendum campaign and outcome are analysed later in this chapter. 
Although there has been interest in the study of back-channel negotiations, the 
 ‘ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ?Žf the All-Party negotiations has not yet received attention in the literature. 
What emerges from the analysis made here is that this lesser degree of secrecy of the All-
Party talks is also associated with the number of participants in the process. Firstly, the 
number of participants made it difficult for the mediator to control the outbound of 
information to the public. Secondly, it allowed for the inclusion of political parties more 
willing to have an open negotiation process, particularly the Alliance PĂƌƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
Coalition, as well as the smaller loyalist and republican parties who were more engaged with 
their constituencies during the negotiations. Thirdly, it meant that journalists had a larger 
pool and more diversified sources of information on what was happening at the talks - 
information that would then become known to the public. The inclusivity of the negotiation 






The political inclusiveness of the GFA negotiations is largely seen as one of the merits of 
the process within the literature. Inclusivity has been generally understood to have allowed 
for the strengthening of moderate parties (Horowitz 2002, 218). It is also considered to have 
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provided for the moderation of the more extreme parties involved which, in turn, is found to 
have allowed the agreement to be reached and to have favoured its durability (McGarry and 
K ?>ĞĂƌǇ  ? ? ? ?ď, 262). The inclusion of republican and loyalist paramilitaries reduced the 
possibility of the peace process being destabilized by paramilitary violence, which had 
sabotaged compromises in the past and polarized society (ibid). By engaging these groups, 
particularly republicanism, and granting legitimacy to their claims, the peace process has 
been found to have created incentives for them to adhere to the nonviolent, political pursuit 
of their claims (Toros 2008, 416 W17). This has led other scholars to argue against labelling 
such groups as spoilers, since they might not be necessarily against peace (Cochrane 2008, 
109), but also that pre-conditions for their inclusion must be introduced to ensure their 
commitment to it  ?K ?<ĂŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? W50). 
Before the impact of political inclusion on the referendum outcome is considered, it is 
important to discuss what this politically inclusive process meant in terms of actual 
negotiation dynamics. Due to the initial absence ŽĨ ^ŝŶŶ &ĠŝŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ hW ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ h<hW ?Ɛ
walk-out, the All-Party talks were never held between all the 10 elected parties at the same 
time. For this reason, they are often rather referred to as Multi-Party talks. The Multi-Party 
negotiations were also not a multilateral give-and-take process and relied on mediators 
shuttling mainly between the SDLP and the UUP (Horowitz 1985, 202; Alderdice 2014). Avila 
Kilmurray, for example, described the negotiations as follows: 
 ‘ Qa lot of shuttle diplomacy was really done on a bilateral party basis between 
representatives of the Irish and British governments and the various parties. Only 
when there was a possibility of getting some sort of agreement were the multi-
party talks actually held. ? 
Kilmurray (2014) 
Nonetheless, the politically inclusive process that, as explained earlier, emerged from the 
wish of the British government to include the smaller Unionist parties associated with the 
loyalist paramilitaries, set the stage for a multi-party negotiation process that, as will be 
argued next, favoured wide political support for the agreement in the referendum.   
 
Impact on Political Party Support and the Campaigns 
 
When the GFA was reached in 1998, the Nationalist community was fully represented 
with both the SDLP and Sinn Féin endorsing the agreement. The Unionist parties still at the 
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table were the UUP, the PUP and the UDP. Gathering support from both communities, the 
ůůŝĂŶĐĞWĂƌƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ were also agreement signatories. All the political 
parties who signed the agreement supported and campaigned for the  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞ ?However, 
while the two Nationalist ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĨƵůůǇ ŝŶ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞ, support 
among political unionism was divided. While the loyalist and smaller PUP strongly 
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?(Irvine 2014), the split in the UUP weakened its support. Members 
of the party were unwilling to paƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ and some were publicly vocal 
about their opposition to the agreement.  
It has been argued in the literature ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ hW ?Ɛself-exclusion from the negotiations 
allowed Trimble to hold a more compromising position that ultimately allowed an 
agreement to be reached (Horowitz 2002, 218). ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞ hW ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ h<hW ?^ ƐĞůĨ-
exclusion had a significant impact on the referendum experience and outcome. Both Ian 
WĂŝƐůĞǇ ĂŶĚ ZŽďĞƌƚ DĐĂƌƚŶĞǇ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞĚ ƵƐŝŶŐ ĞŵŽƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ  ‘ĂƉŽĐĂůǇƉƚŝĐ ? ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ƚŽ
appeal to the Unionist ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?s fears and patriotic feelings (Somerville and Kirby 2012, 
249). Political inclusion, hence, is particularly significant in explaining the differences of 
support between the communities in the referendum. As Lord Alderdice explained: 
 ‘All the parties on the Nationalist side, all the parties in the republic of Ireland, 
everybody was supportive of it. On the Unionist side you had two political parties 
who were completely opposed to it - the UKUP, and more importantly the DUP - 
ǁŝƚŚǀĞƌǇĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ? 
Alderdice (2014) 
The fact that the Nationalist community was fully represented in the negotiations and that 
both the SDLP and Sinn Féin supported the agreement meant that political support for the 
agreement was high in the Nationalist community. In the Unionist political camp, on the 
other hand, the absence of the DUP and the UKUP made political support for the agreement 
comparatively lower. It also meant that, unlike the Nationalist community, the Unionist 
community was targeted by Ă ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? 
In sum, all the political parties who remained in the process supported the agreement in 
the referendum and, although in different ways and tones that are described in more detail 
later in this chapter, campaigned for it. The fact that only the two parties who were not part 
of the last phase of negotiations  W the DUP and the UKUP  W ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞ ?helps 
make the case for the argument that the inclusive negotiations favoured political support for 
the agreement in the referendum since their absence had a negative impact on Unionist 
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support. Furthermore, the difference in inclusion between the Nationalist and Unionist 
political parties in the negotiations bore important consequences for differences between 
Unionist and Nationalist ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?Yet, the lesser degree 
of political inclusion of Unionist leaders, by their own accord, meant that there was a 
discrepancy in political support for the agreement between the two sides during the 
referendum campaign. This helped feed the division within the Unionist community in terms 
of support for the agreement. 
  
 
Civil Society Inclusion  
 
Northern Ireland had an active civil society which strove to be involved in the 
negotiations and pushed for the success of the peace process (Cochrane 2006). Civil society 
organizations spurred from the need to address issues of poverty and deprivation during 
while political institutions were paralyzed by the conflict. With the exception of some 
organizations, such as the Unionist Orange Order, the majority of civil society actors and 
organizations in Northern Ireland, whether in business, trade unions, churches, charities and 
voluntary groups, were overall engaged and mobilized in peacebuilding and reconciliation 
activities (Kilmurray 2014; Cochrane 2000).  
Whether the All-Party talks in Northern Ireland included civil society is, however, not 
consensual. On the one hand, as Professor John Brewer described, the agreement was 
reĂĐŚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŚĂƚ  ‘was almost an elite level negotiation, it did not involve civil 
ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?  ? Q ) ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ũƵƐƚ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ their nominated 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? (Brewer 2014). Nonetheless, as it has been described, the electoral system 
created to involve the paramilitarieƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŚĂĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽůůĂƚĞƌĂů ? ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽĨ
ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ďĞĐĂŵĞ Ă
political party, it emerged from civil society and its delegates indeed describe it as a civil 
society party (Morrice 2014; Kilmurray 2014). It is, however, true that the NIWC was only 
able to participate directly in the negotiations because they were a political party and not 
because the Multi-Party talks were open to civil society participation. Although this was not 
a product of a clear desire or a strategic decision made by neither the governments nor the 
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mediation team, civil society engagement and participation was a result of a clear desire of 
civil society groups to be involved and influence the negotiations.  
Furthermore, while there was no formal consultation process with civil society, 
organizations such as the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA), a 
representative umbrella body for the voluntary and community sector in Northern Ireland, 
had an existing partnership with trade unions for the purpose of intervention with the 
government on socio-ecoŶŽŵŝĐ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐ  ‘ƵƐĞĚduring the two years of the talks to 
offer information to the parties and to communicate back out to our constituencies of 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?, explained Quintin Oliver who worked for NICVA at that time (Oliver 2014) ?  ‘But 
that was informal. There was no formal organism to do that. We did it because we were 
awarĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƐŽ ĚŽŝŶŐ ? ? ŚĞ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ? Plus, UUP, SDLP and Alliance 
negotiators interviewed stated to have been aware, during the negotiations, that civil 
society was pushing for an agreement (Weir 2014; Maginness 2014; Farren 2014; Alderdice 
2014; Donaldson 2014). For example, Alliance Party delegate Lord Alderdice stated: 
 ‘There were times when various elements in civil society would say or do things 
that were helpful in terms of the church, business or trade union leaders saying 
positive things about the talks or telling politicians to get on with the job ? ? 
Alderdice (2014).  
Another significant statement was given by SDLP delegate Sean Farren: 
 ‘Many organizations came to us to express their support and urge us to reach a 
settlement. Employers and trade unions combined. The main employer 
organizations, the Northern Ireland section of the Confederation of British 
Industries, and the main trade unions, all came to us to say they wanted us to 
succeed in the talks. There was a very high degree of support for the talks to be 
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ? ? 
Farren (2014) 
 
These statements support ŽĐŚƌĂŶĞ ?Ɛ(2000; 2001) claim that civil society helped sustain the 
momentum in the negotiations. Therefore, although civil society was not formally included 
in the GFA negotiations, the process did include civil society by way of, as Paffenholz (2014, 
76 W77) categorizes, direct representation ŝŶƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ
direct participation, and of holding less formal consultations with political leaderships. That 
ƐĂŝĚ ?ĂŶĚƚƵƌŶŝŶŐŶŽǁƚŽƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ
the negotiations eventually provided for the emergence of an active and successful civil 
society-ůĞĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? dŚĞ Đampaign, which unsuccessfully attempted to bring all the 
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political parties supporting the agreement under the same umbrella campaign, is considered 
by political leaderships in Northern Ireland and scholars to have contributed to the high 
ŽǀĞƌĂůů ‘ǇĞƐ ? turnout (Hancock 2011). 
 
Impact on the Referendum Campaigns 
 
The civil society-ůĞĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ǁĂƐ ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚ ďǇ Ă ŐƌŽƵƉ ŽĨ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ and NGOs 
who anticipated that political leaders would not be able to run a cross-community campaign 
for the referendum, since they would have to compete in the elections to the Assembly 
thereafter (Oliver 2014). Quintin Oliver, ǁŚŽǁĂƐƚŚĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ, ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘The 
best referendum campaign, in theory, is to have a unified cross-party and non-party coalition 
running the campaign, and that wĂƐƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůǁĞǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽďƵŝůĚ ? (Oliver 2014). Although 
voters in referendums tend to vote according to the position of their parties,  ‘they feel less 
ďŽƵŶĚƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂŶŝŶĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐďĞcause it is easier for them to separate the 
ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?, he further explained. HoweǀĞƌ ? ĂƐ ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? 
campaign struggled to convince the political parties to join their platform. Lord Empey, who 
ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚƚŚĞhhW ?Ɛ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚƚĞƉĂƌƚǇĚŝĚŶŽƚĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĞŝŶǀŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ
to campaign under their umbrella due to ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ƐƉůŝt in support of the 
agƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ P  ‘We had to get our own party to agree first, so our priorities were somewhat 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ  ? Q ) ? ? he stated (Empey 2014). Because the UUP was concerned about losing the 
support for its constituency due to the internal divisions of the party, joining another 
structure was considered impossible at the time (Empey 2014). Similarly, Lord Alderdice 
(2014) explained that the parties had their own campaigns to run for the referendum and to 
the Assembly elections thereafter, therefore, he did not feel it was a realistic proposition to 
ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƚŝŵĞ ?dŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ? ũŽŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĞcivil society-led 
 ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ĂŶĚ ŚĂĚ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚǇ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?Ɛ ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ(Brian 
2014). In ƚŚĞĞŶĚ ?ĂůůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĚĞĐůŝŶĞĚƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵ ?Ɛ invitation, and led their own independent campaigns.  
As a result, the  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶǁĂƐůĞĚĂƐ an independent campaign, and not the cross-
party and cross-communal campaign it originally intended to be. Oliver believed that this 
fact, however, allowed people from NGOs and other professional bodies to have a freer 
range over the campaign. These people, Oliver stated ? ǁĞƌĞ  ‘the ones who understood 
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campaigning and public discourse, who tended to be the ones with creative ideas, and who 
ŬŶĞǁ ŚŽǁ ƚŽ ŵŽďŝůŝǌĞ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? (Oliver 2014). During the six weeks between the day the 
agreement was announced and the referendum on the 22nd of May, the campaign strove to 
create good positive debate ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ?  ‘Some of that was done through 
ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŶŐ ‘ƐŝŶĐĞ ‘There was a certain amount of public information that we knew we had to 
provide as well as a framework for public digestion of the 20000 word intĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌĞĂƚǇ ?, 
said Oliver. The campaign made use of professionalised campaign techniques and the 
London-based advertising company, Saatchi & Saatchi, to effectively deliver thĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?Ɛ
ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐ ? /ƚ ǁĂƐ  “mostly through campaigning techniques which highlighted particular 
reasons to ǀŽƚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ? that the campaign was done ?, Oliver explained. 
The active role that civil society had played, whether from within or outside the 
negotiations, in influencing and in pushing for an agreement to be reached was carried-on 
into mobilizing support for the agreement in the referendum. As described, cŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?Ɛ
long-term engagement in the peace process in Northern Ireland sprouted into a resourceful 
ĂŶĚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?Ɛ,ĂŶĐŽĐŬ(2011) describes, the campaign played an 
important role in delivering a coherent message based on ƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ? vote and 
ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ŶŽ ? ǀŽƚĞ ? Ăƚ Ă ƚŝŵĞ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ
were using mutually exclusive arguments. The more divisive campaign messages of some of 





As was already mentioned, the Good Friday Agreement was endorsed by the eight 
political parties participating in the negotiations when the agreement was reached in April 
1998, as well as by the British and Irish governments. On Strand One arrangements, the 
document provided for a power-sharing Assembly with executive and legislative authority. 
Strand Two provided for the establishment of a North/South Ministerial Council and 
implementation bodies aimed at developing cross-border cooperation between the 
Northern Ireland and the Irish executives. Lastly, Strand Three provided for the 
establishment of a British-Irish Council through a new British-Irish agreement, comprised of 
representatives from the devolved institutions of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and 
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representatives of the British and Irish governments. The agreement further provided for the 
safeguard of human rights and equality, such as the freedom of expression of religion and to 
pursue political aspirations, the right to equal socio-economic opportunities among the 
communities and the right for ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞƋƵĂůƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?
Regarding the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, like the Sunningdale Agreement 
of 1973, the GFA acknowledged that the majority of the people in Northern Ireland wished 
to preserve its union with Great Britain, but provided for its status to be altered if the 
majority of its people consented to this change in a referendum. This allowed both Unionist 
and Nationalist political parties to claim that their right to self-determination was 
safeguarded. Adjoining this ambiguity, the text of the agreement did not provide for 
concrete compromises on some of the most divisive issues. The reform of the Northern 
Ireland police - the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which predominantly employed 
Protestants - and decommissioning were two of the most sensitive issues under negotiation 
left to be resolved through independent commissions after the referendum. tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
Coalition delegate Jane Morrice ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŝƐĂŐƌĞĞĚƵŶƚŝůĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ
ŝƐĂŐƌĞĞĚ ?ƌƵůĞĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂŶĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚďĞŝŶŐƌĞĂĐŚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƐĞŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŽŶůǇ
possible compromise was that independent commissions would be established to 
independently decide on how they be resolved (Morrice 2014).  
 dŚĞ ƐŽ ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞ ĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞǆƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ŝƐ ƐĞĞŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
literature as crucial to enabling political leaders to sign the agreement on the 10th of April. 
This is particularly beĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ƚŽ  ‘ƐĞůů ? ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŝƌ
constituencies in the referendum (Tonge and Evans 2002, 62; Dixon 2013, 114). However, in 
hindsight, this ambiguity has also proven to have been less constructive. Aughey (2005, 147) 
argues that, although constructive ambiguity facilitated agreement, it harmed the 
implementation process by removing the need for important political commitments to be 
made. This was problematic, he argues, because it did not require more trustful 
relationships to develop between the parties27. What will be shown in this section is that, 
regarding the referendum results, the text of the agreement and its ambiguities had a mixed 
impact. On the one hand, the ambiguities of the agreement allowed both Unionist and 
                                                          
27
 The discussion on why the Good Friday Agreement faced implementation problems following the referendum is though 
much wider. A significant debate in the literature exists particularly around the electoral system forged by the Agreement 
and whether it has contributed to segregation or integration in post-Agreement Northern Ireland  ?DĐ'ĂƌƌǇ ĂŶĚ K ?>ĞĂƌǇ
2006b; Dixon 2005; Horowitz 2001). 
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Nationalist ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ŚĞůƉĞĚ ƚŚĞŵ  ‘ƐĞůů ? ŝƚ to their 
constituencies in their campaigns. However, it also allowed for the campaign period to be 
populated by divisive messages and for a win-lose sentiment to arise. Additionally, the 
ambiguities of the agreement suggest that voters were highly influenced ďǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌ ?Ɛ
positions and campaign messages, which was, in the end, not problematic because political 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?, ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ, was higher and ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ? ?  
      
 Impact on Political Party Support and the Referendum Campaigns 
 
AůůƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐǁŚŽǁĞƌĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŽƌŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?
vote in the referendum, while the political parties who were outside the negotiations, the 
hW ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ h<hW ? ďĞĐĂŵĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? KŶ ƚŚĞUnionist political spectrum, 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐĂĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĂŶĚƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉ ?dŚĞhW  ? ƚŚĞ h<hW
and a number of loyalist organizations - including the Loyalist Volunteer Force who dissented 
from the Ulster Volunteer Force over the agreement  W campaigned for thĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞ(Irvine 
2014) ? /ĂŶ WĂŝƐůĞǇ ĂŶĚ ZŽďĞƌƚ DĐĂƌƚŶĞǇ ?Ɛ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ƉůĂǇĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ Unionist ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ 
fear that the agreement would lead to a united Ireland and portrayed it as Unionist 
surrender to republican terrorists. Somerville and Kirby (2012, 249 W50) describe them as 
fear-inducing and patriotism-appealing campaign messages. Conversely, the smaller loyalist 
WhWĨƵůůǇĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞhhW ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚǁĂƐĚŝǀŝĚĞĚ ? 
Several elements of the agreement were particularly hard to sell for the UUP, especially 
prisoner releases and police reform (Empey 2014). Lord Empey described the provisions on 
the police reform and prisoners ?ƌĞůĞĂƐĞĂƐ  ‘ƚŽǆŝĐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚƌĂƵŵĂƚŝĐ ? for Unionists. However, he 
stresƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚǁĂƐ ‘a very good outcome on the constiƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƐŝĚĞ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
 ‘We got the Irish constitution changed, we got the international recognition of our 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?. It was particularly on the constitutional issue, namely that the 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐĞĐƵƌĞĚEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ United <ŝŶŐĚŽŵƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞhhW ?Ɛ  ‘ƐŽďĞƌ ?
 ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ůŽŽŬĞĚ ƚŽ ĚƌĂǁ support from its constituency (Somerville and Kirby 2012, 
245). Also, by leaving issues to be decided by an independent commission, the agreement 
allowed Unionist leaders to claim that decommissioning would take place before the 
establishment of the executive. Dixon (2013, 119 W21) argues that Tony Blair played a part in 
 ‘ŚŽŶŽƵƌĂďůǇ ? deceiving the Unionist community during the referendum campaign by publicly 
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speaking of decommissioning provisions in ambiguous terms. To those in the UUP who did 
ŶŽƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞ ?ƚŚĞ/ƌŝƐŚĂŶĚƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁĞƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĚ
David Trimble into supporting an agreement where Ulster Unionists were forced to concede 
too much to Sinn Féin, particularly on the early release of republican (and loyalist) prisoners 
and the paramilitary decommissioning issues (Weir 2014; Donaldson 2014).  
In contrast, as we have seen, the Nationalist political parties were fully in support of the 
 ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǀŽƚĞ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ^>W ĂŶĚ^ŝŶŶ&ĠŝŶleading their own independent campaigns. As was 
explained by SDLP delegates Alban Maginness and Sean Farren, the party fully supported the 
agreement because it created a new political dispensation that guaranteed the Nationalist 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂƚŚŽůŝĐ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?as well as it 
ĂůůŽǁĞĚĨŽƌƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů /ƌŝƐŚƵŶŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ (Maginness 2014; Farren 2014). 
Because the agreement would bring about the political change that the Nationalist 
community desired, it was expected that there would be high support for the agreement 
coming from it (Maginness 2014). What was also crucial to the high support was the holding 
of the simultaneous referendum in the Republic of Ireland, which allowed the Nationalist 
parties to frame the two referendums as an all-Ireland referendum. Alban Maginness 
explained: 
 ‘ QŝƚǁĂƐǀĞƌǇ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨŽƌƵƐƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĐŽŶĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵƐ ? /ƚǁĂƐŽŶĞ
referendum in fact, although within two jurisdictions, and there were concurrent 
majorities north and south. In the South a massive majority voted in favour and 
in the nŽƌƚŚĂƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ? ? Q )tŚǇǁĂƐƚŚĂƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ?/ ǁĂƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ
time since 1918 that the Irish people as a whole could determine the shape of 
the island and make an agreement that would transform Irish politics, create 
new institutions north and south and between Ireland and Britain, that would 
have real potential to ƌĂĚŝĐĂůůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞŽƵƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? 
Maginness (2014) 
The ^>W ?Ɛ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ, nonetheless, was led in a reconciliatory tone that could draw 
support, or at least not alienate, voters in the Unionist community. In their analysis of the 
^>W ?Ɛ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? ^ŽŵĞƌǀŝůůĞ ĂŶĚ <ŝƌďǇ(2012, 242 W44) found that the campaign messages 
aimed to appeal to all in Northern Ireland by portraying the agreement as a win-win 
outcome and pointing to a new partnership and reconciliation between the communities.  
ĞƐƉŝƚĞ ƚŚĞ ^>W ?Ɛ ƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůŝĂƚŽƌǇ ƚŽŶĞ ? ƚŚĞ ŽǀĞƌĂůů ƚŽŶĞs of the political pĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?  ‘ǇĞƐ ?
campaigns were divisive. As we have seen, while Unionist political parties stressed the 
success in keeping Northern Ireland in the UK, Nationalist parties stressed the success in 
getting the principle of consent in the agreement. Importantly, it is argued here, this is the 
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result of the different degrees of political support coming from political parties on the 
Unionist and the Nationalist side, and the differing interpretations and framing of the 
agreement in their individual campaigns. Hayes and McAllister (2001, 78 W80), as already 
mentioned, demonstrated that the public expression of reservations towards the agreement 
by Ulster Unionist leaders depressed ƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶŝƐƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ support for the agreement at 
the beginning of the campaign period. KƚŚĞƌƐƉŽŝŶƚ ƚŽ^ŝŶŶ&ĠŝŶ ?ƐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
have been shown to have negatively affected the Unionist commuŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǀŽƚĞ 
(Somerville and Kirby 2012, 246 W47; Breadun 1998). One particularly damaging publicity 
ƐƚƵŶƚǁĂƐĂ ‘ƚƌŝƵŵƉŚĂŶƚ ? welcoming of PIRA prisoners at a Sinn Féin special convention held 
just twelve days before the referendum (Somerville and Kirby 2012, 246 W47). The stunt was 
meant to bolster support within the republican community, where a fringe was not 
supporting the agreement. However, since the early release of prisoners was one of the 
most controversial provisions of the agreement for the Unionist community, the event had a 
negative impact on the Unionist ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ public opinion at the time (Breadun 1998). 
Additionally ?^ŝŶŶ&ĠŝŶ ?ƐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
found to have had a negative impact on the Unionist ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ perceptions of the 
agreement and the peace process (Mac Ginty 2000; Breadun 1998). PUP leader Winston 
Irvine described ^ŝŶŶ&ĠŝŶ ?ƐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĂŶĚƚŚĞUnionist ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽŝƚĂƐĨŽůůŽǁƐ P 
 ‘Republicans would come out saying that it was a victory for them and that they 
got everything that they need and the reaction to that from the other (Unionist) 
ƐŝĚĞǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞŵƵƐƚďĞůŽƐŝŶŐ. ? 
Irvine (2014).  
^ŝŶŶ&ĠŝŶ ?Ɛ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ŝŶ ĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ĨƌĂŵĞĚĂƐ Ă  ‘ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ? and a step towards 
Irish unity, is also seen to have had a negative impact on the Unionist comŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ vote 
(Irvine 2014; Clarke 2014). It was because support was dropping among the community 
during the campaign that Trimble accepted to partner with the SDLP and attend a pop-rock 
concert by the Irish band U2. On stage, John Hume and David Trimble publicly shook hands 
and the gesture worked as a symbol oĨƵŶŝƚǇƚŚĂƚƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĚƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉ(Somerville 
and Kirby 2012, 247 W48). 
In conclusion, if constructive ambiguity in the GFA helped both Unionist and Nationalist 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ‘ƐĞůů ? the GFA to their constituencies, it also allowed for the Unionist and Nationalist 
political parties to use mutually exclusive messages in their campaigns. As Somerville and 
Kirby (2012, 251 W52) argue, ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ hhW ĂŶĚ ^ŝŶŶ &ĠŝŶ ?Ɛ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ǁĂƐ
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focused on selling the agreement to their own constituency weakeneĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ
overall. Therefore, although constructive ambiguity might be positive in getting the political 
leaders to support the agreement and to help them  ‘sell ? the agreement to their 
constituencies and communities, the absence of a coherent message on the agreement had 
negative repercussions for the Unionist community ?ƐǀŽƚĞ, which was already divided. Yet, if 
it has been attested that the content of the negotiated document shaped political support 
for the agreement and the referendum campaigns, it is not straightforward that it directly 
shaped voterƐ ? decisions, as is analysed next.  
 
Impact on Public Information and Uncertainty 
 
During the referendum campaign period, there was wide public and media discussion 
about the agreement in Northern Ireland, even about the ambiguity of the document 
(Devenport 2014). Additionally, the local media largely supported ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? vote during the 
referendum campaign. Unprecedentedly, the Irish News, a Catholic newspaper, and the 
Belfast News Letter, a Unionist newspaper, issued a joint editorial in support for the 
agreement, explained William Graham, former reporter for the Irish News (Graham 2014). 
Aside from media and public debate, a copy of the document was sent to every 
household in Northern Ireland by the British government, making information on the text of 
the agreement readily available to every citizen. Additionally, a civil society group called 
Democratic Dialogue created a booklet where the content was translated into everyday 
language to facilitate its understanding. However, although the text of the agreement might 
have been known to the majority of the people in Northern Ireland, it cannot be assumed 
that the text itself shaped voter decision in the referendum. While negotiations secrecy 
raised the question of whether or not information about the negotiations shaped the 
referendum, the question posed here is whether or not information about the document 
itself had an impact. 
Quintin Oliver from the civil society-ůĞĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? campaign, believed that the people were 
 ‘ƵŶƌĞĂĚǇ ?ĨŽƌĂƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵĂŶĚ ‘When they were presented with the 20000 word document, 
they were confused, shocked, suƌƉƌŝƐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ? ŵŽƐƚůǇ ? ƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽƵƐ ? ? Also, as Liam Clarke, 
journalist for thĞĞůĨĂƐƚdĞůĞŐƌĂƉŚ ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ‘the agreement was written in a way that you 
could not really have a detailed knowledge. /ƚĚĞƉĞŶĚĞĚƵƉŽŶŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? (Clarke 2014). 
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For this reason, Oliver believed that people looked for information, not from the content of 
the agreement, but rather from what was said by politicians, businessmen, church leaders, 
artists and other public figures whose opinion they trusted (Oliver 2014).  
Notwithstanding, it can be said that the people of Northern Ireland were generaly 
knowledgeble of the agreement. Hayes and McAllister (2001, 82 W83) actually found a 
ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶǀŽƚĞƌƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ PƚŚĞǇĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŶŽ ?
ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ ůĞƐƐ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂďůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂŶ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ? ǁŝƚŚ ĂƚŚŽůŝĐ ǀŽƚĞƌƐ
being more knowledgeable and PƌŽƚĞƐƚĂŶƚ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞƌƐďĞŝŶŐless knowledgeable in general. 
Overall, there was information readily available to citizens regarding the agreement, as well 
as wide public and media discussion. But the fact that the language of the agreement was 
ambiguous and some of the issues were left to be resolved in independent commissions, 
suggests that it was not possible for the people, or anyone for that matter, to have a full 
understanding of its implications. Therefore, although the public might have been informed 
about the agreement, it was not necessarily its content that shaped their vote.  
One important finding across both communities is that those who supported the GFA, 
whether grassroots or elites, viewed and publicly portrayed the agreement as a point in a 
process, rather than a definite, unchangeable, outcome. For example, Lord Empey stressed 
ƚŚĂƚ  ‘it (the GFA) iƐǁŽƌŬ ŝŶƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐƚŽĂŶĞǆƚĞŶƚ ? (Empey 2014). Like Wier, he mentioned 
the difference between how the Unionist and republican communities and political parties 
view the agreement: 
 ‘We (Unionists) tried to look at it as a settlement, republicans are looking at it as 
ĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? Q )ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚhey cannot admit to their supporters that their ultimate 
objective (of a united Ireland) is not achievable without Unionist ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?.  
Empey (2014) 
  
From the Alliance ParƚǇ ? >ŽƌĚ ůĚĞƌĚŝĐĞ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ?  ‘we did not spend the time in the 
referendum campaign telling people in the referendum about our reservations because the 
main aim was to get ŝƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŶĚƚŚĞŶǁŽƌŬŽŶŝƚ ? (Alderdice 2014). Hayes and McAllister 
(2001, 82 W83) ĂůƐŽ ĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞ ŝŶƚŚĞ Protestant community 
was a vŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĂƐ ‘ĂŶĞǁďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ?. This actually contradicts the intuitive idea 
that the Unionist community would be more averse to the agreement because it 




In conclusion, the findings on whether and how the content of the agreement shaped the 
referendum results are complex. They suggest that, while the constructive ambiguity of the 
agreement favoured political support for the agreement in the campaigns, it also allowed for 
antithetical campaign messages coming from the Unionist and Nationalist parties to co-exist 
during the referendum campaign period. The different tones of the campaigns and, 
particularly Sinn Féin ?s campaign, helped divide support in the Unionist community. The 
ambiguity of the agreement, on the other hand, meant that voters were more reliant on 
information from the campaigns and, hence, were more influenced by them. This was, 
however, not problematic for overall support because the majority of the political parties in 
EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚǁĞƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ there was an independent and strong  ‘ǇĞƐ ?
campaign in place.  
 
 
Process Determinants in the Good Friday Agreement Referendum  
 
The Good Friday Agreement negotiations were able to bring to the table those involved in 
paramilitarism and transform a violent conflict into, arguably, a solely political one. 
Undoubtedly, the process of negotiations itself, the contact and communication between 
the leaderships fostered by the process, successfully transformed the relationships between 
the participating leaders (Close 2014; Alderdice 2014). As a result, life in Northern Ireland 
has changed since the GFA was agreed upon and put to the referendum in 1998. Paramilitary 
violence and fear is no longer a part of the everyday life experience. The referendum was 
indeed a success and an important symbolic turning point in the transition from violent 
conflict to peace in Northern Ireland (Lee and Mac Ginty 2012, 44). Constant implementation 
setbacks, however, have generated a prevailing sense in Northern Ireland that the 
agreement has not yet delivered its promises and that it might collapse at any time, a fear 
that has kept politics polarized. Therefore, while the negotiations and referendum were 
successful in engaging and mobilizing the communities around the search for peace, it is 
unfortunate that more has not been done at the political level to continue to harness it. 
The political inclusiveness of the Good Friday Agreement negotiations, not only had a 
positive impact in allowing for the agreement to be reached and, arguably, its 
implementation (Horowitz  ? ? ? ? ?DĐ'ĂƌƌǇĂŶĚK ?>ĞĂƌǇ  ? ? ? ?ď), it also played an important 
121 
 
role in generating support for a positive outcome in the referendum. The fact that several 
political parties across the communal political spectrums participated in the negotiations 
and endorsed the final agreement meant that political support for the agreement was 
widespread. The negotiation process was, however, comparatively less inclusive in the 
Unionist community than in the Nationalist. The DUP and UKUP walkout and subsequent 
ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ŵĞĂŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐn was only composed of Unionist 
political parties and targeted the Unionist community. The Nationalist community, on the 
other hand, had both political parties, the SDLP and Sinn Féin, endorsing the agreement and 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? 
The negotiation process included civil society, which was found to favour support for the 
agreement. On the one hand, there was direct involvement of civil society through the 
tŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ ?ŽŶƚŚĞother hand, a pre-existing 
willingness from active civil society groups to reach and pressure the political leaderships in 
the negotiation process. Their involvement is, nonetheless, a product of NŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
ĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?s push for participation rather than a pre-existing willingness or preoccupation 
of those in the political process to include them. Nonetheless, civil society was engaged with 
the negotiation process and this evolved into it a crucial role in the referendum, helping to 
deliver a strong, organized, and even pƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƚŚĂƚĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚƵŶŝĨŝĞĚ
campaign messages. 
Although the GFA referendum had a positive outcome, this research was interested in 
understanding what shaped the difference of support between the two communities. For 
that reason, it was demonstrated that ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
negotiations was found to have had negative repercussions on the Unionist ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? dŽŶǇ ůĂŝƌ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ŽŶ dƌŝŵďůĞ ƚŽ ĂĐĐĞƉƚ ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ
ultimately drove the UUP to a split that weakened the party ?s ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞĂŶd 
its referendum campaign. As the majoritarian community, and given that an agreement 
would always mean that Unionists would have to share power with Nationalists, it could be 
argued that the Unionist community would always be less supportive of the final agreement. 
However, a majority of the community was supportive of the process until the agreement 
was reached and the referendum campaign began (Hayes and McAllister 2001, 78 W80). 
ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ?ŝĨƚŚĞĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐƚĞǆƚŽĨƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĂůůŽǁĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐƚŽ ‘ƐĞůů ?
the agreement to their community and/or constituency, it also allowed for those same 
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ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ĨŽƌ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǀŽƚĞ ǁŝƚŚ ĚŝĨĨĞƌ Ŷƚ ƚŽŶĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? dŚĞƐĞ
divisions during the campaign served to foster perceptions among both communities that 
the NationalistƐǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŝŶŶĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞUnionistƐǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ůŽƐĞƌƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ
and the agreement, which had a negative bearing on the referendum results.   
The process was confidential rather than secret. Again, this is not to be confused with the 
secret back channel negotiations which, in hindsight, are seen today to be harming the 
implementation process. In fact, during the time that the interviews for this research were 
undertaken in Northern Ireland, it had become public that the Blair government had 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂ ƐĞĐƌĞƚ  ‘KŶƚŚĞ ZƵŶ ? letters scheme that allowed escaped PIRA prisoners, and 
others concerned they might be arrested, to freely return to the UK (Kearney 2014). This had 
created, or rather intensified, a sentiment among Unionist political leaders that the bilateral 
negotiations and secret deals between the two gave Sinn Féin the upper hand in the GFA 
negotiations. Lord Empey, UUP delegate in the negotiations and current chairman of the 
party explained: 
 ‘ Qƚhat is one of the main reasons why we have difficulties now, because people 
do not believe that they are being told the truth, we do not believe that there 
are not other deals out there. The credibility of the (British) government and its 
commitments and statements is low ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƵƐ ? ? 
Empey (2014) 
 
The inclusivity of the process also played a determinant role in the lesser degree of secrecy 
of the talks. Therefore, while some aspects of the final agreement might not have been 
known to the public (the early release of prisoners, for example), it was known to the 
Northern Ireland public what an agreement would entail. Previous agreements between the 
Irish and British governments, and even the early public participation of the public in 
choosing who would take seats in the negotiations, allowed for a generally unsurprising 
outcome. Further, the text of the agreement itself was readily available to all in Northern 
/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?zĞƚ ?ǁŚĞŶĂƐŬĞĚǁŚǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǁŽŶ ŝŶEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ŵŽƐƚ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ
that it was because people were tired of violence and wanted peace, not necessarily 
because they supported the text of the agreement. Liam Clarke explained his sentiment over 
the GFA ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ P  ‘I think people were voting for peace and at that level it was an 
informed decision, that thŝƐ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ ƚŽ ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ ƉĞĂĐĞ ? (Clarke 2014). What would be 
important to further research is if information on the negotiation process prevented a 
greater fluctuation of public opinion during the referendum and given this, if the successful 
123 
 
ratification of the agreement became more expectable, as well as whether access to 
information affected support for the agreement during the negotiations themselves.  
Some of the findings of the in-depth analysis of the GFA negotiations and referendum 
conducted in this chapter present similarities and differences to those reached in the Annan 
Plan case. For example, where political and civil society was included in the negotiations, 
there was more support for the agreement. The next chapter will take on the task of 
comparing the findings of the two cases. It will show that differences between the Annan 
Plan and GFA negotiation processes regarding the aspects under study, indeed, contributed 
to the contrasting rejection/acceptance of the agreements in the two cases. Interestingly, as 
it will be discussed, several similarities can be observed between the GFA negotiations and 
referendum processes and the ones in the Turkish Cypriot community, while the same 
aspects are not observed in the Greek Cypriot case. The comparison of the cases will allow 
an understanding on how peace negotiations can favour public support for peace 

















5. Comparing the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement Experiences  
 
As presented in the previous chapters, characteristics of Annan Plan and GFA negotiation 
processes helped shape the referendum experiences and results in each of the cases. One 
important difference at the onset of the two negotiations was that, while the GFA 
negotiations in Northern Ireland took place under the knowledge that the agreement would 
be ratified through a popular referendum, this was not the case in Cyprus. The decision to 
hold a referendum came at a later stage in the Annan Plan negotiations and had the aim of 
bypassing the need for the ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ĞŶdorsement of the agreement. While a more 
inclusive and private (rather than secret) process in Northern Ireland was both cause and 
consequence of the fact that the agreement reached would have to be accepted by the 
communities, the Annan Plan negotiations were a traditionally exclusionary process that 
eventually culminated in a referendum. The differences and similarities between the two are 
explored in this chapter with the aim of developing a deeper and more nuanced 
understanding of how peace negotiations can shape peace settlement referendum 
outcomes, and how holding the latter can better serve peace processes around the world. 
This thesis aimed not only at understanding how the negotiations shaped the general 
outcomes of the two referendums, but also the differences in support between the 
communities. It, therefore, also aimed at understanding why there was a circa 40 per cent 
difference in the support given by the two communities in Northern Ireland and in Cyprus, 
which was presented in the two previous chapters. In this chapter, along with the main 
comparison of the Annan Plan and GFA cases, as two instances of negotiations with peace 
settlement referendums where in one case the agreement was rejected and accepted in the 
other, the results across the four communities are also compared. To recapitulate, it aims at 
exploring how the negotiation process conditions shaped the different levels of support 
observed in each of the communities: the very high 96-7 per cent support from the 
Nationalist community, the 65 per cent support from the Turkish Cypriot, the 51-3 per cent 
from the Unionist community and, lastly, the low 24 per cent support from the Greek Cypriot 
community. 
The first section of this chapter is dedicated, precisely, to performing those comparisons. 
Following the same structure of as the two previous chapters, it compares the case study 
ĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐ ? ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐŽŶ each of the same four aspects of the negotiation process: mediation 
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strategy, political inclusion, civil society inclusion, and agreement design. The comparison 
reveals that the GFA negotiations were comparatively less secretive, and more 
representative and inclusive, which incƌĞĂƐĞĚƉƵďůŝĐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
for the agreement, and civil society campaign mobilisation ĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞ ?/ŶǇƉƌƵƐ ?ƚŚĞ
secrecy of the negotiations left Greek Cypriots dependent on information coming from the 
campaigns, while the more exclusionist process failed to secure political party support for 
the agreement or to foment or mobilise civil society around it. In the Turkish Cypriot 
community, on the other hand, a strong mobilisation of opposition parties and civil society 
organisations made for a more representative and inclusive negotiation process and a strong 
 ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ. 
The second part of the chapter discusses the implications of the comparative study to 
existing literature. Drawing from the two case studies compared here, it argues that peace 
settlement referendums require less secretive and more inclusive and participative 
negotiations that can help educate voters and prepare communities for the next stages of 
the peace process. Peace negotiations that are exclusive and secret can marginalize and 
alienate the public. Unless there is a higher degree of political inclusion and an engaged civil 
society, whose concerns political leaderships hear, the small time periods between the end 
of negotiations and the day of the referendum does not suffice to educate the public. 
Importantly, it will be argued, civil society is more likely willing and prepared to lead non-
partisan campaigns. These help reduce win-lose perceptions of the agreement among the 
communities and help avoid a polarising referendum experience. Revisiting arguments in the 
literature against the use of peace settlement referendums, the chapter concludes that, it is 
not that referendums are unsuitable to conflict contexts, but that they are rather not 
suitable to all kinds of peacemaking processes. Therefore, when a referendum is used to 





As was stated earlier in this thesis, authors have argued that one of the (main) causes for 
ƚŚĞ ŶŶĂŶ WůĂŶ ?Ɛ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ƐĞĐƌĞƚŝǀĞůǇ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞůŝƚĞƐ ?
during which the mediators failed to consider, involve, or gain support from other quadrants 
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of society (Drath 2004, 341 W52; Michael 2007; Lordos 2009). If process secrecy could explain 
the rejection of the Annan Plan in the Greek Cypriot community, it remained to be explained 
why the Turkish Cypriot vote was not equally affected. In addition, if negotiations secrecy 
had shaped the Annan Plan referendum outcomes, it was important for this research to ask 
if and how it affected the GFA referendum. It, indeed, found that the GFA negotiations were 
not secret but, rather,  ‘confidential ? and that the inclusivity of the process itself shaped a 
less secretive negotiation process. The secrecy of the Annan Plan negotiations, it was 
argued, was counteracted in the Turkish Cypriot community by a greater, earlier public 
interest and debate in the Annan Plan negotiation process. It will, therefore, be discussed 
here how these differences in the degree of secrecy played out comparatively in the 
referendums.   
The second set of mediation tactics compared in this section is the use of arbitration and 
pressure. The cases show that both mediation strategies reduced political accountability for 
the agreement, ŚĂĚ ĂŶ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽŶ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉĞĂĐĞ ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ?
hence, the shape and strength of the referendum campaigns. Lastly, in both case studies, the 
participation of external actors had varied implications on the referendums that will be 
briefly discussed.   
 
Secrecy, Confidentiality, and Public Information and Uncertainty  
 
In mediation studies, procedural strategies have been found to not have a significant 
effect in getting parties to an agreement (Bercovitch and Houston 2000, 175 W76). However, 
this research found in the two cases studies that, when a referendum is used to ratify a 
peace agreement, the degree to which negotiations are exposed to the domestic 
environment is a procedural aspect that has important consequences for the referendum. 
Both the negotiations in Cyprus and Northern Ireland were typically political elite-driven and 
 ‘ĐůŽƐĞĚ ĚŽŽƌ ? ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? Both negotiations also took place under the principle that 
 ‘ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŝƐĂŐƌĞĞĚƵŶƚŝůĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐŝƐĂŐƌĞĞĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ǁŚŝůĞĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ
between political leaders, renĚĞƌƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ‘ǀĞƌǇŚĂƌĚƚŽƉƵďůŝĐŝƐĞ ?, as Quintin 
Oliver explained (2014). However, the GFA negotiations were comparatively less secretive. 
Interestingly, what made for a less secretive process in Northern Ireland was the 
inclusiveness of the process itself. The inclusion of more political parties meant that some of 
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these parties were keener on informing their constituencies on the progress and content of 
the negotiations. The Alliance WĂƌƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ not only provided a middle 
ground for dialogue between the main Unionist and Nationalist parties, but were also keen 
on increasing the negotiations exposure to the public. dŚĞ tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ĐůŽƐĞƌ
engagement with its constituency during the negotiations, alongside that of the PUP and 
Sinn Féin, also contributed to a lesser secrecy of the negotiation process. As was found, a 
more inclusive process also meant that journalists had a larger pool of diversified sources of 
information on what was happening behind closed doors than was the case in the Annan 
Plan negotiations. In Cyprus, because only the ůĞĂĚĞƌ ?Ɛnegotiation teams were represented 
at the table and because the mediation team decided to have a more secretive process, 
journalists had limited access to information and the people were generally uninformed, or 
misinformed, about the negotiations, but to different degrees in the two communities.   
It has been shown that voters tend to rely on information coming from the campaigns 
when the issues at stake in the referendum are new or unfamiliar (Leduc 2002, 713). The 
more voters look for, and wait for, information from the campaigns, the more volatile their 
voting decision-making will be. Secrecy predisposed an ill-engaged and ill-informed Greek 
Cypriot community to follow their leaders and the cues of the stronger and highly politically 
ďĂĐŬĞĚ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? This was, however, counteracted in the Turkish Cypriot community by 
a greater level of political inclusion and civil society engagement. It can be counter-argued 
ƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŽĨhŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉƚŚĂƚŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞ
in the Turkish Cypriot community (Lordos 2008; Bahcheli 2004). Accession to the EU was 
ƵŶĚĞŶŝĂďůǇ ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĂŶĚĨƌĂŵŝŶŐŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ŝŶ North Cyprus. While this 
ŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚŚĞŵĂŝŶŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ŝƚĂůƐŽĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇŚĞůƉĞĚƵŶůĞĂƐŚĂ
wave of political and civic mobilisation during the negotiations. This allowed for a greater 
degree of public discussion of the Annan Plan in the community. AƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?
ĐĂŵƉ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ? ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ? Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? and the media 
worked to stimulate public discussion about the Annan Plan helped dispel fears in the 
community about the aftermath of the referendum (Talat 2014; Elcil 2014). In fact, the 
Nationalist and the Turkish Cypriot communities were comparatively more informed voters 
than their counterparts (Hayes and McAllister 2001, 82 W83; Bryant 2004; Kaymak 2009), as 
well as the communities that more strongly supported the agreement in the referendum.  
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'ŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ƐĞĐƌĞĐǇ ĐĂŶ ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ ůĞƐƐ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ƉƵďůŝĐƐ ŝŶ ƉĞĂĐĞ ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵƐ ? ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ǁŝůů ďĞ ŵŽƌĞ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ƚŽ  ‘ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ƐƉŽŝůĞƌƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶŽ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ ?
fear-inducing messages. With voters more dependent on the campaigns, the greater the 
incentives there will be for political parties to invest in the campaigns, and the more 
politicised and competitive the referendum will be. The Greek Cypriot case illustrates this 
chain of events the best, but other cases show similar dynamics at play. The recent EU 
membership referendum in the UK took place after a renegotiation of UK membership was 
held behind closed doors by the Council of Ministers, without any kind of public or civil 
society participation  W which is more broadly lacking in the European Union institutions. 
What followed was an eight-month ůŽŶŐ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘>ĞĂǀĞ h ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ
assumedly misinformed UK voters on the benefits of leaving the EU (BBC News 2016).   
As the negotiation delegates and leaders interviewed in this research explained, a certain 
degree of secrecy, or rather, confidentiality is crucial to allowing political representatives to 
discuss their positions and interests openly. Yet, in cases where the peace settlement will be 
put to a referendum, it is important that negotiations create public debate and engagement, 
which can be curtailed by secrecy, as was the case in the Greek Cypriot community. As 
Michael (2011, 187) argues in his analysis of the Annan Plan negotiation, mediators need to 
design, preferably in cooperation with the leaders, a public communication strategy. This is 
especially important because political leaders are often the most important source of 
information for voters in referendums. Conversely, the extent to which political leaders 
taking part in peace negotiations will be willing to inform the public during the negotiations 
depends on the secrecy of the process, as well as on the inclusivity of the process. 
 
Arbitration, Pressure and Political Party Support  
 
While mediation research has found that directive mediation strategies are the most 
effective in getting political leaders to reach a negotiated settlement (Bercovitch 1986; 
Bercovitch and Houston 1993; 2000), the use of pressure can be damaging to political 
support for peace settlements in referendums. As both cases show, when agreements are 
not reached by the political leaderships on their own terms, this decreases their incentive to 
support the agreement during the referendum. This took place in rather different ways in 
the two negotiation processes and indeed, with quite different mediation tactics and actors 
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involved. Despite the obvious differences, it makes sense to compare the impact of these 
tactics since both the arbitration procedure in the Annan Plan mediation and British pressure 
on Trimble had a negative impact on political leaders ? support for the peace settlement, 
which shaped the strength of the referendum campaigns.  
As was already stated in the case study chapter, what the Annan Plan case further 
illustrates, is that a peace settlement referendum is unlikely to succeed when the agreement 
is not endorsed by political leaderships (Kaymak 2012; Drath 2004), particularly if those 
leaderships participated in the negotiations. However, the arbitration procedure had 
another important consequence that was not yet mentioned in this thesis. The interviews 
with members of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot delegation at Bürgenstock revealed 
that arbitration offered the two delegations an incentive to harden their positions in view of 
getting the best possible outcome. At the same time, it ƌĞŵŽǀĞĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚ ĨŽƌĂ  ‘ŐŝǀĞĂŶĚ
ƚĂŬĞ ? ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ and finding common ground. Tasos Tzionis, who was part of PapaĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?
delegation, stated that he disliked describing tŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂƐ ‘ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ‘ŝt was a 
process, especially after February, that would get a Plan to be submitted to separate and 
simultaneous referendums, with or without negotiations. (Tzionis 2014). The delegation had 
refused to have face-to face negotiations at Bürgenstock, which would have allowed for 
direct negotiations to take ƉůĂĐĞ ? EŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ dƵƌŬŝƐŚ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ ĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? dĂůĂƚ ?Ɛ
description was similar, in that the process of give and take between the delegations was 
reduced. Talat explained that ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽŶĞ ŚĂŶĚ ?  ‘we were not negotiating with the Greek 
ǇƉƌŝŽƚƐ ? Q ) ?ǁĞǁĞƌĞƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƉĞƌƐƵĂĚĞƚŚĞhEƚŽƚĂŬĞŽƵƌƉĂƌƚ ? ? and, consequently:  
 ‘We were keeping our positions at an acceptable level, not demanding too much, 
but also not compromising easily, whereas if the negotiations would have been 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽƐŝĚĞƐ ? Q )ǁe would have had to compromise. ?  
Talat (2014)  
hƐŝŶŐĂƌďŝƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ƚŽŽŬĂǁĂǇƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƚĞĂŵƐ ?ŶĞĞĚƚŽďĂƌŐĂŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĨŽƌ
a compromise solution, and instead shifted their focus to persuading the mediation team to 
support their positions. Arbitration, therefore, created an incentive for the parties to 
maintain an adversarial relationship.  
Consequently, in Cyprus, not enough trust or cooperative engagement developed 
between the sides. In Northern Ireland, as was demonstrated, the delegates interviewed 
consensually regarded the ability to change relationships between the parties by establishing 
a trust based on a mutual perception of the fairness of the negotiation process as one of the 
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ŵĞƌŝƚƐ ŽĨ DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?Ɛ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ. It is certainly impressive that the setting of a deadline for 
agreement was welcomed by all the political parties involved. Yet, if the pressure of a 
ĚĞĂĚůŝŶĞǁĂƐŶŽƚĚŝǀŝƐŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽŶĂǀŝĚdƌŝŵďůĞƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶ
agreement that, most importantly, did not provide for a precise calendar for 
decommisƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ ?ŚĞůƉĞĚƐƉůŝƚƚŚĞhhW ?dŚĞhhW ?ƐƐƉůŝƚ ?ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ?ǁĞĂŬĞŶĞĚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ
 ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ and further divided voters in the Unionist community.  
As political parties split, it has been found, voters lose confidence in the agreement 
(Schneider and Weitsman 1996, 604) and tend to rely on information coming from the 
campaigns to make their voting decisions (Leduc 2002, 713). Internal splits, therefore, make 
voters more dependent on the referendum campaign in deciding on how to vote, making the 
referendum more competitive and the result more unpredictablĞ ? dŚĞ hhW ?Ɛ ? /^z ?Ɛ ? ĂŶĚ
^ĞƌĚĂƌĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?ƐWĚŝǀŝƐŝǀĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making process are varied examples of this. 
/Ŷ ƚŚĞW ?ƐĐĂƐĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ, ƚŚĞƐƉůŝƚŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚ ŝŶĂƉĂƌƚǇ ƚŚĂƚǁĂƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞĂůƐŽĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ŝŶƚŚe Turkish Cypriot community. 
What emerges from the comparison of the cases in these aspects is that the need for 
tactics that generate artificial agreement on certain issues between political leaders signals 
ƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐ Žƌ ŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ Žƌ  ‘ƐĞůů ?the agreement in the referendum, and vice-
versa. It is also a symptom that relationships between the parties are still distrustful and 
polarised, whereas a degree of trust between political elites is desirable to avoid polarisation 
during the referendum.  
 
Managing Kin-^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? Involvement 
 
Authors have a benign outlook on the involvement of the kin-states in the negotiations in 
Northern Ireland  ?DĐ'ĂƌƌǇ ĂŶĚ K ?>ĞĂƌǇ  ? ? ? ?Ă, 48; Byrne 2000). Similarly, the Turkish 
government is seen to have played a crucial role in making the Annan negotiations possible 
by pressuring, and ultimately, side-lining Denktash (Kocadal 2016). Conversely, it has also 
been argued that the UN mediators in Cyprus wrongfully assumed that the Greek 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŶŶĂŶWůĂŶǁŽƵůĚĞŶŚĂŶĐĞ'ƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? support for the agreement (Michael 2011, 185). Undeniably, the kin states 
played a major role in getting the political parties to an agreement in both cases and their 
support of the agreement during the referendum campaign was important in raising support 
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in the local communities. However, when we consider the impact of kin state involvement 
on the referendum campaign period, their participation in the negotiations themselves can 
be seen as less benign. In Northern IreůĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ‘ƋƵĂƐŝ-ŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ? (Byrne 
2000; Kocadal 2016) role and its pressure on the UUP ultimately reduced Unionist political 
support for the GFA ŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?ŝŶǇƉƌƵƐ ?dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞůĂƐƚ
round of negotiations, particularly Turkish Prime Minister ƌĚŽŐĂŶ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚƚŽƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂĂƚ
Bürgenstock, fuelled  ‘ŶŽ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ dƵƌŬĞǇ ŚĂĚ  ‘ǁŽŶ ? Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝ ŶƐ
table. 
It can be challenging for a mediator to manage the involvement of kin states in 
negotiations. As we have seen, this was a challenge that George Mitchell faced in his own 
efforts. However, it is also unlikely that peace negotiations even take place between the 
ůŽĐĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ without the support of these parties. Equally, their 
support for the peace agreement during the referendum can increase support for the 
agreement in the referendum  W as it did, in particular, among the Turkish Cypriot and 
Nationalist communities. Likewise, as Sandal and Loizides (2013, 418) ĂƌŐƵĞ ?ƚŚĞhhW ?ƐĂŶĚ
/^z ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂůůŝĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂl arena played an important role in 
socialising more conservative actors to the cause of peace. However, the GFA and Annan 
Plan referendums suggest that less intrusive types of kin stateƐ ? involvement in peace 
negotiations are more desirable when agreements will need to be ratified in a referendum. 
dĂŬŝŶŐ <ŽĐĂĚĂů ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? )typology, this would mean that kin states act only as promoters, 
rather than quasi-mediators, powerbrokers, or enforcers in the negotiations, merely 
supporting and/or pressuring their  ‘kin-community ? to cooperate. Ideally, as authors who 
have studied the GFA negotiations suggest (Kocadal 2016, 187; Byrne 2000, 17), the kin 
states should be able to cooperate with each other, as was the case in Northern Ireland, 
although this is likely a rare event. It remains, however, to be empirically tested whether kin 
statĞƐ ? ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ in the negotiations, Žƌ ƚŚĞŝƌ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ƉƵďůŝĐ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƚŚĞ
agreement, directly influenced public perceptions of the agreement or referendum voting 







Political Inclusion and Referendum Spoilers 
 
Political inclusion is one of the most striking differences between the Annan Plan and GFA 
negotiations. The GFA negotiations were decidedly more politically inclusive (not to be 
confused with multilateral) than the Annan Plan negotiations since, while the negotiations in 
Northern Ireland included the elected political parties from each of the communities, only 
the leading parties elected in each community negotiated the Annan Plan. However, as it 
was demonstrated, Turkish Cypriot opposition parties were informally included in the 
negotiations by the UN Good Offices mission in Cyprus from 2002. Additionally, after the 
2003 elections, dĂůĂƚ ?Ɛ CTP was actually part of the Turkish Cypriot delegation. Indeed, 
political inclusion has shown to have had an effect on all three referendum determinants in 
each of the cases: it influenced political support for the agreement in the referendum, 
strengthening the referendum campaigns and, as was shown in the GFA negotiations, also 
shaped the degree of public information and uncertainty by reducing negotiation secrecy. 
In Northern Ireland, the Nationalist community was fully politically represented at the 
negotiations and both the SDLP and Sinn FéŝŶ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? vote. This led the 
community to deliver a higher support for the agreement in the referendum. Comparing 
across all four communities, the degree of political inclusion, in fact, is strongly related to the 
comparative level of support coming from each of the communities in the referendum. The 
Nationalist community, then the Turkish Cypriot community, then the Unionist community, 
and, lastly, the Greek Cypriot, are, in descending order, the most politically represented 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŚŝŐŚĞƌƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞƐŽĨ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞƐ ? 
Excluding political parties, on the other hand, had important repercussions on the degree 
of political support for the agreement and the strength of the referendum campaigns. One 
of the arguments put forward in the literature is that the negotiation process in Northern 
Ireland successfully sidelined potential spoilers and strengthened the more moderate 
positions and political parties by allowing the DUP and UKUP to leave (Curran and Sebenius 
2003, 150 W51). However, their self-exclusion eventually removed any incentive for the UKUP 
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ hW ƚŽ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? dŚĞƌĞĂĨƚĞƌ ? ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ŶŽ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ŚĞůƉĞĚ ĚŝǀŝĚĞ
support for the agreement in the Unionist community. Therefore, if to side-ůŝŶĞ ‘ƐƉŽŝůĞƌƐ ?ĐĂŶ
facilitate agreement at the negotiations table, eǆĐůƵĚŝŶŐ  ‘ƐƉŽŝůĞƌƐ ?ĐĂŶ ? ŝŶ ĨĂĐƚ ?ďĂĐŬĨŝƌĞ ŝĨĂ
referendum is used for ratification.  
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Similarly to the Northern Ireland case, side-ůŝŶŝŶŐ ZĂƵĨ ĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ? ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ  ‘ƐƉŽŝůĞƌ ? ? ŝƐ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŶŶĂŶŵĞĚŝĂƚŽŶ(Michael 2007, 598). However, the 
process was also successful in managing Denktash as a referendum spoiler. Like 
WĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚĞŶŬƚĂƐŚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ? ?even adopting a similar rhetoric 
(Bryant 2004). Therefore, it was important to ask how the two Presidents ? support for the 
 ‘ŶŽ ?ŚĂĚŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐŝŵƉĂĐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞĐommunities. On the one hand, the political changes in the 
TRNC and Turkey meant that there was greater political support for the Annan Plan in the 
Turkish Cypriot community than in the Greek Cypriot. However, it was argued, the differing 
degrees of public information and engagement during the negotiations and referendum also 
explain the opposing communal behaviours. In the Turkish Cypriot community ĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?Ɛ
political opponents, civil society, and the media worked to stimulate public discussion about 
the Plan and to dispel fears in the community about its aftermath. A more inclusive process 
and engaged community, especially its earlier engagement with the negotiations, helped 
prepare the community for the referendum and ĚŝůƵƚĞĚƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? 
In the Greek Cypriot community, on the other hand, when Papadopoulos opened the 
campaign period by reneging on the Annan Plan, the parties outside the negotiations 
struggled in their decisions to support the Plan during the referendum campaign. This was 
the case for DISY and AKEL in particular. After all, except for DISY, who had negotiated the 
first two versions of the Annan Plan, and EDI, whose members negotiated the application of 
the acquis communautaire with the European Union, AKEL and EDEK had not participated in 
the negotiations that led to the agreement.  
Furthermore, a form of inclusion that has not been considered in the Cyprus negotiations 
is that of other minority communities. Although they are much smaller than the Turkish 
Cypriot community, the Latin, Armenian, and Maronite communities have never been 
formally included in the negotiations. Antonis Hajiroussos, who has represented the 
DĂƌŽŶŝƚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞZĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĨŽƌŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐ ?ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĞhE
could have included other minorities in negotiations and look less at the Cyprus problem as 
concerning only Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. He explained how it was only after 
insistence that the UN mediation team accepted to meet with him regarding the Maronite 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŽŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ(Hajiroussos 2014). 
134 
 
Therefore, these findings support arguments in spoiler management literature that 
mediation processes should be inclusive (Darby 2001; Zahar  ? ? ? ? ? DĐ'ĂƌƌǇ ĂŶĚ K ?>ĞĂƌǇ
2006b), adding that it also favours support for the peace settlement in a referendum. 
Nonetheless, several arguments can be made against inclusive negotiation processes. For 
example, Horowitz (2002, 202, 218) argues that, although the process was inclusive, the GFA 
agreement was mainly negotiated by the SDLP and the UUP and, therefore, was not a 
product of a multilateral negotiation process. This is considered by the author to be a 
positive feature of the process because, he argues, it allowed for a more coherent and 
implementable agreement to be reached. However, George Mitchell writes in his memoir 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůůŝĂŶĐĞWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐĂƉacity to communicate with both Unionist and Nationalist parties 
helped build a good network of relationships at the table (Mitchell 1999, 44). On the other 
hand, both the Alliance Party ĂŶĚƚŚĞ tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ held greater concerns about the 
implementation of the agreement and its longer-term societal impact (Alderdice 2014; 
Kilmurray 2014). The inclusion of the Women's Coalition in particular meant that other 
issues beyond those concerning the distribution of power, which could also be more easily 
agreed on, were brought to the negotiations table28. Therefore, Horowitz (2002) does not 
consider the role that the bi-communal parties had in shaping the negotiation dynamics that 
brought about the agreement, nor their impact in bringing about an implementable one.  
When the negotiation dynamics are analysed for the purpose of understanding what led 
to the referendum outcome, as opposed to what led the political parties to reach an 
agreement, the lack of a more multilateral process diminished the possibility of a cross-
ĐŽŵŵƵŶĂů ? ƵŶŝƚĞĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? dŚŝƐ ? ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?could have reduced the negative 
impact of the campaign period on the Unionist ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛsupport for the agreement. As 
YƵŝŶƚŝŶKůŝǀĞƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ?  ‘We struggled with getting all the parties on board because they 
were still not talking to each other. The talks had not been a multilateral process ? (Oliver 
2014). Conversely, in the Turkish Cypriot community, ƚŚĞ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?
campaign was that political parties and civil society groups were part of the same umbrella 
campaign created by the This Country is Ours platform. 
                                                          
28
 For example ?ƚŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŝǀŝĐ&ŽƌƵŵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂƐĂƐĞĐŽŶĚĐŚĂŵďĞƌ
to the ƐƐĞŵďůǇ ĂŶĚ ǁŽƵůĚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂů ĐŽůůĞŐĞƐ  ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ƚŚĞ ǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ? ƚŚĞ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ? ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ? ƚŚĞ ůĂďŽƵƌ
sector). They believed the forum to be particularly useful in dealing with more politically divisive issues during the 
implementation of the agreement by allowing civil society to discuss solutions without engaging in the stereotyped 
divisions of the political system (Kilmurray 2014). Unfortunately, the Civic Forum failed to fully materialize due the 
stagnating political period that came about with the implementation of the agreement.   
135 
 
Having more parties at the negotiations table complicates the number of issues and 
interests to be addressed and agreed upon at a negotiations table and can make agreement 
more difficult to reach. At the same time, it may give legitimacy to terrorist groups, allow 
certain groups to instrumentalize the process to advance their own agendas, or lead to a 
greater polarization between participating parties. However, even if an agreement is easier 
to reach between a smaller number of parties, it could be rendered useless if it is rejected in 
a referendum. If the agreement is to be ratified through a referendum, the Annan Plan and 
the GFA cases suggest that wider political inclusion is desirable so that more political parties 
have stakes in the agreement and will subsequently support it. Secondly, inclusivity may be 
necessary to manage/prevent the emergence of referendum spoilers, or at least to weaken 
their campaigns. The more political parties are involved in negotiating an agreement, the 
higher is the likelihood that those political parties will endorse the agreement during a 
referendum and, therefore, the wider the political support for it will be. After all, the way 
through which negotiation process conditions can influence political party support is, 
ĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚ ?ďǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐŝŶŐĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌŽƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂŶ
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŽƌŶŽƚ ?ƌŐŽ ?ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐĂ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞƚŽ
ƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶǁŝůůďĞ ? 
 
 
Civil Society Inclusion and the Referendum Campaigns 
 
In Northern Ireland and the Turkish Cypriot community, there existed a mobilised civil 
society that strove to influence the negotiations. Both in the GFA and the Annan Plan 
negotiations, civil society was accidentally, rather than intentionally included: in Northern 
/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ 
political leaderships, and in North Cyprus through the This Country is Ours platform. In both 
cases, civil society actors were important referendum campaigners and their engagement 
with the negotiation process had important repercussions on the shape and strength of the 
 ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ. 
 In the Turkish Cypriot referendum, the same unions and organisations who were part of 
the This Country is Ours ƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĚŝŶůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? The involvement 
of civil society groups coming from different sectors of society, from business to education, 
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and their cooperation with pro-solution parties, drew support for the success of the 
negotiations from different quadrants of society. The earlier and higher degree of 
engagement from these groups with the negotiations, on the other hand, allowed for a 
ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ďĂĐŬĞĚďǇĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ƚŽƌĞĂĐŚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
referendum campaign period.  
Similarly in Northern Ireland, the civil society-ůĞĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƉůĂǇĞĚĂĐƌƵĐŝĂů ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ
pushing support for the agreement. As Rao (2013, 10) argues, it compensated the more 
hesitant support coming from some of the political parties who were fearful of the political 
risk and cost of committing their support to an agreement and having it not be supported by 
their constituencies in the referendum. However, what did not take place in Northern 
Ireland, which was the case in the Turkish Cypriot community, was the cooperation of civil 
society groups and politicĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?dŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞ
the exception, but it was, in any case, a civil society-led party. Unlike in the Turkish Cypriot 
community, in Northern Ireland the intention to create an umbrella campaign did not 
materialise ĂŶĚĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĨƌĂŵĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǁĂǇƐ ?'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇŽĨ
the agreement, these frames became contradictory. The epitome of this problem was Sinn 
&ĠŝŶ ?Ɛ  ‘ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ? ĐůĂŝŵƐ, which ultimately helped alienate voters in the Unionist community 
(analysed more closely in the next section). Nevertheless ?ƚŚĞ ?ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶǁĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ
in delivering unified messages of support for the agreement. 
 In the Greek Cypriot community, we see the opposing dynamic taking place, with the 
strong ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇďĂĐŬĞĚ  ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƚĂŬŝŶŐŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵĂŶĚmuffling ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ
that was mainly lead by individuals in civil society with the help of NGOs. Scarcer civil society 
bi-communal initiatives in Cyprus were never properly recognised as a valuable policy option 
by the macro political level (Hadjipavlou 2002). Additionally, as Kanol and Kanol (2013) 
argue, UN officials have often ceded to political pressure to withdraw UN support for civil 
society bi-communal cooperation reconciliation initiatives, worrying that doing so would 
ignite Greek Cypriot fears that its support would signal international recognition of the 
TRNC. Whereas in the Turkish Cypriot community, civil society mobilised in collaboration 
with opposition parties and was paƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƌŽŶŐ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ŝn the Greek Cypriot case 
ƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶǁĂƐŵĂŝŶůǇĐŽŵƉosed of civil society activists whose resources were no 
match to the highly pŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇďĂĐŬĞĚ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ- although they were condemned by the 
 ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĨŽƌƌĞĐĞŝǀŝŶŐĨƵŶĚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhEĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ ? 
137 
 
The literature on civil society consistently argues that including civil society actors in the 
negotiations can lead to more durable agreements and stable peace in conflict settings 
(Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). They echo recent claims that the inclusion of 
civil society groups increases public support for the peace negotiation process, particularly 
by enhancing public perceptions of the legitimacy of the process (Zanker 2014; Nilsson 2012; 
Belloni 2008; Barnes 2002). This research contributes to the findings in this literature in 
adding that civil society inclusion can also increase public support for a peace settlement in a 
referendum, particularly through the crucial role it can play in the referendum campaigns. 
What we see in both the negotiations in Northern Ireland and in the Turkish Cypriot 
community is that civil societies that are engaged in the negotiations tend to be highly 
mobilised ŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ ?Civil society actors are important campaigners and having 
these groups engaged in the negotiations can stimulate them to establish platforms for 
collaboration that can used to generate ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐĚŽǁŶƚŚĞůŝŶĞ ?KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?Ă
very benign view of civil society is being presented here, which may not be the case in each 
community where there were also civil society groups who did not support the peace 
settlement during the referendum. The example given of the Pancyprian Citizens Movement 
in the Greek Cypriot community, however, confirms the dynamic that earlier mobilization of 
Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇĐĂŶŵĂŬĞ ƚŚĞƐĞŐƌŽƵƉƐŵŽƌĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞƌƐ ? ĞǀĞŶ ŝĨ  ‘ŶŽ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞƌƐ ? 
Yet, including these groups in the negotiations, in one or more of the broad array of ways in 
which this can be done, can potentially increase the likelihood that they will campaign for 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ?Nonetheless, because civil society in conflict settings tends to develop with the 
purpose of assisting the population while the political establishment is frozen by the conflict, 
it might be prone to support efforts that aim at solving the conflict.  
In sum, civil society groups can aid the development of ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ
make up for less enthusiastic political party campaigns, or serve as platforms that unite 
them. They are also better suited to deliver campaigns that are less divisive in making use of 
more reconciliatory messages that can help reduce polarization in the referendum. 
Additionally, the inclusion of civil society in the peace negotiations tends to favour more 
transparent negotiations, allowing for more information about the process to be 
disseminated, as opposed to between political elites which typically only reveal the outcome 
that was reached. Given that civil society actors are closer to the people, they are also crucial 
disseminators of information and can promote voter information in the communities. 
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Agreement Design: Content versus Process Information 
 
The Annan Plan and the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) are two very different documents. 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the Annan Plan was described by the Secretary-General 
ĂƐ  ‘a truly comprehensive proposal, including all legal instruments necessary, and leaving 
nothing to be negotiated subsequently. ?(United Nations 2003, para. 61). The GFA is virtually 
its polar opposite. In the GFA, the political parties ŽĨEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ‘ĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŽĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ? ?
as SDLP delegate Sean Farren described when interviewed (Farren 2014), and left some of 
the most divisive issues in the Northern Ireland conflict to be agreed subsequently. 
Consequently, while the Annan Plan is more than 192-pages long (plus 250 pages of 
annexes) (United Nations 2003, para. 17), the GFA is comparatively much smaller, only 40 
pages. 
Comparing the two referendums, there was overall more information available about the 
content of the agreement in Northern Ireland than in Cyprus. In Northern Ireland, every 
household was sent a copy of the final agreement, which was not the case in Cyprus, 
ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƐŵĂůůĞƌĂŶĚŵŽƌĞ ‘ƌĞĂĚĂďůĞ ?ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŶŶĂŶWůĂŶǁĞƌĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?
across the communities, the ones with the more informed voters delivered the higher rate 
of support in the referendum. Regarding Northern Ireland, Hayes and McAllister (2001, 79, 
82) ƚĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĨŽƵŶĚ ‘ŶŽ ?
ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ ůĞƐƐ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂďůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂŶ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ? ǁŝƚŚvoters in the 
Nationalist community being the most knowledgeable. Similarly, in Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots 
were believed to have been better informed about the Annan Plan than the Greek Cypriot 
community (Bryant 2004; Kaymak 2009), who was also found to have been misinformed by 
political elites. It could be argued that the Nationalist and the Turkish Cypriot communities 
were both the two minority communities and, for that reason, welcomed the changes that a 
power-sharing arrangement would bring and, therefore, ǁŽƵůĚǀŽƚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ
in any case. While this may partially explain the referendum outcome in the communities, it 
dismisses the antecedent condition that, because these communities were more motivated 
for changes, they were more engaged and informed than their counterparts. 
All things considered, it is important for support that the community is generally informed 
about the content of the agreement and its implications. This is, nonetheless, a challenge for 
the reasons described in the case studies. The campaigners interviewed in Cyprus and 
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Northern Ireland did overall believe that people, in general, were not well informed about 
the content of the agreement and followed their leaders and/or others in their community. 
In Northern Ireland, the ambiguity of the agreement was the main justification cited, while 
in Cyprus interviewees spoke of the length and legalistic language of the agreement. As was 
shown, regardless of the direction of their support or which community they belonged to, all 
interviewees were dissatisfied with the length of the Annan Plan. On the one hand, it made 
it difficult for the people to understand it and, on the other, a source of suspicion due to the 
general public ?ƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇŝŶ fully grasping its text and implications. 
In exploring the impact of the referendum campaigns on voter information and potential 
voting behaviour, this thesis shows that caution is needed in reading an immediate link 
between referendums results and the content of the plan. This is one of the aspects where 
there is a tendency in the literature to assume that there is symmetry between political 
ůĞĂĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ǀŽƚŝŶŐ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ? For example, Kaymak (2012, 89) 
argues that the Greek Cypriot veto of ƚŚĞŶŶĂŶWůĂŶƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘the Greek Cypriot voters 
would be keen to see substantively different elements embedded in any settlement 
ƉĂĐŬĂŐĞ ?. While this was voiced by Greek Cypriot political leaderships, it does not necessarily 
reflect public opinion in the community. As has also been stated, other authors have argued 
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŶŶĂŶ WůĂŶ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĞŬ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
concerns (Lordos 2009; Michael 2011, 186). However, if the people did not have a clear 
understanding of the content of the agreement and were effectively misinformed by their 
President about what a post-Annan Plan Cyprus would come to be, we cannot linearly 
interpret the referendum result as Greek Cypriot voters manifesting dissatisfaction with 
agreement provisions.  
It is not to say, however, that what is agreed at the negotiations table is irrelevant in the 
referendum. The content of a peace agreement is important in getting political party support 
for the agreement during the campaign period and, for this reason, political leaders need to 
ďĞĂďůĞƚŽ ‘ƐĞůů ?ƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? However, as the GFA case shows, while 
creating ambiguous commitments might favour political support, it can be damaging if 
antagonist interpretations of those provisions co-exist during the referendum campaign. As 
it was demonstrated, scholars argue that the  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞ ĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ
GFA ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ƚŽ  ‘ƐĞůů ? ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐŝĞƐ (Tonge and 
Evans 2002; Dixon 2013, 114). It allowed Sinn Féin to state that there would be no 
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decommissioning prior to the establishment of the power-sharing government, while the 
UUP claimed that it would take place beforehand. It also allowed Unionist political parties to 
campaign for an agreement that kept Northern Ireland in the UK, while republicans claimed 
to be a step closer to Irish unity. Yet, it was demonstrated, if ambiguity allowed the leaders 
ƚŽ ďĞƚƚĞƌ  ‘ƐĞůů ? the agreement during the campaign, it also allowed for divisive views and 
disagreements to remain between the leaderships and, consequently, for win-lose views of 
the agreement to negatively impact support for the peace settlement. Therefore, if 
ambiguity can facilitate the reaching of an agreed document between political leaders, it can 
negatively impact support for it in the referendum if the political leaders are unable to 
uphold less contrasting, or zero-sum views.  
Amongst the campaigners interviewed in both Cyprus and Northern Ireland, there was a 
ĐůĞĂƌĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶŚŽǁ ‘ŶŽ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐǀŝĞǁĞĚƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?
While Annan Plan and GFA supporters described the agreement as a point in a process, or a 
way to move forward, those ǁŚŽĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ŚĂĚƐƚĂƚŝĐǀŝĞǁƐŽĨƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ
and described them as endpoints. For example, Ali Erel, who supported ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
Turkish Cypriot community, stated ƚŚĂƚ ‘The agreement is just the start, the basis to work on 
and it is bound to have mistakes ? (Erel 2014). Similarly, Marios Epaminondas, who 
campaigned ĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƐƚĂƚĞĚ  ‘This plan is good enough, it 
is not perfect but it is a way of moving forward. ? (Epaminondas 2014). In Northern Ireland, 
>ŽƌĚŵƉĞǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƚŚĞ'&ĂƐ  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐƚŽĂŶĞǆƚĞŶƚ ? (Empey 2014) and Hayes 
and McAllister (2001, 82 W83) claim ƚŚĂƚ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞƌƐƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽǀŝĞǁƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĂƐ ‘ĂŶĞǁ
ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ?. However,  ‘yes ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ believed in the possibility that relationships between 
the parties would be healed enough to negotiate in the future, on aspects of the agreement 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞůĞƐƐŚĂƉƉǇǁŝƚŚ ? ‘EŽ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ?ŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ?ǁĞƌĞŵŽƌĞƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽƵƐŽĨ
the other and believed theǇ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ůŽƐĞƌƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĂů ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? dŚŝƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ?
while knowledge of the content of the agreement can influence voting behaviours in peace 
settlement referendums, how they are viewed in the overall context of the 
peace/reconciliation process can markedly divide support.  
Agreement design is, indeed, the determinant that delivered the more surprising and 
complex results. Although the question of the referendum is on the text of the agreement, it 
is surprising to find that the text of the document itself appears to be less important factor in 
ƐŚĂƉŝŶŐ ǀŽƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? tŚŝůĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ĚĞƐŝŐŶ ŝƐŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇ ĐƌƵĐŝĂů ƚŽ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ
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support for the agreement in the referendum, the content of the agreement itself cannot be 
found determinant when it is not an important source of information to voters. Of course, 
the content of the peace agreement shapes the debates that take place in the public realm 
during the referendum campaign, but that seemed to happen indirectly in the two cases, by 
the way political leaders and the campaigns framed the agreement to their constituencies 
and how the media disseminated this information. The findings of this qualitative research 
are, hoǁĞǀĞƌ ? ůŝŵŝƚĞĚƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌ ?ƐĂŶĚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞƌƐ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů
experiences. As it was shown, they sometimes contradict findings from quantitative studies 
and, perhaps more importantly, they raise new questions that these studies are more 
equipped to address. 
 
 
Bridging Peace Negotiations and Referendums Literature 
 
Similar to what was the case in the Annan Plan referendum, ƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞŝŶ
the recent peace settlement referendum in Colombia came as a surprise. Defying all 
expectations, the peace agreement reached by the Colombian government and the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Havana was rejected by a slight majority 
of voters, in a referendum with a low voter turnout. Public opinion polls had led many to 
ďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇƚŽƚŚĞ'ŽŽĚ&ƌŝĚĂǇŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚǁŝŶby a 
robust margin (Murphy and Cobb 2016). While failed peace settlement referendums may 
prompt the question of whether they should be held in the first place, the findings of this 
research suggest that referendums might not in themselves be the problem. 
Instead of a traditional focus on how peace agreements can be reached by political 
leaders in peace negotiations, the focus of this research was on how peace negotiations 
ĂĨĨĞĐƚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? support for the resulting peace settlements in a referendum. In 
analysing why negotiation processes end in successful or failed peace settlement 
referendums, instead of why political leaders reached or did not reach a peace agreement, 
this research highlighted different aspects of the negotiation process. It found that, although 
agreement design might be crucial in accommodating political elites and designing 
implementable and durable post-conflict institutions, the process of negotiations itself and 
the wider societal setting in which it takes place can play a more important role on whether 
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the agreement is supported or not. Less secretive and more inclusive peace negotiations can 
potentially both help depolarise relationships between political leaderships as well as 
mobilise civil society and the wider communities in support for the peace settlement, which 
can aid the reconciliation process.  
This section will further discuss how the comparison of the Annan Plan and Good Friday 
Agreement negotiations and referendums can inform existing academic literature and the 
practice of peace negotiations and mediation. Two questions and broad debates are 
addressed here. First, it discusses how the findings of this research contribute to the growing 
debate on whether referendums, and peace settlement referendums in particular, should be 
used in peace processes. It then puts forward the argument that peace negotiations with 
referendums require a type of process that is different from what has been traditionally 
conducted in negotiations where the agreement only required political leaderƐ ?
endorsement to be ratified.   
 
 To Hold, or Not to Hold, a Peace Settlement Referendum 
 
In discussing how the in-depth analyses and comparison of the Annan Plan and GFA 
experiences inform literature and practice on peace negotiations and referendums, this 
section explores the question of whether a peace settlement referendum should be held in 
the first place. It reviews existing arguments in the literature that are for and against the use 
of referendums in peace processes and contributes to this debate by discussing them with 
the findings of the case comparison.   
Addressing peace settlement referendums specifically, Loizides (2015, 142) contends that, 
where politically feasible, referendums are risky and should not be used to ratify negotiated 
agreements.  ‘i^lent elite pacts ?ĂƌĞĂ ƉƌĞĨĞƌĂďůĞĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ because, he argues, the public 
will eventually support it when the benefits of the agreement emerge during 
implementation. This has recently been found to be the case regarding Bosnian support for 
the US-mediated Dayton Accords (Morgan-Jones, Loizides, and Stefanovic 2015). However, 
this requires that the implementation of the agreement leads to a relatively peaceful post-
conflict situation, which is not always the case. Elite pacts more frequently create 
implementation problems and can lead to the re-emergence of conflict. In his study of the 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiation of the Oslo Accords, Wanis-St. John (2006, 141; 2011, 271 W72, 
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286) found that the implementation of the agreement was undermined precisely by the 
conditions of mistrust and rejectionism that created the need for secret negotiations in the 
first place. Importantly, the exclusionist process fed negative reactions to the agreement 
from those who were outside the negotiations, exacerbating spoiler problems and 
negatively influencing public opinion. Also, more inclusive, and less elitist, negotiation 
processes are the ones that produce more durable agreements (Wanis-St. John and Kew 
2008; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Nilsson 2012).  
As an alternative to a peace settlement referendum, Loizides (2015, 145 W48) 
recommends the use of South African-style mandate referendums. In a mandate 
referendum, a leader asks the community to support his/her efforts in reaching an 
agreement at the negotiations table. In this sense, mandate referendums can play a crucial 
role in allowing political leaders to balance democratic accountability with their legitimacy 
and credibility at the negotiations table. The elections to the Peace Forum in Northern 
Ireland, have actually been seen to have functioned as a mandate giving exercise (Cochrane 
2000). Therefore, as this research found to have been the case in Northern Ireland, mandate 
referendums can work to familiarise the public with the content of the negotiations and, 
indeed, bring the negotiation issues into the realm of public debate. They can also serve to 
familiarize the public with the referendum process if the final agreement will be placed for 
referendum. Yet, a less secretive and more participatory peace negotiation process can 
potentially bring the same benefits with less risk involved.  
Another argument against the use of a peace settlement referendum is one that exists in 
the larger literature on referendums: that the public is not apt to make decisions on complex 
policy issues. As largely upheld in referendums literature (Hobolt 2007, 175 W76; Schneider 
and Weitsman 1996), a referendum can only be a true instrument of direct democracy and 
expression of democratic will if it is exercised by well-informed voters. The cases compared 
here suggest that more transparent peace negotiation processes that engage with civil 
society and the public can promote voter education. This has further important implications 
for the timing of the referendum. Usually peace settlement referendum take place soon 
after the agreement is reached in order to take advantage of the momentum created by the 
public announcement of the agreement. This was the case in both the Annan Plan and GFA 
referendums, which took place around a month after the agreements were reached or 
announced. Lee and Mac Ginty (2012), for example, contend that these campaign periods 
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are too short to allow voters to understand the issues at stake in the referendum, as they 
argue to have been the case in Guatemala. The alternative option is to set a longer campaign 
period to allow more time for voter education and public debate on what is at stake in the 
referendum.  
The Northern Ireland and Turkish Cypriot experiences suggest that, to hold the peace 
settlement referendum soon after the agreement is reached can best build on its 
momentum if a less secretive and more inclusive process takes place. The comparison of the 
Annan Plan and GFA cases further suggest that, unless there is a higher inclusion of 
stakeholders and an engaged civil society, the small time periods between the end of 
negotiations and the day of the referendum, indeed, do not suffice to educate the public. 
This type of process allows for public debate on the issues under negotiations to take place 
at an earlier stage and pushes political leaders to educate their constituencies. Although 
longer campaign periods could ideally function to inform voters, as we have seen, 
referendum campaigns tend not to be purely informational campaigns and can, in fact, work 
to misinform voters. Uninformed referendum voters can be easy targets for opportunistic 
political leaders who may manipulate the public and use the referendum to further their 
own political agendas (Schneider and Weitsman 1996, 584). In any case, the need for a 
longer referendum campaign period already signals that the public is unready for a 
referendum, likely due to lack of public and civic participation and/or secretive politics.  
There is yet one last important argument made against the use of referendums in peace 
processes: that the referendum experience runs the risk of stirring conflict by further 
radicalising public opinion (Mac Ginty 2003, 16 W17). Peace settlement referendums can be 
particularly prone to polarising referendum experiences because the question asked 
requires a dichotomous  ‘yes ?/ ?no ? answer that is prone to create ? winners ? and  ‘losers ?. 
Rynhold and Cohen (2003, 101 W2) argue that a referendum should not be held in the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process because it risks doing more harm than good, by risking 
exacerbating existing tensions. This is likely to be the case. However, the reason for this may 
not necessarily be because the referendum process in inherently problematic, but because 
the negotiation process has relied on secrecy (Wanis-St.John 2011). Nonetheless, /ƐƌĂĞů ?Ɛ
increasingly hard-line politics suggest that an agreement, let alone a referendum, is still not 
in sight. A certain degree of de-radicalization must take place before a referendum can be 
used to benefit the peace process. Essential to this de-polarization process is that a 
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conciliatory, win-win, or middle-ground discourse can co-exist with more radically different 
perspectives during the referendum campaign. This research suggests that this needs to 
start during the negotiation process. In peace settlement referendums, as the cases 
compared in this research suggest, it is desirable that a certain degree of reconciliation takes 
ƉůĂĐĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐƐŽƚŚĂƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĐĂŶƐĂǇ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ƚŽĂŶĂŐƌĞĞĚĨƵƚƵƌĞŝŶƚŚĞ
referendum. Social transformation does seem to be desirable for an agreement to be 
supported in a referendum and for the referendum experience itself to not further polarise 
society and politics. ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞŐŽĂůƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇǀŽƚĞƐ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ?ĂƐ
we have learned from the Northern Ireland case, the ideal would be that agreements are 
equally supported by the communities in conflict. However, for that to happen, it is 
necessary that a certain degree of political reconciliation take place before the referendum 
is held. zĞƚ ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐǁŚĞƌĞƉĞĂĐĞŵĂŬŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨƚĞŶĨĂŝů ?ďǇŬĞĞƉŝŶŐƚŚĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů
accommodative behaviours away from the public eye and allowing for radical views to linger 
in the communities.  
It is not, therefore, that referendums are inherently problematic and for that reason 
should not be held in a peace process, but rather that peace negotiations need to be 
adapted when there is a desire, choice, or a requirement for a peace settlement to be 
ratified through a referendum. How the process can be adapted is the question explored in 
the next section.    
 
The Challenge of Tailoring Negotiations for Settlement Referendums 
 
In finding that negotiation process conditions shaped the peace settlement referendum 
outcomes in the Annan Plan and GFA cases, there is an underlying claim in this thesis that 
the seeds for a successful outcome can be planted at earlier stages of the process - rather 
than during the referendum campaign period. To ratify a negotiated peace settlement 
through a referendum, therefore, requires that the negotiation process itself is conducted in 
a way that will favour public support for the agreement. Let us explore how this can be 
done. 
>ĞĞĂŶĚDĂĐ'ŝŶƚǇ ?Ɛ(2012) study of the Guatemalan referendum of May 1999, in which 
the peace agreement reached between the Guatemalan government and the Guatemalan 
National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) was rejected, reaches conclusions that are consistent 
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with the cases compared here. In fact, the authors compare specific features of the Annan 
Plan and GFA cases with the Guatemalan case. In opposite to the Annan Plan and GFA cases, 
however, the referendum in Guatemala had an overwhelming 81,5 per cent rate of 
abstention. The failure of the Guatemalan referendum, the authors argue, was caused by a 
the lack of meaningful consultation with indigenous communities, lack of public information, 
and the exacerbation of fears by right-wing groups opposed to the agreement during the 
referendum campaign. The Guatemalan case, in all three aspects, resembles the Annan 
WůĂŶ ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚum in the Greek Cypriot community. However, while the authors find that the 
existence of security concerns was also a cause for the referendum failure, it is unlikely that 
these concerns will not exist in a peace process referendum. On the other hand, security 
concerns regarding the decommissioning of paramilitaries and prisoners releases were part 
of the referendum campaign debates in Northern Ireland and, yet, did not prevent the 
majority of both communities in Northern Ireland from voting 'yes'. Furthermore, as was 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚĐĂƐĞ ?ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŵĂǇďĞŝŶĨůĂƚĞĚďǇ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐĂŶĚ ?
ŚĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞŝƌŝŵƉĂĐƚŵĂǇĚĞƉĞŶĚŽŶƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?
whereas the authors are sceptical of the role that third party interveners can have in 
improving the chances of peace process referendums being positive and successful 
experiences, the findings of this research supports a contrasting view.  
During negotiation processes that culminate in a peace settlement referendum, 
mediators can promote successful peace settlement referendum by leading more inclusive 
and open negotiation processes that foster public interest, participation, and education. 
Mediators can encourage negotiators to gain support from their communities for the 
commitments that are being made at the negotiations table. This requires changes in 
political discourse. As Ramsbotham (2011, 61; 2010) has criticised, the discursive and 
linguistic intractability of conflict is a crucial dimension of conflict transformation that has 
consistently been ignored in peacemaking practices. How well this dimension of the conflict 
is addressed during the negotiation process, can in fact, have important consequences for a 
referendum campaign period. However, the greatest challenge to it is that political leaders 
fear losing public support during peace negotiations if they do not retain an adversarial 
public posture. As Horowitz (1985, 343 W346) explains, especially ethnic political party 
leaders fear the stigma of ďĞŝŶŐ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ŽĨďĞƚƌĂǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ cause, from which 
they can struggle to ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌ ? ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?Ɛ (2012, 674) ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
147 
 
ĞŶƚƌĂƉŵĞŶƚ ? ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚŝƐĚǇŶĂŵŝĐǁĞůů ? The author explains that peace mediations have 
traditionally been led with the aim of helping political leaders escape this trap by creating 
face-saving devices, like secrecy, that would allow parties to make concessions without being 
seen as traitors by their supporters. Although this may help parties reach an agreement, 
face-saving allows relationships between leaderships and their political attitudes or 
discourses to remain adversarial, or even hostile. When the agreement will be ratified in a 
referendum, this is even more unfeasible. Even in the case of Northern Ireland, where the 
referendum was a  ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? ? ĂƐ ŽĐŚƌĂŶĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĂƌŐƵĞƐ, the opposite campaign messages 
given by the UUP and Sinn Féin during the referendum highlighted the fact that little 
consensus-building and ideological transformation of the conflict had occurred. If an 
agreement emerges between parties that are viewed as highly adversarial, voters are likely 
to be suspicious of the negotiations outcome and believe that their representatives have 
betrayed them. It is, therefore, important that the communities are prepared to support the 
concessions that their political leaders have to make at the negotiations table.  
The need to change hostile political discourse into a more compromising one and hostile 
public attitudes into more reconciliatory ones is an important dimension of conflict 
resolution in ethnic conflicts that authors have argued to be consistently missing in practice 
(Kaufman 2006, 202; Ron 2009). In this regard, Ramsbotham (2011b, 19 W21; 2011a, 72) 
argues for a more interventive role of the mediator. He suggests that ƚŚĞ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ? Žƌ
ƉĞĂĐĞŵĂŬĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ŽǁŶ ƉƵďůŝĐ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ŶĞĞĚƐ ƚŽ Ăŝŵ Ăƚ ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉƐďǇ ‘ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵ ŝŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ‘ĚŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞƐƉĂĐĞ ?.  
Mediators can play an important role in generating more transparent politics that citizens 
can be more aware of and participate in. Engaging civil society can serve to balance 
confidentiality with the need for public awareness and participation (Wanis-St. John 2008), 
and mediators can have the capacity to create spaces that foster contact between the civil 
society and political leaderships during negotiations. Civil society actors and groups that are 
engaged with the negotiation process can shape the referendum campaign experiences and 
promote a discourse of compromise, tolerance, peace, and views of a common future.  
The main lesson that can be drawn from comparing the Annan Plan and the GFA 
negotiations and referendums, therefore, is that successful peace settlement referendums 
require a negotiation process that can foster public support for the agreement. More 
concretely, they need to be preceded by inclusive negotiations that involve a broad 
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spectrum of political stakeholders and civil society. It is perhaps unsurprising to find that the 
use of a direct democracy, participatory tool, demands that a more transparent and 
participatory negotiation process takes place. One that breaks away from the traditional 
elite and  ‘behind closed doors ? negotiations model. Therefore, it is not that referendums are 
inadequate for peace processes or the ratification of peace agreements, but rather that they 








Peace negotiations had not yet been analysed with the purpose of understanding how 
they shaped referendum results. This thesis has achieved this aim by comparing how the 
Annan Plan negotiations in Cyprus contributed to its rejection in the referendum of April 
2004, with how the Good Friday Agreement negotiations shaped its successful referendum 
in May 1998. Its findings have confirmed that support for the peace settlements in the 
referendums was also shaped by the way the negotiation processes were conducted in each 
of the cases. The less secretive, more politically and civically inclusive process in Northern 
Ireland was found to have led to a higher level of political party support for the agreement 
and a ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ, while the opposing dynamic was true in the rejection of the 
Annan Plan. In Cyprus, the secret and exclusionary negotiation process left Greek Cypriot 
ǀŽƚĞƌƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞŵŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐƵĞƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇĂŚŝŐŚůǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇďĂĐŬĞĚ ‘ŶŽ ?
campaign which led them to overwhelmingly reject the Annan Plan. 
However, the striking similarities between the GFA case and the findings on the Turkish 
Cypriot community case were, perhaps, the most interesting results from the comparison. 
Although the Annan Plan negotiations were more exclusionary than the GFA negotiations, 
this research found that the UN Good Offices mission consulted with Turkish Cypriot political 
parties outside the negotiations at earlier stages of the negotiations. These consultations 
were found to include civil society actors. The strong mobilization of opposition parties and 
civil society in support for the Annan Plan negotiations was found to have made for a more 
politically and civically inclusive negotiation process than was the case in the Greek Cypriot 
community. In both the Northern Ireland case and in the Turkish Cypriot community, those 
characteristics of the process were found to have favoured support for the agreement in the 
referendum. 
Qualitative research methods were used to develop and explore the links between the 
negotiations and the referendums in both processes. Given the reduced number of cases of 
peace negotiations with peace settlement referendums, the two cases presented 
themselves as the best suited for comparison. The Cyprus and Northern Ireland conflicts and 
subsequent peace processes share historical features, such as their British colonial history 
and the European Union enlargement process, that hardly could be matched by other cases. 
Most importantly, their selection allowed for the comparison of a case of peace negotiations 
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where a peace settlement was rejected in a referendum with one where it was accepted. 
Plus, the differences in support given by each of the local communities were interesting to 
compare. First, there was a similar difference in the percentages of support given between 
the local communities in each of the cases and, secondly, the results across the Greek 
Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Nationalist, and Unionist communities allowed for a unique 
comparison of a wide range of different rates of support. 
The extensive interviews conducted with negotiation delegates, political leaders, 
campaigners, civil society representatives, journalists, and academic experts were crucial to 
the research aim of exploring the links between the negotiation process and the referendum 
outcomes in both cases. Interviews with negotiation delegates and other politicians who 
were not included in the negotiations, allowed this research to explore what shaped their 
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? ŽƌŶŽƚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? ƚŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
referendum. This approach also allowed this thesis to explore how that shaped the 
campaigns led by their political parties. Interviews with individuals and civil society groups 
gave further insight into how civil society inclusion shaped the referendum campaigns. All 
interviews offered insights into the kind of information available to the public on the 
negotiation process and the content of the agreements themselves, as well as how it 
reached, or not, each of the communities. 
This concluding chapter brings together the findings of this study, along with its main 
implications for researchers and practitioners. It begins by recapturing the main proposition 
of this thesis concerning the relevance of studying peace settlement referendums as 
negotiation outcomes. It reviews how this was achieved and what it revealed. Thereafter, an 
overview of the findings relating to each of the aspects of the negotiations under study is 
presented. Each of the subsections sums up the findings reached in each the case studies 
analyses and their comparison. They conclude that the referendum outcomes were shaped 
by mediation strategies and by whether political parties and civil society groups were 
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? dŚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŚĂŶĚ, while shaping 
political support for the agreement, was found to have a relative influence on the 
referendum outcome, hence, this section concludes by arguing that the referendum results 
ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚ ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ? ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ŝƚƐĞůĨ. Lastly, this chapter 
presents a reflexion on the contribution and limits of the research and highlights the 
implications for existing research and peace mediation practice, along with numerous 
151 
 
suggestions on avenues for further research. It stresses the importance of the course of the 
negotiation process in building referendum results and revisits the argument made in the 
previous chapter that the use of a referendum to ratify a peace settlement is not suitable for 
all types of peace negotiation processes.      
 
 
Peace Settlement Referendum Results as Negotiation Outcomes 
 
Academic research on peace negotiations traditionally examined how different sorts of 
agreements were reached in peace negotiations, or whether they are able to abate crisis and 
reduce military tensions in conflict settings (for example, Bercovitch and Langley 1993; 
Anderson 2008; Beardsley 2006). In recent years, researchers moved to understand how 
peacemaking processes affect and are affected by the wider society in which the 
negotiations take place. This shift revealed that other actors beyond the political elites who 
traditionally negotiate peace settlements can shape the outcome of a negotiation process. 
Involving civil society groups and engaging the wider public has been increasingly argued in 
recent years to be crucial for the successful implementation of peace settlements and the 
establishment of an enduring peace (for example, Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008; Belloni 
2008; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Paffenholz 2009; Nilsson 2012). As research and literature 
on peace processes has become more interested in instruments of civic and public 
engagement, the benefits and risks of using referendums in peacemaking processes have 
started to be assessed (for example, Johansson 2009; Lee and Mac Ginty 2012; Loizides 
2014; Qvortrup 2014). Although some of this embryonic research suggests that certain 
features of the negotiations have shaped referendum experiences and results in peace 
processes around the world, a systematic and in-depth study of negotiations aiming to trace 
their impact on referendums had not yet been conducted. 
More research had been done on other types of referendums than on those taking place 
in peace processes. The fact that this is a relatively recent phenomenon helps explain why 
this is the case. As it was shown, the most significant bulk of research has been done on 
European integration referendums (a few examples from the numerous works cited in this 
thesis are: M. Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994; Schneider and Weitsman 1996; Hobolt 
2006; Hobolt 2007; Baun et al. 2006). In effect, there remained a significant gap between 
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peace negotiations and referendums literature. On the one hand, research on referendums 
tended to analyse referendum results and campaign periods and, therefore, said little about 
how they were impacted by negotiation processes. On the other hand, while research on 
referendums has shown that the referendum campaign periods themselves have a crucial 
impact on voting behaviours in referendums (for example, Leduc 2002; Vreese 2004; Hänggli 
and Kriesi 2010), this had not been fully considered in connection with existing analyses of 
peace negotiations with settlement referendums. Consequently, success or failure in peace 
negotiations has sometimes been indiscriminately used to refer to either an agreement 
being reached by the political leaderships in the negotiations, or an agreement being 
accepted in a referendum. 
The comparison of the in-depth analysis of the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement 
negotiations presented in this thesis proposed a way to bridge the outlined gap between the 
two types of research and explanations. To answer the research question do peace 
negotiations influence support for peace settlements in referendums and, if so, how (?), it 
asked did the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations lead to opposing 
referendum outcomes and the differences in support between the local communities and, if 
so, how (?), and developed a novel research design. Gathering from referendums literature 
that referendum results are shaped by political ůĞĂĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
referendum, the impact of the referendum campaigns, and public information and 
uncertainty about the issues or the agreement at stake in the referendum, this thesis looked 
at what aspects of peace negotiations could have shaped these referendum outcome 
determinants. Taking existing knowledge from negotiations literature and the two 
negotiation processes, it compared, in a structured and focused manner, how mediation 
strategies, political inclusion, civil society inclusion, and agreement design shaped them. 
From the analysis of the extensive interview data and other primary data, the following 
conclusions were reached on each of the different aspects of the negotiations analysed. 
 
The Conditions that Shape Referendum Outcomes are Influenced by Mediation Strategies 
 
Mediators can, through the mediation strategies that they use, significantly shape the 
conditions under which peace negotiations take place. This research demonstrated that, for 




of the negotiations were among the factors that contributed to the failure of the Annan Plan 
process (Drath 2004; Michael 2007; Lordos 2009). However, the findings reached here are 
more detailed and nuanced since they explain how the negotiation process had an impact on 
the Annan Plan referendum campaign periods and, ultimately, the referendum results. In 
explaining how specific mediation strategies shaped the referendum experience, this study 
demonstrated that, firstly, it is actually the mixing of the two strategies that ultimately had a 
negative impact on the rate of support given to the agreement by the Greek Cypriot 
community. Secondly, unlike previous explanations, it questioned why those mediation 
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ ĂŶ ĞƋƵĂů ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ dƵƌŬŝƐŚ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ
support. In doing so, this study showed that a potentially negative impact was 
counterweighed in the Turkish Cypriot community by the pro-ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ Đŝǀŝů
ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚĞƚŚƌĞĞ-year long period 
of effective mobilization of the community in support of the negotiations collaterally set the 
seeds for the victory of tŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ.  
The analysis of how mediation strategy might have shaped the GFA referendum in 
Northern Ireland showed that, although confidentiality was an important feature of the 
process, the negotiations were not secret per se. Importantly, the lesser degree of secrecy of 
the process was not a result of a mediator decision, but rather due to the sheer number of 
political parties participating in the negotiations and, more importantly, the contact that the 
smaller parties maintained with their constituents. The involvement of kin states, on the 
other hand, interfered wiƚŚ'ĞŽƌŐĞDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?as was stated by the Northern Irish 
delegates interviewed (Alderdice 2014; Empey 2014; Weir 2014). The pressure on Trimble to 
accept the agreement and the subsequent split in the Ulster Unionist party created divisions 
among Unionist politicians on the benefits and shortcomings of the agreement. This had a 
ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ'&ƌŝŐŚƚĂƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ
campaign period.  
By differentiating between the impact of mediation strategies on referendum outcomes 
and the outcome reached at the negotiations table per se, this study showed that mediation 
strategies that work to get political leaders to an agreement might affect support for that 
same agreement in the referendum. When the two cases were compared, it emerged that 
procedural strategies had a greater impact in shaping the referendums in both cases. Studies 
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on the effectiveness of mediation strategies have looked at what strategies are more 
effective in getting political leaders to a cease-fire, to reduced military tensions, or to an 
agreement of some sort. For this reason, directive and facilitative strategies were found to 
be the most effective (for example, Touval and Zartman 2001; Bercovitch and Derouen 2004; 
Beardsley 2006). The fact that this study looked, instead, at whether those mediation 
strategies would help or hinder the chances of the agreement being accepted by the people 
in a referendum, showed that procedural strategies relating to the degree of exposure of the 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ? /ƚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ƚŚĂƚ
negotiation secrecy comes with a cost (Wanis-St.John 2011; Babbitt et al. 2013). Information 
about the negotiation process and the agreement is necessary to rebuff or counteract the 
misinformation campaigns led by spoilers - such as the ones led by Papadopoulos and 
Denktash in Cyprus, or Ian Paisley in Northern Ireland -, especially during peace referendum 
campaigns. Secret negotiations might be advantageous in getting the political leaders to 
agree, but can be counterproductive when a referendum is used for ratification. While 
mediators might find it beneficial to isolate leaders from, for example, less accommodative 
party carders, they run the risk of alienating the public.  
The comparison further showed that, while pressure - a tactic within the spectrum of 
directive mediation strategies - may be effective in getting negotiating parties to an 
agreement, it can have a negative impact on support for the agreement in the referendum. 
Pressure can be counterproductive because it may push leaders to support an agreement 
that does not have grassroots backing. Now, this backing may not exist for a variety of 
reasons, but if the public is not aware of what is being negotiated, or if negotiators did not 
ƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚƐ ? ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ
negotiations table, pressuring leaderships to accept an agreement can have negative 
repercussions on the peace settlement referendum down the line.  
This study of the impact of mediation strategies on support for the Annan Plan and GFA in 
their respective referendums, therefore, provided insight into the tension between the 
mediation strategies deployed to allow for progress in the negotiation process and the 
ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐŝĂů ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ĂŶĚ
shortcomings of the settlement. Additionally, it demonstrated that some of the conditions 
ƚŚĂƚ ƐŚĂƉĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ the peace settlement are malleable to the mediator, 
lending support to others in mediation literature who have called for a greater recognition of 
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ƚŚĞ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƉĞĂĐĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ (Stedman 1991; Greig 2001). It suggests that 
mediators should be careful in the choice and mix of strategies that they deploy, so that they 
are sensitive to the impact these may have on the local context. Peace mediations do not, 
ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŽĐĐƵƌŝŶĂ ‘poůŝƚŝĐĂůǀĂĐƵƵŵ ? (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2004, 23). Therefore they 
ŵƵƐƚďĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ŝŶĂǁĂǇƚŚĂƚƚĂŬĞƐ ŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŝƚƐ ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?
ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚability for the 
peace process and favour public information are particularly important. It is also important 
that leaders change adversarial discourses and that the improvement of ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ ?
relationships during the negotiation process is perceived and trickles-down to the 
communities. Strategies that aim at increasing transparency and civil society inclusion can 
potentially favour this effect, at the same time as they can potentially generate ownership 
and responsibility for the success of the peace process, among both the leaderships and the 
communities. In fact, the use of a referendum can itself be seen as a mediation strategy that 
aims to engage the public. However, as it has been shown, other strategies are necessary to 
complement it.  
 
Political Party Participation in the Negotiations Favoured Support in the Referendums  
 
One significant difference that was evident between the two cases from the start of the 
research process was the number of political parties that were formally included in the 
negotiations. From the outset, a total of 10 political parties participated in the GFA 
negotiations (although it can be argued that negotiations between the UUP and the SDLP 
were more central), while only the elected leaderships of each of the Cypriot communities 
and their delegations were part of the negotiations in Cyprus. To compare this aspect of the 
negotiations made sense, on the one hand, because the inclusivity of the negotiation 
process is one feature of the Good Friday Agreement negotiations that has been time and 
again pointed out has having contributed to the success of the process (for example, Darby 
2001; Curran and Sebenius 2003; McGarƌǇĂŶĚK ?>ĞĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?ď). On the other hand, research 
ŽŶƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŐŽŶŝƐƐƵĞƐĂƚƐƚĂŬĞ
in a referendum has often the most impact on a referendum result (for example, Schneider 
and Weitsman 1996; Hobolt 2006; Vreese 2006). Therefore, it was important to understand 
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ŝĨ ĂŶĚŚŽǁ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŵƉĂĐƚĞĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? Žƌ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?
decisions to support, or not support, the agreement in the two cases.  
/Ŷ ƚŚĞ ŶŶĂŶWůĂŶ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘pro-solution ? political parties in the Turkish Cypriot community, 
who were outside the negotiations until 2003, actively looked to influence and shape the 
negotiations. While their original purpose was to put pressure on Denktash to negotiate, as 
Denktash began to lose popular support within the community, these parties came into 
increasingly more substantial contact with UN mediators. By 2003, Talat eventually became 
ƚŚĞ dƵƌŬŝƐŚ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ ĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ůĞĂĚĞƌ at the Bürgenstock negotiations. While the 
moderates rose to the negotiations table in the Turkish Cypriot community, the opposite 
was the case in the Greek Cypriot ?WĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŽ-solution DISY 
ĂŶĚ/ǁĞƌĞŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůƐƚĂŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐƚŚĞŚŝŐŚůǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇďĂĐŬĞĚ ‘ŶŽ ?
campaign resonated and gained momentum in the communitǇ ?<> ?ƐƐǁŝtch to supporting 
ƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞ coupled with the split in DISY, meant that only a few politicians were involved 
ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? ^ĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇ ? ŝĨ WĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?position and public statements against 
the Annan Plan had an impact on the low Greek Cypriot support for the Annan Plan in the 
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ? ĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?Ɛ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ?ŶŽ ? ǁĂƐ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁĞŝŐŚƚĞĚ ďǇ Ă ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?
campaign in North Cyprus.   
Contrary to the Annan Plan case, all the parties that took part in the last stages of the GFA 
negotiations supported the agreement in the referendum, while the DUP and the UKUP, 
who abandoned the negotiations in the year prior, were against it. By including a larger 
number of political parties, the negotiation process favoured political support for the 
agreement during the referendum. Concomitantly, this support was significant in explaining 
the difference in support between the Unionist and the Nationalist communities. The self-
exclusion of the DUP and the UKUP ŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶǁĂƐĞǆĐůƵƐŝvely targeted at 
Unionist voters.  
Comparing the two cases, the more inclusive negotiation dynamics towards the Turkish 
Cypriot political parties and the GFA negotiations suggested that including more political 
parties in the negotiations favoured the  ‘ǇĞƐ ? campaigns and political support for the 
settlements in Northern Ireland and North Cyprus. Inclusive negotiations may, therefore, 
prevent referendum spoilers from arising, or limit the impact of their  ‘ŶŽ ? campaigns. The 
comparison of how political inclusion shaped differences in support between the 
communities also showed that, particularly in the Northern Irish case, that the tone in which 
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the agreement is supported by political leaderships can shape referendum outcomes. This 
was salient in the negative impact that the victoriouƐƚŽŶĞŽĨ^ŝŶŶ&ĠŝŶ ?ƐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŚĂĚŽŶ
the Unionist ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ support.   
In short, the study of how political inclusion shaped community support for the 
agreement in the two referendums demonstrated that having more political parties at the 
negotiations table favoured support for the settlement in the referendum. Nonetheless, the 
ƌĞƐƵůƚƐĂůƐŽƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐĐĂŶƐƚŝůůďĞĚŝǀŝƐŝǀĞǁŚĞŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
same outcome. The fact that political parties will likely have to run for election after the 
referendum reduces their incentive to cooperate with other parties ŝŶĂ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?For 
this reason, unified campaign platforms and umbrella campaigns, such as the one led in 
North Cyprus and the civil society-ůĞĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ in Northern Ireland, are desirable in 
peace settlement referendums. These campaigns are better suited to sell the agreement 
under a unified frame and help dilute the impact of winner-loser campaign messages on 
voters.   
Having a greater number of parties at the negotiations, with competing interests and 
differing views on a solution to the conflict, may represent a greater challenge to an 
agreement being reached. A negotiation process that includes a greater number of groups 
with claims to political power runs the risk of leading to further fragmentation within the 
parties at the table. The inclusion of armed groups alone is an enormous challenge to any 
peace process that requires clear rules for interaction and the promotion of their 
transformation into non-violent actors (DudoƵĞƚ  ? ? ? ? ? WůĂŶƚĂ ĂŶĚ ƵĚŽƵĞƚ  ? ? ? ? ? K ?<ĂŶĞ
2015). However, the exclusion of political parties and/or groups that legitimately represent 
the interests of a community, or section of that community, can backfire when a referendum 
is used to ratify the agreement. This does not imply that all should be granted a sit at the 
negotiations table since meaningful consultation with mediators can also be an option. As 
this research has found that support for a peace settlement in referendum does not 
necessarily reflect public opinion on the text of the agreement, peace negotiations can be 
geared towards improving the relationships and public discourse of adversarial groups and 
political representatives. Less focus on the final agreement and a greater focus on the 
process can potentially facilitate negotiations between a larger number of parties and 
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Recent academic literature has increasingly been finding the manifold roles that civil 
society can play in helping divided societies recover from conflict. Including civil society 
groups in negotiations has been shown to ripen negotiations, increase grassroots support 
and political accountability and, consequently, bring about more durable agreements 
(Paffenholz, Kew, and Wanis-St. John 2006; Nilsson 2012; Aljets, Chacko, and Jessop 2008). 
The comparative study of the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations and 
referendums has contributed to this blossoming field by showing that an active civil society 
can play a crucial role in generating support for peace settlements in referendums. 
 The similarities in the degree of engagement with the negotiations between civil society 
in Northern Ireland and in the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as the absence of this 
dynamic in the Greek Cypriot community, were striking. In the Annan Plan case, while civil 
society in the Greek Cypriot community did not significantly mobilize or engage with the 
peace process, the opposite was the case in the Turkish Cypriot. The push to pressure 
Denktash to cooperate in the negotiations set in motion a movement that, together with 
pro-solution political parties, was able to influence its course. The letter written to the UN 
Secretary General expressing civil society ?Ɛ Ƶnified support for the success of the 
negotiations, plus the informal consultations that civil society leaders were able to have with 
UN mediators, were the ways through which Turkish Cypriot civil society was able to 
influence the negotiations. The same civil society groups and political parties who organized 
in support of the Annan Plan negotiations then translated, during the referendum, into a 
well-ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚĂŶĚƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞĚ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?/ŶƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ
hand, the ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĂŶĚĨĞǁĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŐƌŽƵƉƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?
campaign were waned by the stronger and highly politically backed  ‘ŶŽ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? 
Although the forms of inclusion in the negotiations were different, a similar dynamic to 
that observed in the Turkish Cypriot community took place in the GFA negotiations and 
referendum. Unlike the communities in Cyprus, the communities in Northern Ireland had to 
live together, and it was in the effort to reconcile the communities that civil society emerges 
as a crucial actor in the peace process. As was the case in Cyprus, there was no intent on the 
part of the mediators or political leaderships to include civil society in the negotiations. 
Rather, it was civil society itself that made the effort to be included. In the GFA negotiations, 
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ƚŚŝƐ ƚŽŽŬ ƉůĂĐĞ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů
consultations with delegates from the several political parties participating in the 
negotiations. Members of these civil society grŽƵƉƐ ƚŚĞŶ ǁĞŶƚ ŽŶ ƚŽ ĨŽƌŵ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?
campaign. The campaign had been originally intended to unify the campaigns of all the 
political parties who endorsed the agreement, but the majority of the parties refused the 
ŝŶǀŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?EŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝgn was able to deliver a more unified message to 
both communities and help raise the Unionist vote in particular. In Cyprus, there was some 
ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĞŬǇƉƌŝŽƚ ĂŶĚ dƵƌŬŝƐŚ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ
communities, but it was very small and came too late (Erel 2014). 
In Northern Ireland and in the Turkish Cypriot community, the existence of an engaged 
civil society ǁĂƐĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂƐƐĞƚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌ ŶĚƵŵƐ ?dŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?
contacts, organizations, and platforms created and marshalled during the negotiations 
mobilized and served, thereafter, to support the activities of the campaigns during the 
referendums. The insipient and disengaged civil society in the Greek Cypriot community, on 
the other hand, engaged in the referendum in a poorly organized fashion that was no match 
ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƌĂŵƉĂŶƚ  ‘ŶŽ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?What emerged from the comparison, therefore, is that 
including (in its broadest sense) civil society groups in peace negotiations favours support for 
peace settlements in referendums.    
  
The Referendum Results did not Necessarily Reflect Opinion on the Peace Settlements 
 
The initial intent of this research was to compare which aspects of the Annan Plan and 
the Good Friday Agreement might have shaped support from each of the communities in the 
two cases. Surprisingly, it emerged that, although voters in both referendums were asked if 
they would accept the implementation of these agreements, it could not be established that 
the texts of the agreements themselves were a significant source of information to voters. 
Rather, it was how these texts were presented or framed by political leaders and others 
during the campaigns that appear to have played a more significant role in shaping support 
in the referendum. Still, others have argued and/or found that the Nationalist and Turkish 
Cypriot communities were more knowledgeable of the agreements than their counterparts 
(Hayes and McAllister 2001; Bryant 2004). This suggested that information about the 
agreement is, nonetheless, important for support.  
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Within the Greek Cypriot community, the text of the agreement did not necessarily 
determine either the positioning of all the political parties in the referendum, nor support 
from the community in the referendum. Whereas the agreement might have not satisfied 
WĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? Žƌ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĞŬ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ ĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝƚcannot be assumed that it 
ǁŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ƋƵĂůůǇ ? <> ?Ɛ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽ ? ǀŽƚĞ Žƌ
/^z ?Ɛsplit support were not essentially due to dissatisfaction with the agreement. While 
WĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ ǁĂƐ ŚĂŶĚĞĚ ĂŶ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ that the Greek Cypriot 
community ƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚ  ‘ďƵǇ ?, the interviews conducted in Cyprus suggested that the Greek 
Cypriot delegation did not negotiate with the intention to reach an agreement that they 
ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ  ‘ƐĞůů ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞir community (Hadjidemetriou 2014; Papapetrou 2014; Talat 
2014). Papadopoulos was, however, effectivĞŝŶ ‘ƐĞůůŝŶŐ ?the idea that he had been handed a 
bad deal.  
One explanatorǇ ĨĂĐƚŽƌ ƚŽ ǁŚǇ WĂƉĂĚŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ 'ƌĞĞŬ ǇƉƌŝŽƚ
voters, it was found, resided in a larger and older problem of the negotiations. A lack of 
communication to the public on the compromises needed to reach an agreement had 
created false expectations among the community regarding what a compromise agreement 
could consist of. On the other hand, it left the community, at large, with only the one month 
referendum campaign period to learn about and digest the agreement, while the  ‘ŶŽ ?
campaign gained momentum. This was not the case in the Turkish Cypriot community. The 
ƉƌŽƚĞƐƚŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƵŶĐŚĂŝŶĞĚďǇĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ ?ƐƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚŚŝƌĚǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶŶĂŶWůĂŶ
at the Hague led to a more engaged and informed community. Public and media discussion 
of the implications of the Annan Plan began to take place as far back as 2002, when the third 
version of the Plan was released. In fact, as was mentioned in the case study chapter, some 
of the interviewees who were part of the campaign referred to it as being inseparable from 
the antecedent campaign to support the negotiations ? ŝŶ ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁŽƌĚƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ (Talat 2014; Akinci 
2014; Elcil 2014). 
While the Annan Plan was a comprehensive agreement that aimed at not leaving issues to 
be negotiated after the referendum, that was not the case in the Good Friday Agreement. 
tŚŝůĞƚŚĞ  ‘ŐĂƉƐ ? ŝŶƚŚĞŶŶĂŶWůĂŶǁĞƌĞĨŝůůĞĚďǇƚŚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
divisive issues were left to be decided by independent commissions after the referendum in 
the Good Friday Agreement. Importantly, by providing for the possibility of Northern Ireland 
161 
 
uniting with Ireland, if that wish is expressed by majority of its citizens in a referendum, it 
allowed Unionist political leaders to claim the agreement kept Northern Ireland in the UK 
and republicans to claim it was a step towards Irish unity. Ambiguity regarding the 
decommissioning issue also allowed Ulster Unionists to claim decommissioning would take 
place immediately after the referendum, while allowing Sinn Féin to claim otherwise. As 
other authors have stated, constructive ambiguity was fundamental in getting to an 
agreement on Good Friday (Dixon 2013; Tonge and Evans 2002). It was furthermore crucial 
in getting all those same political parties to support it during the referendum.  
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝĨƚŚĞĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌ ?ƐĞŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚ ?
it also allowed them to campaign under antagonistic interpretations of the agreement. The 
political ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƐĞůůŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŐreement to their own community allowed for the co-
existence of antithetical campaign messages during the campaign period. This fuelled, in 
turn, winner-loser perceptions of the agreement that had a particularly negative impact on 
the more divided Unionist community. Furthermore, even though the agreement was sent 
to all those residing in Northern Ireland, its ambiguities suggest that the content of the 
agreement itself was not a major source of information, nor itself alone sŚĂƉĞĚ ǀŽƚĞƌ ?Ɛ
decisions.    
The findings reached in comparing the two cases were not straightforward in this aspect. 
They are, in fact, quite complex and open to different interpretations, and could benefit 
from more detailed research. Regardless, by examining if and how the respective agreement 
designs shaped the referendum results, it brought to attention to the fact that the result of 
ƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽƌƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶ
of the content of the agreement itself. Because it accommodates political interests, the 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŝƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƚŽŚĂǀŝŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ
in the referendum. For this reason alone, it has a strong influence on the referendum 
outcome, since polŝƚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ ĂŶĚ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŝƐ ǁŚĂƚ ƚĞŶĚƐ ƚŽ
shape voterƐ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ ?zĞƚ ? ŝƚ is also a function of how well educated voters are 
about the agreement and its, likely uncertain, implications. Precisely because the 
implementation of an agreement is bound to be an arduous process with an unpredictable 
outcome, whether trust has developed in the political and communal relations is likely to 
ƉůĂǇĂƌŽůĞŝŶǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ĨƚĞƌĂůů ?ƚŚĞǁŝůůƚŽŵĂŬĞĂĚĞĂůĂůƐŽĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶƚŚe belief 
one has that the other side will keep its end of the bargain.  
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What is interesting and surprising about these findings is that they suggest that, although 
the question asked in both referendums was whether voters accepted or rejected the peace 
setƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞƐ ŐŝǀĞŶďǇǀŽƚĞƌƐ ǁĞƌĞŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĂƚ
same question. The recent peace settlement referendum experience in Colombia, in October 
2016, is another example of this in the sense that the question in the referendum asked 
voters whether they supported the agreement and the ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ  ‘a stable and lasting 
peace' ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĞĐĂŶŶŽƚŝ ƚĞƌƉƌĞƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞŽĨ
Colombia, who have been through decades of conflict, do not want peace. In much the same 
way, we cannot reduce the result of a referendum to a clear answer to the question it posed.  
Written agreements undeniably influence a referendum vote, if only because they deeply 
shape political support, the referendum campaigns, and the issues that are part of it. Yet, 
this points to another important finding of this research: information about the negotiation 
process is more important to propelling support for an agreement in a referendum than 
information about the agreement. Informing and educating the public about the terms of a 
peace agreement naturally occurs only after the agreement is reached and is, of course, 
bound to occur only during the campaign period. The campaign period, then, might be too 
short to allow the voters to come to grips with agreements that are complex and whose 
implications are difficult, if not impossible, to grasp. This thus leaves voters to try to grasp 
ƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂ ‘ǇĞƐ ?Žƌ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞĂŵŝĚƐƚsometimes aggressive campaign messages. As 
was discussed in the last chapter, extending campaign periods may not actually serve to 
generate more informed and educated voters, as well as they may allow the momentum 
created by the agreement being reached to be diluted. It also does not mean that 
negotiations should be completely open processes. These findings do, however, lend more 
support to the thesis that, as observed in the Turkish Cypriot and Northern Ireland cases, 
communication between political leaderships, civil society groups and the public during the 
negotiation process is important to getting peace settlements supported in referendums.  
 
 
The Importance of Process: Contribution and Limits of the Study 
 
This research has provided the first comparative in-depth study of peace referendums. It 
has contributed to research and literature on peace negotiation by introducing peace 
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settlement referendums as a negotiation outcome. It has, simultaneously, contributed to 
research and literature on peace process referendums by showing how negotiation process 
conditions impact referendum experiences and outcomes. It further provided a research 
design through which this relationship can be studied and further demonstrated that, 
although referendums happen outside the negotiation process, they are not independent 
from what happens behind their closed doors. The research design created and applied in 
this research can be used to investigate other cases of peace negotiations with referendums 
and to increase our understanding of how referendums can best serve peace negotiations. 
Importantly, by using the same design, or improving it, findings that are comparable across 
the cases can be generated, which is largely lacking in the literature on peace process 
referendums.    
The study of the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement referendum results as 
negotiation outcomes allowed this research to break away with traditional analyses of peace 
negotiations, ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂǀĞ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞůŝƚĞƐ ? ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐĂŶĚ
the outcome of negotiations as something that is only produced by them. This had led 
authors to often equate the behaviours, preferences, etc. of political leaderships to those of 
the groups or communities thaƚ ƚŚĞǇ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? ƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ‘'ƌĞĞŬ ǇƉƌŝŽƚƐ ? ?  ‘dƵƌŬŝƐŚ
ǇƉƌŝŽƚƐ ? ?  ‘Unionists ? ? Žƌ  ‘EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƐ ?, without discriminating whether it refers to the 
communities or to their political representatives, or both. What is problematic here is that 
there is no questioning of whether these leaderships are actually representing the group or 
cŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ‘accƵƌĂƚĞůǇ ? ?dŚĞŽƵƐƚŝŶŐŽĨĞŶŬƚĂƐŚ, after he refused to actively negotiate the 
Annan Plan when the community at large supported it illustrates this. By analysing the 
negotiation ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ ?ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚpublic support 
for an agreement in a referendum are two different negotiation outcomes, this thesis 
separated the public, or the communities, from the political leaders. Taking the referendum 
results across the communities as the outcome of interest it, therefore, allowed for the 
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚŽƌŚŝŶĚĞƌĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂĐĐeptance of the 
agreement, and ŶŽƚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?as has been traditionally done. 
Although the literature on peacebuilding and peacemaking has been increasingly pointing 
to the need for instruments to address the ůŽĐĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ, literature and 
research on high-level mediation continues to resist this tendency. As a result, mediation 
research and literature have ignored that referendum results are a dimension of mediation 
164 
 
success and, therefore, mediators should care about how the negotiation process might 
influence public perceptions of the agreement. Despite high-level mediation still being 
practiced in the mainstream international traditions, changes have begun to occur with, for 
example, the growing involvement of civil society in negotiations. Civil society groups, this 
research has shown, are important peace process referendum campaigners and therefore, 
the degree to which they are involved with the negotiation process has important 
repercussions for the referendum outcome.  
One important take away from this study is that a positive result, ŽƌĂ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?ƉĞĂĐĞ
settlement referendum, should not only be understood as an overall percentage result, but 
that differences in support between the communities are also important. These differences 
reflect, and fuel, winner-loser perceptions of the agreement that can make for more 
polarizing referendum experiences. To avoid this polarization, it is important that political 
leaders change adversarial and zero-sum discourses during the course of the negotiations. 
The major barrier to this, however, is that political leaders are often reticent to reveal to the 
public the concessions made at the negotiations table for fear that it may threaten their 
political survival. While secret negotiations protect political leaders, they allow them to 
maintain a public adversarial image ƚŚĂƚŚĂŵƉĞƌƐƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨǀŝĞǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ
agreement as a compromise, rather than a winner-loser outcome. It can both be positive in 
terms of support for the agreement and societal reconciliation if the message in the 
campaigns is that the solution found is the best possible solution in which each side gains 
and losses. It is important therefore, that the negotiation process is successful in reconciling 
elites and grassroots as far as possible, so that the referendum does not re-ignite the 
conflict.  
After demonstrating the way in which the negotiation processes affected the 
referendums in both cases, this study made the case that a peace settlement referendum 
requires that a certain type of negotiations take place. This is at odds with the traditional 
secretive and exclusionist or elitist way in which peace negotiations are typically conducted. 
To make this case, it was important to address existing arguments in the literature that 
peace settlement referendums, or referendums in general, should not be used in peace 
processes in the first place. The findings here suggest that a way through which a 
referendum result can be constructed, is through negotiations that are more open, 
politically representative, and engaged with civil society. Therefore, it might not be that 
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referendums are unsuitable to conflict contexts, but that they are rather not suitable to all 
kinds of peacemaking processes. 
In sum, the comparison of the Annan Plan and GFA cases suggest that more open and 
inclusive peace negotiations can potentially help depolarize relationships between political 
leaderships, and help mobilize civil society and the wider communities in support for the 
peace settlement, which can aid the reconciliation process. Therefore, referendums in peace 
processes are better understood and have a greater chance of succeeding if they are 
understood as a point in a process, to be more precise, as a very crucial point in the 
reconciliation and transformational process that the transition from conflict to peace entails. 
The findings support an existing push in peace and conflict studies literature for more 
inclusive negotiation processes and suggest that mediators can lead a negotiation process 
that is more conducive to successful ratification processes by limiting secrecy, including 
political parties, and creating opportunities for civil society participation and contact with 
the wider public. It is by generating negotiations that are more open and both politically and 
civilly inclusive, that peace processes can enjoy positive referendum experiences and avoid 
further polarizing conflict communities.  
 
Limits of the Study and Avenues for Further Research 
 
The findings of this study present some limitations. To begin with, there are limitations in 
terms of the generalizability of the findings, since the Annan Plan and Good Friday 
Agreement negotiations and referendums both took place in societies with democratic 
regimes  W although their democratic credentials could be argued. This limitation was 
inherent to the case study selection process, but whether the same results would hold in 
conflict settings with other types of regimes could be the focus of future research (or even 
whether referendums are considered in these peace processes at all).  
An aspect that this research only had a glimpse at, relates to the impact of the type of 
issues at play in the referendum and the campaigns. Security issues have been pointed out 
as problematic to support for peace settlements in referendums (Lee and Mac Ginty 2012), 
and indeed they were salient in both the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement 
experiences. As was described in this thesis, the continued presence of Turkish troops post-
referendum on the island was a significant security issue that was debated during the 
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referendum campaign period in the Greek Cypriot community, as was the decommissioning 
of the paramilitaries in the GFA referendum. However, to understand comparatively how 
specific issues shaped voting behaviours is an analysis that deserves future work. For 
example, it could be explored how the security versus economic benefits, or human rights 
issues, played out in voter decision-making. Another aspect that received limited attention 
was whether or not the question asked had an impact on the referendum results. While the 
ƚǁŽĐĂƐĞƐĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚŚĞƌĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ǇĞƐ ?Žƌ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀ ƚĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĐůĞĂƌůǇƐŝŐŶŝĨǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
for the text of an agreement, the reasons for this can be manifold, from lack of voter 
information to simply votes for peace or change. In other words, we could benefit from 
learning more about the motivations behind voting in peace process referendums. 
In attempting to bridge a gap, this research has highlighted yet further gaps in our 
knowledge of how peace negotiations affect referendums. A considerable amount of 
research remains to be done on peace process referendums and especially in analysing them 
as an extension of the political process that peace negotiations are. Future research could 
make use of surveys conducted on the day of the referendum to ascertain how perceptions 
of mediation/negotiation processes influenced voting behaviours more directly. A 
foreseeable second peace settlement referendum in Cyprus could provide an ideal 
opportunity. As noted earlier in this thesis, further research could be done regarding the 
involvement of kin states in the negotiations and the impact of such involvement on public 
opinion. Another area where more research, or more nuanced research, is still needed is on 
whether the content of a peace agreement directly influences voters in peace settlement 
referendums. As was argued in this thesis, studies based on public opinion polling can 
ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ĨƌŽŵ ĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ǁŚĂƚ ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ? ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ ? ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ďĞƚƚĞƌ
understand who, what, when and under what circumstances they are informed and 
influenced.  
Nonetheless, because this research was concerned for how process conditions affected 
the referendum results, it remains to be more profoundly studied if and how they are 
affected by contextual conditions. One particularly important aspect to study that this 
research suggested, and one which could further test the results of this research, would be 




Additionally, since this study was based on research and literature from European 
integration referendums, it potentially can, in turn, inform that literature. European treaties, 
bailout agreements, and other deals have been traditionally negotiated by European political 
elites behind closed doors. Examination on the level of secrecy/openness, political 
inclusion/exclusion, and engagement with civil society actors in different European 
institutions, and its impact on referendum outcomes could offer insights on whether 
transparent EU institutions could foster greater support for European integration.  
Lastly, this research has only had a glimƉƐĞ Ăƚ ŚŽǁ ũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŽǀĞƌĂůůmedia 
behaviours during the referendum campaign periods shape the outcome of the referendum. 
The media plays a crucial role in informing the communities and in shaping public opinion, 
from the start of negotiations to the day of the referendum. In conflict settings, they can 
become important allies of the peace process, as they were described to have been in by 
interviewees in the Turkish Cypriot community and in Northern Ireland. In fact, some of the 
journalists interviewed explained that, as citizens of their community, they felt they had the 
responsibility to support the peace process (Graham 2014; Özuslu 2014). Regardless, as 
described, the media appears in both referendums as an interested actor and, in both 
referendums, the media is considered to have played an important role in shaping public 
opinion. At the same time, they were seen as biased in both Cyprus and Northern Ireland. 
The media did not act as a neutral actor, merely aiming to inform the public and reporting 
ƚŚĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ? ŝŶEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ ĞůĂŶĚĂŶĚEŽƌƚŚǇƉƌƵƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
 ‘ŶŽ ?ŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚǇƉƌƵƐ ?/ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƚŽďĞĚŽŶĞƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞŵedia 
in peace process referendums. 
 
 
Final Thoughts and Future Prospects 
 
This research has been among the first to provide a comparative in-depth study of peace 
referendums. It created a novel research design that allowed it to focus on how the 
negotiation processes shaped the referendum campaign periods and the referendum 
outcomes in the two selected cases. While studies of peace negotiations had not yet looked 
into how they might shape referendum experiences and outcomes, studies on peace 
referendums had not yet analysed in-depth how referendums were shaped by negotiation 
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process conditions. The gap in academic research defied the reality that peace negotiations 
and peace process referendums are inseparable phenomena. After all, referendums ask 
voters about specific aspects of the negotiations, as is the case of whether they accept a 
resulting peace settlement. In doing so, it put forward a novel argument that when 
referendums are held to ratify a peace settlement, the process of their negotiation and 
mediation needs to be adapted from the start. As a tool of democratic politics, peace 
settlement referendums need to be preceded by inclusive negotiations that involve a broad 
spectrum of political stakeholders and civil society, and engage the public at earlier stages of 
the process.    
The Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement referendum results can now be more clearly 
understood as an outcome of the political peace negotiations that preceded them. Indeed, 
their opposing results had very significant and opposing impacts on the Cyprus and Northern 
Ireland peace processes. The Annan Plan referendum result meant that a historical 
opportunity for re-unification was lost and for the past 13 years the Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot leaderships have not been able to come as close to an agreement again. In 
the south, the economic upheaval and stability brought by EU accession further disengaged 
the Greek Cypriot community from the negotiation process, while the Turkish Cypriot 
community grew sceptical that the peace process would deliver its promises. The victory of 
ƚŚĞ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ŝŶEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ?ǁĂƐĂƚƌĞŵĞŶĚŽƵƐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ
peace process that came to mark a crucial period in the transition to peace. Still, as was 
discussed earlier in this thesis, the momentum brought by the agreement and the greater 
mobilization of people during the referendum offered a momentum for reconciliation that 
was not ideally harnessed. Win-lose perceptions of the agreement that had their roots in the 
negotiations and the campaign period were further intensified by difficulties in the 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? Ɛ Ă ƌĞƐƵůƚ ? ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ŚĂǀĞ ƌŵĂŝŶĞĚ ƉŽůĂƌŝǌĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ
between the two communities have persisted. 
In Cyprus, the profound impact that the euro currency crisis in the Republic of ǇƉƌƵƐ ?
economy in 2013 and the election of two pro-solution leaders in both communities, 
however, has provided for a renewed momentum that had not existed since the Annan Plan 
negotiations. The current President of the Republic, Nicos Anastasiades, and the Turkish 
Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci both supported the Annan Plan and have just recently began 
to negotiate some of the thorniest issues of the Cyprus problem, raising hopes that a 
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referendum will take place in 2017. Changes that have taken place since 2004 provide cause 
for a moderate optimism to the prospect of another referendum. In particular, civil society is 
more mobilized in support for a solution in the Greek Cypriot community than it was during 
the Annan Plan. One symbolic example of this is the unprecedented joint support that the 
religious leaders of the two communities have been publicly offering to the negotiation 
process (Andreou 2016). It is, however, unlikely that the physical separation will end before 
another referendum takes place. Nonetheless, cooperation between the  ‘ǇĞƐ ? campaigns on 
each side is still possible and should take place. Civil society groups in each community could 
play a crucial role in delivering reconciliatory messages to the communities on both sides, 
but cooperation needs to take place much earlier and to an entirely different extent than 
was the case in 2004.   
2016 was, in fact, a year marked by dramatic and surprising referendums. The close 
results of the  ‘ƌĞǆŝƚ ?ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵm gave a slight majority of votes in favour of the UK ?Ɛ exit of 
the European Union and, later in the year, a peace settlement was rejected in Colombia. In 
fact, the referendum in Colombia shows similar dynamics to those found in the Annan Plan 
negotiations and referendum. Similarly to the Annan Plan negotiations, the peace 
negotiations took place between the leaders of the two sides, the President Santos and FARC 
leader Rodrigo Londoño. It thereby excluded other parties, leaving Álvaro hƌŝďĞ ?Ɛ
Democratic Centre Party with an incentive to spoil the referendum for political gain (Tellez 
and Beardsley 2016). Similarly to the Annan Plan case as well, the negotiations were held, 
not in Colombia, but in Cuba, leaving the forces opposing the peace process at home while 
the peace settlement was being negotiated abroad (Medina and Loizides 2016). Similarly to 
what has been described in the Greek Cypriot case, this has been argued to have disengaged 
the Colombian public at large and partly explain the very low 37 per cent turnout in the 
referendum (Newman 2016). Although there was a greater concern for transparency than 
was the case in Northern Ireland (Oliver 2016), the process still failed to effectively mobilize 
support in the referendum. The public consultations process that took place during the 
negotiations, Paffenholz (2015) alerted, had not been geared towards gaining public 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇƚŽǁŚĂƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘,ĂĂƐƐƚĂůŬƐ ?ŝŶEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ? which 
ended with no agreement in 2014, the consultations only aimed at getting civil society and 
public input to the negotiations. There was no mechanism in place for output to be returned 
back to the public, or any obligation for the leaders to actually consider the inputs in the first 
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place. Unlike in Northern Ireland and the Turkish Cypriot community, there was insufficient 
mobilization among civil society in support for the peace process during the negotiations, 
which also broadly lacked effective ways of informing and engaging the public (Paffenholz 
2015). Therefore, although a successful Good Friday Agreement-like result was expected in 
Colombia (Murphy and Cobb 2016), the negotiations more closely resembled the failed 
Annan Plan referendum in the Greek Cypriot community. 
The Colombian case further exemplifies how relevant research on peace settlement 
referendums still is, and will likely increasingly be. We are only recently beginning to 
understand how the phenomenon of peace negotiations can more positively shape the 
societies and communities within which they take place. Studying the referendum results of 
these two cases as the outcome of the negotiations offered a glimpse into how negotiations 
have an impact on those communities and societies. Having a deeper knowledge of how the 
negotiations of these two agreements shaped these two disparate referendum results has 
shown that support for a peace agreement cannot be gained overnight. It hopes to bring 
about greater consciousness for the more profound role that negotiations can have in 
reconciling divided societies. Just as these communities are affected by the events of the 
conflict, they are also affected by the unfolding events within the peace process and are not 
immune to what takes place at the negotiations table.  
The findings of this research have provided a rich basis for further investigation and other 
directions of inquiry. Its research design, in particular, can hopefully be applied and further 
developed to compare more cases. As peace process referendums - and peace settlement 
referendums in particular - are consistently held around the world, this field of research is 
growing in importance. Additionally, as the occurrence of peace settlement referendums 
increases, the greater the number of cases that can be compared and the greater knowledge 
we can build on how peace negotiations can positively make use of them. Referendums can 
be opportunities for an aggravation of divisions or a collaborative step towards a common 
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Interview Script: Politicians 
 
 Background/personal history: Can you describe your political activity during the 
Annan Plan/GFA negotiations? How would you describe the Annan Plan/GFA 
negotiations? Were you involved in the yes/no campaign? 
 
 On the negotiation process: What were the more important negotiation issues to 
your delegation and why? What is your opinion of the mediator ?Ɛ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?
What did he, or his team, do that was helpful/unhelpful to you during the 
negotiations and the campaign? How do you regard the governments ?/ Greece and 
dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ involvement in the process? Was secrecy important? Why? Did you engage 
with your community during the negotiations? How?  
If not negotiator: Do you consider yourself to have been well informed about 
the negotiation process? How were you informed? Did you/your party at any 
time try to reach out to the mediation team or influence the negotiations in 
any way? 
 
 On the referendum campaign: Did you participate in a referendum campaign? Why? 
How did you and your party campaign? Did you expect the referendum results to be 
what they came to be? Did your expectation impact your attitude/actions? What do 
ǇŽƵƚŚŝŶŬŚĂĚĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶǇŽƵƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƐƵƉŽƌƚ? Did the timing of the 
referendum influence your campaign? Were your constituents informed about the 





Annex 4  
Interview Script: Civil Society Actors/Campaigners 
 
 Background/personal history: What was the movement/organisation you were/are 
involved in? Why was it formed? Why did you take part in it? Was it/you involved in 
the yes/no campaign?  
 
 On the negotiation process: How would you describe the Annan Plan/GFA 
negotiation process? What in the negotiation process was helpful/unhelpful to your 
campaign? Do you consider yourself to have been well informed about the 
negotiation process? How/ where did you find information? Did you/your 
movement/organization have contact with the mediation team or attempted to 
influence the negotiations in any way? Did you attempt to influence the political 
ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?positions at the negotiations table ?tŚĞŶĂŶĚŚŽǁ ? ? 
 
 On the referendum: Did you participate in a referendum campaign? Why? How did 
you campaign? What do you think influenced the referendum results in your 
community and in the other community? Were the people informed about the 
agreement and its potential implications? Did the timing and the way the referendum 
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